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Abstract 
This study examines the peculiarities of executive-legislative relations in selected states of Ekiti, 
Ondo, Osun and Oyo, South-West Nigeria, in the Fourth Republic. The study interrogates the 
incessant antagonism and confrontation between the executive and legislative arms of 
government in the selected states within the ambit of the socio-cultural milieu and institutional 
contexts peculiar to them. It also examined the implications of the constant acrimonious 
executive-legislative relation on democratic stability of the states and political stability of 
Nigeria. Through empirical fieldwork research through interviews, coupled with primary and 
secondary data from archival materials, public documents and extant literature, the study 
reviewed and reaffirmed the primacy of the legislature in the Nigeria’s presidential system. With 
the use of descriptive method and content analysis, the study established the peculiarities of the 
elites’ behaviour toward the exercise of power in relation to the crisis of confidence that usually 
engendered constant frictions in the executive-legislative relations in the selected states. The 
study discovered that the particularistic nature of the political elites in the states and the varying 
roles and degrees of interventions by political parties, determined the intensity of the executive-
legislative feuds. The study revealed the implications of the acrimonious executive-legislative 
relations on democratic stability of the selected states, and, by extension, Nigeria. The study 
concluded that eliminating friction between the executive and the legislature is somewhat 
difficult, if not completely impossible, given the realities of power separation and checks 
mechanisms built into the nation’s constitution. The study found that determined commitment of 
the political elites across the executive-legislative divide would be necessary to stem the tide of 
political instability arising from the tension generated by the conflict between the two arms of 
government. For democratic stability to be sustained, the arms of government should operate 
within the limit of their constitutional powers while the judiciary is strengthened and insulated 
from the vagaries of politics. An activist judiciary is needed for judicious interpretation of the 
rules and principles that guide the operation of presidential system in Nigeria. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
1.1 Background information 
Modern democracies operate on the basis of shared decision-making powers, among the three 
principal branches of the government: the executive, legislative and the judiciary. Generally, the 
drafters of the constitution usual make statutory provisions to formalize the structures of these 
interactions. However, in practice, precedents and habits often fill in the gaps to create the 
political context for the daily routine operations of the government.1 In other words, the 
constitution defines the interface between the executive and the legislature in the conduct of 
governmental affairs. Nevertheless, the nature and the context of power sharing determine the 
relative influence, that each of the branches of government has, over public policy (Lijphart, 
1991; Aminu, 2006). 
There are studies on executive-legislative relationships in democratic settings. This is 
predominant in presidential systems, given the independent nature of the two branches of 
government (Obiyan, 2013). Presidentialism operates on the principles and application of the 
doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances (Nweke, 2013). Heyhood (1997, 
p.297) has noted that separating the power of the legislature from the power of the executive, 
was ‘the principal virtue of presidential system’ because they created internal tensions that 
helped to protect individual rights and liberties. In other words, to advance the cause of good and 
accountable governance, and safeguard the collective interests of the people, the drafters of 
presidential constitutions usually allocate substantial oversight powers to the legislature, which 
place it at a vantage position to serve as a check on the exercise of executive power (Hochstetler, 
2011; Oleszek, 2014).  
The major concern of the founding fathers of the American presidential constitution was the need 
for an appropriate strategy that could dissuade any disproportionate distribution of powers 
(Shugart and Carey, 1992; Shugart and Haggard, 2001). James Madison, a foremost proponent of 
                                                          
1
 Under the 1999 constitution of Nigeria, section 5(1a-b) vested the executive powers of the Federation on the 
President while section 4(1-5) stipulates the powers of the National Assembly, i.e. the central legislature. In the 
same vein, section 5(2a-b) specifies the powers of a state governor while section 4(6-7) specifies the powers given to 
the house of assembly of a state i.e., the state legislature. 
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the American presidential constitution, had argued in the Federalist Paper Number 47 that ‘an 
essential precaution in favour of liberty can be found in the extant principles of separation of 
power’ (cf. Fagbadebo and Francis, 2016, p.3). He averred that given the nature of men in 
relation to the exercise of governmental power, the only precautionary strategy in the defence of 
liberty was a clear and distinctive separation of the three principal powers of government. 
According to him, this would insulate the exercise of governmental power from abuse. ‘The 
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, judiciary, in the same  hands, whether of 
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may just be pronounced 
the very definition of tyranny’ (Federalist Papers Number 47).            
Madison’s standpoint reaffirmed the classical position of Baron de Montesquieu, the progenitor 
of the principle of separation of powers. Presidentialism espouses the fragmentation of power by 
the various branches of government. The underlying principle of presidentialism revolves around 
the exercise of power (Mainwaring, 1993; Mainwaring and Shugart, 1997; Shugart and Haggard, 
2001). In other words, power is central to the operation of presidentialism as a governing system. 
The differing perspectives of scholars on the capability of presidential principles to engender 
stability in democratic regimes revolved around fragmentation of powers among the arms of 
government (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Mainwaring, 1993; Perez-Linan, 2007; Gerring et al, 
2009; Linz, 2010). 
Most debates on the principles of presidentialism often centre on the appropriate strategy to 
ensure a modicum of synergy among the different structures of the state exercising governmental 
powers (Parson et al, 1997; Ahrens, 2001; Oleszek, 2014). For instance, the position of Juan Linz 
(1993; 2010) on the perils of presidentialism emanates from the possibility that the exercise and 
control of power by the executive and legislative branches of government have the proclivity 
towards gridlocks and immobilism in governance process. To him, the presidential principles 
lacked the institutional mechanism for resolving conflicts between the executive and legislative 
branches of government in the face of serious disagreement.   
Linz associates this prospect of ‘gridlock and immobilism’ with the problem of dual legitimacy, 
personalised executive power and rigidity of fixed term characteristic of presidential system 
(Fagbadebo and Francis, 2016). He avers that the independent sources of power of the two 
powerful institutions of government necessiate their separate struggles for electoral legitimacy 
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and this propels conflicts in the legislative process. The fixed terms of office for the president 
could also generate anxiety in the executive branch because of the limited time and opportunity 
to articulate its policies and programmes (Parson et al, 1997). 
In view of what Linz (2010) referred to as the institutional inadequacies of presidential system, 
he recommends the parliamentary system as a more profound alternative to achieving good 
governance and regime stability because of its operational mechanism. This, according to him, 
dwells principally on the fusion of powers and unity of purpose between the executive and 
legislative branches of government. The overriding institutional ethos of parliamentarism, found 
in the principle of collective responsibility and fusion of power, ties political strength of the two 
organs of government; and therefore, promotes unity, regime stability and good governance 
(Linz 2010). 
Gerring et al (2009) attribute the failure of the presidential system to its institutionalised 
fragmentation of powers among the various arms of government. According to them, the extent 
to which the executive and legislative branches of government ‘continue to depend on separate 
and independent sources for electoral power, the prospects for harmony in the power relation 
between the two is seriously abridged’ (Gerring et al, 2009, p.335). 
However, in defence of presidential system, many scholars have downplayed the sprawling 
power of the heads of the executive branch as an invitation for arbitrariness (Aleman and 
Schwartz, 2006; Perez-Linan, 2007; Oleszek, 2014). They argue that the possession of such 
powers did not translate into arbitrary application, against the collective interests of the 
governed. According to them, the involvement of the legislature in the policy process limits the 
exercise of executive power and safeguards the interests and aspirations of the citizenry 
(Oleszek, 2014; Palanza and Sin, 2014).            
Many believe that the overriding import of the presidential constitution is that the policy-making 
process is not an exclusive preserve of the executive branch (Lindsay and Ripley, 1994; 
Hochstetler, 2011). Presidentialism promotes institutional structure that recognises multiple 
centres of powers, operating interdependently, in a system of cooperation and collaboration. 
Nevertheless, precedent and the available period of democratic practice determined the 
institutional balance and the relative influence of the executive and legislative branches of 
government on public policy, especially in developing presidential democracies. Poteete (2010) 
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has argued that the institutional structure of most democracies, presidential or parliamentary, in 
the African continent favoured executive dominance. Most African democracies are emerging 
from long years of military or monarchical rules, devoid of any accountable government. 
The unifying platform, under which the differing perspectives of scholars on presidentialism 
coalesce, is that the nature of power relation between the executive and legislative branches 
determined the outcome of governance in presidential democracies. Thus, the competing 
influence of the two organs of government, over public policy, ensures a balanced legislative 
process devoid of executive absolutism. As Oleszek (2014, p.382) has noted, one of the essential 
instruments in this regard is the oversight power of the legislature, the continuous ‘watchfulness 
of executive actions and activities’. He conceives legislative oversight as the continuous review 
of executive actions in line with the legislative intents, which entails but not limited to 
investigating the execution of statutes, supervising administration and implementation of public 
policies. Thus, the intensity and effectiveness of the oversight role of the legislature often 
determine the pattern of executive-legislative relationships in presidential system (Aleman and 
Schwartz, 2006). 
Another defining mechanism in power relation between the executive and the legislature, in a 
presidential system, is the concept of veto power (Palanza and Sin, 2014). Veto simply connotes 
a constitutional advantage granted the executive branch to negotiate its preferences on legislative 
outcomes, especially on laws passed by the legislature. In the Nigerian Constitution, the 
executive branch, either the president or governors at the states level, has the constitutional 
mandate to assent to bills passed by the legislature. Hence, in a situation where the bills are not 
in tandem with the preferences of the executive branch, the president or governor has the right to 
return the bills to the legislature for amendment or outrightly withhold his assent. On the other 
hand, the legislature can override executive veto by invoking section 100(5) of the constitution, 
which empowers it to by-pass executive assent by passing the bills into laws through a two-third 
majority of its members.  
The fact that the president can use his power of veto to obstruct legislative outcomes and the 
reasonableness that the legislature can override presidential veto ensures a measure of 
moderation and mutual caution on both sides of the divide. In addition, this normally provides a 
synergy between the executive and the legislature in presidential system. As Fagbadebo and 
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Francis (2016, p.6) have argued, in a system of divided but shared power, ‘veto becomes an 
instrument of negotiating a consensus on the varying interests of the legislative and executive 
actors in the policy process’. 
Veto rids the legislative process of arbitrary tendencies and unhealthy competitions and rivalry, 
and thus becoming a hub of shrewd bargaining and consensus building on a variety of issues 
(Aleman and Schwartz, 2006; Palanza and Sin, 2014). Nonetheless, the use of veto power and 
the frequency of legislative override depend on the socio-cultural milieu and institutional 
contexts of different societies practicing presidentialism. The import of these variations in the 
outcomes of presidential regimes across nation-states has led to the renewed calls for the 
empirical evaluation of different contexts and institutional designs to determine the performance 
of presidential system.  
The institutional contexts of contemporary societies do harbour some socio-cultural differences, 
which are relevant to the consideration or assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
presidentialism as a governing system (Lijphart, 1991; Lipset, 1993; Mainwaring, 1993; Linz 
and Stephan, 1996). The variations in the historical antecedents of nation-states, occupy a central 
position in determining the performance of presidential regimes (Cheibub and Limongi, 2002; 
Olson, 2002; Aleman and Schwartz, 2006; Perez-Linan, 2007; Gerring et al, 2009; Poteete, 2010; 
Palanza and Sin, 2014; Fagbadebo, 2016).   These include the quality of leadership, behaviour of 
the political elites, especially the perception of the institutional actors on governance and its 
purpose, as well as the prevailing culture of the people and the power matrix in the larger 
society. 
Mattes and Mozaffar’s study on the legislatures and democratic developments in six key African 
countries- Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Uganda, provides insights into the 
workings of African legislatures. They submit that most African legislatures were beginning to 
develop institutional capacities that had positive impact on democratic development. This 
development, they argue, was not so much linked to the ‘extent of democratization, but to the 
presence of a small but critical mass of MPs who focused on strengthening the institutional 
capacities of their legislatures especially in countering executive dominance’ (Mattes and 
Mozaffar, 2016, p.6). However, the authors were quick to add that these insights, needed a 
‘wider comparative analysis and strong systemic testing’ for a more valid inference. 
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It is evident that increasing capacity of the legislature could not be described as a common 
phenomenon applicable to African states but largely depends on each nation’s socio-political 
context as well as character of the elites (Ekeh, 1975; Joseph, 1991; Osaghae, 2002). Poteete 
(2010) also gives credence to this viewpoint while reviewing the case of Botswana. He avers that 
at both national and sub-national levels in Botswana, executive-legislative relations tilted in 
favour of executive dominance with little or no challenge from the legislature. Recent studies 
have renewed calls for investigation of factors that accounted for divided government with due 
consideration of the dictates of the larger society (Perez-Linan, 2007; Omotola, 2008; 
Fagbadebo, 2016). 
In Nigeria, the establishment of representative legislatures at the federal, state, and local levels of 
government by the 1999 Constitution, after a prolonged military rule epitomized a fresh attempt 
at constitutionalism. Since constitutionalism requires differentiation of governmental functions, 
the drafters of the 1999 Constitution recognised the principle of separation of powers as one of 
the crucial features for ensuring the operation of presidential democracy in the country (Aguda, 
2000; Nwabueze, 2004; Oyewo, 2007).  
Nevertheless, conflicts, most especially, between the legislature and the executive, have 
chatacterised the operation of the constitution, at the federal and state levels. Since the 
commencement of the Fourth Republic in 1999, the battle line between the executive and the 
legislature both at the federal and state levels has been drawn over issues of appointment, 
appropriation and oversight function of the legislature (Dorgu, 2008; Bassey, 2006). The sources 
of these conflicts were mostly on the issue of the existence, scope, and the efficacy, of the 
independence of the legislature and oversight function in the constitutional system. One of the 
morbid symptoms of this deep and unsettled condition in Nigeria is the ‘gladiatorial contest 
between the executive and the legislative arms of government’ (Bassey, 2006, p.128).  
Similarly, Adamolekun (2005) notes that modern societies depend largely on the executive arm 
and its administrative agencies for the implementation of all policy decisions emanating from the 
legislature. In addition, the executive is expected to perform various functions, which shows that 
it wields considerable powers. Institutionally, the role of the legislature is that of representation, 
legislation and oversight; while that of the executive is policy initiation, implementation, and 
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execution and management of the general governmental affairs, all within the confines of 
constitutional provisions (Oleszek, 2014). 
The fact that democratic theory conceives the executive arm, as instrument to serve the people, 
underscored this oversight role of the legislature (Awotokun 1998). However, it is more than 
mere instrument; it wields tremendous power and authority. Ben Nwabueze (1992) has argued 
that  
By its very nature, the executive function is inherently prone to arbitrary use, but 
its propensity to arbitrariness would be greatly accentuated where the function of 
lawmaking also reposes in the same hands. For it is not just that the repository of 
the combined power can pass oppressive laws and then execute them 
oppressively, he can also oppress individuals by administrative acts not 
authorized by law and then proceed to legalize his action by retrospective 
legislation. Government in such a situation is not conducted according to 
predetermined rules; it is a government not of laws but of will, a government 
according to the whims and caprices of the ruler (Nwabueze 1992, p.53). 
Under the 1999 Constitution, the executive, symbolized by the president, the state governors and 
the local government chairmen, is exclusively responsible for policy formulation, policy 
implementation, including the execution of the provisions of the laws, and the general 
administration of the country. Nevertheless, such policies only become authoritative after 
legislative consideration and approval. In other words, since the constitution vested the 
legislature with powers to vet and monitor the implementation of projects and programmes, as 
well as advice, consult and liaise with the executive in the course of carrying out these functions, 
it follows that stable and smooth administration of the country depends critically on legislature- 
executive accord and cooperation. 
This is the more reason why the legislators, as the elected representatives of the people, often 
utilize the various measures guaranteed by the constitution to hold the executive accountable. 
And this often results into friction, bickering and unhealthy competition between the two arms of 
government. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Managing executive-legislative relations has been one of the most problematic issues in 
Nigeria’s presidential democracy since the country returned to civil rule in 1999 (Oyewo, 2007; 
Fagbadebo, 2009; Aliyu, 2010; Obiyan, 2013). Over the years, both the executive and the 
8 
 
legislative arms of government have tried, in varying degrees, to invoke their constitutionally 
assigned powers, in manners that have had implications and consequences for the smooth 
running of government and the overall stability of the nation’s body politic.  
There has been evidence of acrimony between the executive and the National Assembly, as 
reflected in the passage of the 2000 Appropriation Bill, the Anti- corruption Bill, Niger Delta 
Development Commission and the Universal Basic Education Bills (Aiyede, 2005). The ‘drum 
beat of impeachment’, at the federal and state levels, had not only slowed down government 
routine but also precipitated political and constitutional crisis (Oyewo, 2007; Ojo, 2006; Obiyan 
and Amuwo, 2013). Thus, the needed and expected cordial relationship between the legislature 
and the executive was a rarity, even, in cases where a political party controls the executive and 
the legislature (Awotokun, 1998; Aiyede, 2005). Evidently, in a number of cases, the control by 
a single party of both the executive and the legislature did not guarantee harmonious 
relationships. For example, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) controlled both the presidency 
and the National Assembly from 1999 to 2015; yet that did not guarantee harmonious 
relationships between the two arms of the federal government (Aiyede, 2005; Obiagwu, 2006; 
Fawole, 2013). 
There are studies on Nigeria’s presidential system in the Fourth Republic. Most of these 
appeared to be in agreement that executive-legislative conflicts and antagonism is at the forefront 
of challenges facing the country’s presidential democracy (Aiyede, 2005; Aminu, 2006; Bassey, 
2006; Oyewo, 2007; Fashagba, 2009; Fawole, 2013; Jude and Ika, 2013; Oni, 2013; Nwabuani, 
2014; Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016; Godswealth et al, 2016; Ovwasa and Abdullai, 2017). 
However, the trend is that most of these studies tend to concentrate more on the interface 
between the Presidency and the National Assembly while developments at the states level suffer 
considerable neglect of scholarly attention. In other words, there is a dearth of empirical studies 
that interrogate the peculiarities surrounding most cases of executive-legislative stand-offs and 
their consequences on the body politic, especially at the states level. 
This study argues that every phenomenon of executive-legislative impasse has its own unique 
nature, causes, and implications for the democratic stability of Nigeria as a nation. Thus, a study 
on the dynamics and peculiarities of executive-legislative relations in some selected states in 
Nigeria aims at filling this gap in the literature. Also, by seeking to bring attention to the issues 
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and factors that might limit the effectiveness of Nigeria’s democracy and political system, the 
study will also prove to be useful in sshaping discourse on executive-legislative relations in other 
countries on the African continent, as well as provoking further research on the subject-matter.   
This study examines the peculiarities of executive-legislative relations in some selected South-
West states in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. It examines issues relating to executive-legislative 
conflicts and antagonisms, both within and across party lines, including the influence of 
defection from one political party to the others, mostly because of executive-legislative impasse. 
There are 36 states in Nigeria, each with unicameral legislature. Cases of serious impasse were 
recorded in three states -Ekiti, Osun and Oyo- out of the six states in the Southwest, while minor 
frictions occurred in the other three states -Ondo, Ogun and Lagos states- between 1999 and 
2007. Ondo, Ogun, and Lagos states had all experienced relatively stable relations between the 
executive and the legislature over the period under review, while the same cannot be said of 
Osun, Oyo and Ekiti states where executive-legislative acrimony reached its climax with the 
impeachment of Governor Rasheed Ladoja in 2005, Ayodele Fayose, and his Deputy in 2006, 
respectively 
This study focuses on four out of these, which include Ekiti, Oyo, Ondo and Osun states. These 
states are selected given the fact that they are all proximate and contiguous neighbours with 
almost the same political history and democratic credentials but not too similar experiences of 
executive-legislative relationships since the return of civil rule in 1999. The present 
Southwestern geopolitical zone of Nigeria emanated from the defunct Western region and 
peopled by the second largest ethnic group in Nigeria- the Yorubas. With the return of civil rule 
in 1999, the entire six states in the zone came under the control of one single political party, the 
Alliance for Democracy (AD). And in 2003, 5 out of the 6 states with the only exception of 
Lagos, fell into the hands of another single party, the PDP. 
 Moreso, even where known frictions have been identified between the executive and the 
legislature in these four cases, the nature and causes of the impasse in each state presented 
varied. The nature and causes of executive-legislative acrimony in each of the states presented 
different developments. The height of executive-legislative friction in Ekiti culminated in the 
impeachment of the governor and his deputy, and this later precipitated a political crisis that led 
to the declaration of a state of emergency in the state, by the Federal Government. While the 
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climax of executive-legislative impasse in Oyo, which had an ambience of godfatherism led to 
the removal of the governor from office by the legislature but was subsequently nullified by the 
courts and governor restored to office. In Osun state, the executive-legislative rift led to 
commencement of impeachment proceedings against the governor, and the eventual 
impeachment of the deputy governor (Awotokun, 1992; Aliyu, 2010; Fagbadebo, 2016; Omitola 
and Ogunnubi, 2016). 
In other words, the various cases presented different patterns and background. In fact, the various 
cases did not end or play out in the same way. What informed these dis-similar patterns? Can the 
forces outside its immediate environment, influence the legislature? If yes, under what 
condition(s)? Are there factors, which promote harmonious or disharmonious executive-
legislative relations? The study attempts to provide empirical responses to these questions and 
many others. 
1.3 Key Research Questions 
The study provided answers to the following research questions. 
i. What are the purposes of the checks and balances mechanism in the provisions of the 1999 
Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria? 
ii. What are the peculiar nature and characteristics of executive-legislative relationships in the    
selected states over the period under review? 
iv. What are the major explanations for the incessant antagonisms and confrontations between 
the executive and the legislative arms of government in the selected states? 
v. What implications do acrimonious executive-legislative relations have on democratic     
stability in Nigeria? 
vi. What measures are the available to manage executive-legislative gridlocks in Nigeria’s 
presidential system?  
1.4 Rationale and Objectives of the study 
Much of the literature on executive-legislative relations in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic tended to 
assert that executive-legislative relationships, since the nation returned to civil rule in 1999, have 
been generally defective and acrimonious (Aiyede, 2005; Aminu, 2006; Bassey, 2006; Oyewo, 
2007; Fashagba, 2009; Fawole, 2013; Jude and Ika, 2013; Nwabuani, 2014; Fatile and 
Adejuwon, 2016; Godswealth et al, 2016; Ovwasa and Abdullai, 2017). However, the primary 
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objective of this study was to interrogate, through empirical means, the peculiarities surrounding 
most cases of executive-legislative stand-offs and their consequences on the system especially at 
the state levels. The major contention in this study is that each of these executive-legislative 
acrimonies has its own unique nature, causes and implications on the entire body politic, hence 
its empirical importance.  
There has been concentration on the Presidency and the National Assembly, with passing 
remarks on the developments at the state levels (Akinbobola, 2002; Lafenwa, 2006; Oni, 2013). 
Thus, it is worthwhile to undertake an examination of the peculiarities in the nature and character 
of executive-legislative relationships in some selected states in a bid to provide explanations for 
the incessant antagonism and confrontation between the executive and legislative branches of 
government in Nigeria’s presidential system.  
As Oyewo (2007), Poteete (2010) and Nwaubani (2014) have reasoned, the stability and 
democratic stabilty of any nation is predicated on the harmonious executive-legislative 
relationship and partnership. It is on record that the events that led to the collapse of both the first 
and second republics in Nigeria emanated from the states2. From the empirical data gathered, the 
study had insights from the states on executive-legislative harmony and/or disharmony as well as 
their implications and consequences for democratic consolidation. The exploration of the internal 
dynamics as well as the institutional contexts, peculiar to the states, is not only necessary to 
managing executive-legislative gridlocks in the country’s presidential system but pivotal to the 
overall democratic health and political stabilty of Nigeria as a nation.  
In addition, the study seeks to utilise empirical data to explore some of the factors promoting the 
recurrent executive-legislative feuds in Nigeria since the adoption of presidentialism as a 
governing system with a view to bringing attention to the issues and factors that might limit the 
effectiveness of Nigeria’s presidential democracy and political system.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 The first Military coup in Nigeria in 1966 had, as one of its principal remote causes, in the Western region crisis of 
1965. Similarly, the collapse of the second republic in 1983 also had its roots in the leadership failure and steer 
recklessness of the political elite, which were more, pronounced in the states. For more details see Ekeh, 1975; 
Adegboro, 1982; Dare and Oyewole, 1983; Orji, 1983; Dudley, 1985; Babangida, 1992; Maduagwu and Oche, 1992; 
Agedah, 1993; Davies, 1996; Ihonvbere, 1996; Akinsanya and Davies, 2002; Anifowose, 2004; and, Lafenwa, 2006. 
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1.5 Methods and Methodological Approach to the Study 
In arriving at the choice of a particular research design appropriate for this study, the researcher 
considered the goal of the research and the subject matter of the executive-legislative 
relationships in the selected states, which serve as a mirror for the Nigeria’s presidential system. 
Specifically, the place of methods, methodology and epistemology in addressing the 
problematique of the research were considered. Methods, in this sense, entail all the techniques 
that are used for the gathering and processing of research data. While methodology encapsulates 
the approach and instruments used in making the choice of research methods. In other words, the 
sphere of research methodology extends beyond that of research methods. In essence, research 
methods form part of the methodology. Kothari (2004) argues that 
 When we talk of research methodology we not only talk of the research methods  
 but also consider the logic behind the methods we use in the context of our  
 research study and explain why we are not using others so that research results are 
 capable of being evaluated either by the researcher himself or by others  
 (Kothari, 2004, p.8). 
Methodology provides answers to the all important questions of how research problem is 
defined, what data have been obtained and which particular method is suitable and why certain 
technique of data analysis will bring out the appropriate outcome as well as a host of similar 
other questions relevant to the subject-matter of research (Creswell, 1998; 2009; Elo and 
Kyngas, 2008).  
Epistemology, on the other hand, directs attention to the cultural components of the ways of 
knowing (Walter, 2017). It is primarily concerned with understanding the nature of how the rules 
of what was regarded as knowledge were set, what constituted knowledge, and who could or 
could not be considered as knowledgeable (Dooley, 1990). In this context, epistemological 
considerations show what should be the ideal relationship between a researcher and the subject 
under investigation. In order to eliminate bias, it ponders on the extent of involvement of the 
researcher with the people in the study (Neuman, 2004). Given the logic that ‘social sciences is 
often informed and influenced by our worldviews and perspectives’ as Walter (2017, p.23) has 
argued, epistemology becomes an important tool for consideration in the research process. 
The study adopted an interpretative paradigm to probe the core of the research problematique. 
The interpretative tradition dwells mainly on the nature of social interaction and interrelations in 
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the society. Its emphasis is on ‘the meanings individual actors give to social interactions’ 
(Walter, 2017, p.17). From the interpretative perspective, the society is construed as a world of 
meaning in which human actions occur because of ‘shared understanding’ (Creswell, 1998; 
2009). As Maggie Walter (2017) has argued, understanding human society requires an in-depth 
knowledge of the motives behind people’s actions, which is contingent on their ‘interpretation of 
the world’. The main concern of this approach is the exploration of the ‘meanings actors give to 
their circumstances’ because these meanings provide ‘explanations of what they do’ (Walter, 
2017, p.17-18). 
To corroborate the interpretative paradigm, which guided this study, the researcher utilised the 
qualitative method for the purposes of gathering data. This study is an examination of the 
peculiarities in the interplay of power between the executive and legislative actors in Nigeria’s 
presidential system. Dougherty (2002) argues that the qualitative method provides the researcher 
with the opportunity to study things in their natural settings, in a bid to interpreting them in terms 
of the meanings ascribed to them. The usefulness of this method to the qualitative researcher lies 
in its flexibility to exploring phenomena in their natural settings. Creswell (2009) opines that the 
main objective of a qualitative researcher is to gain an in-depth understanding of the intricacy of 
decision making as well as web of interactions among actors operating within the political 
structures.  
In a related manner, Bouma and Ling (2004) submit that the ‘key task of qualitative research is 
meaning making’; a process, they reason, ‘does not usually requires statistics or large-scale data’ 
(Bouma and Ling, 2004, p.30). Hence, the main focus of researchers in qualitative studies is 
often on few individuals in the society, using methods that draws out the meanings, perspectives, 
and understanding which such ‘individuals or groups attach to behaviours, experiences and 
social phenomena’ (Babbie, 2002, p.16; Creswell, 1998; 2009). In addition, Maggie Walter 
reasons that the qualitative method is a ‘subjective approach whereby the researcher aims to 
understand and interprete experiences by viewing the world through the eyes of the individuals 
being studied’ (Walter, 2017, p.20). In addition, considering the subject matter of this study, it 
was appropriate to adopt the qualitative approach, which relied majorly on recounting the 
experiences of relevant actors in the executive-legislative process. 
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1.5.1 Data Collection Methods  
Data for this study were obtained from the in-depth interviews of key informants. This technique 
gives the researcher the freedom to obtain information from the respondents, without any 
restraint and in the pattern that would make the researcher attained the desired data (Babbie, 
2002). In-depth interview enables the researcher with the means to explore a relevant and varied 
view point and perspectives, in a bid to gain a wider range of insights on the subject matter of the 
research (Seidler, 2004).  
For the purpose of this study, the researcher adopted purposive sampling technique. This 
provided the advantage to select respondents having specific information relevant to the core 
areas of the study (Korb, 2012). As Ogula (2005, p.29) has noted, purposive sampling enables 
the researcher to ‘identify specific groups of people who exhibit the characteristics of the social 
phenomenon under study’. In other words, the researcher chooses the sample based on whom he 
thinks is appropriate for the study; and a key aspect of this procedure is the knowledge, 
experience or involvement of the respondents in the sample with the issue under study (Henry, 
1990). 
Key informants interviewed were drawn from among the political elite in the executive and the 
legislative branches of government, the major political parties, and the academia. These 
informants were purposively selected from relevant serving and past political actors because of 
knowledge, expertise or involvement with the subject matter of research. They were identified 
and contacted by means of my numerous and extensive visits to government institutions and 
party offices in the selected states, through ‘snowball sample’, formal requests for interviews, 
and through other informal networks. A snowball sample, according to Ogula (2005), is a subset 
of a purposive sample and is often achieved by requesting a participant already identified and 
contacted to suggest someone else who might be willing or appropriate for the study.  
The researcher had face-to-face interview sessions with a former Acting Governor, a former 
Deputy Governor, and two former speakers of state legislative assemblies. The former acting 
governor presided over the impeachment of a state governor and the deputy, which paved the 
way for his emergence as acting governor. He relished his experience in the imbroglio and this 
provided great insights into the issues surrounding the impeachment in the state. The former 
Deputy Governor provided his own perspective to the shrewd politics that culminated into his 
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impeachment by the state legislature and the subsequent nullification of the process by the 
Appeal Court. In the same vein, the two former speakers gave their accounts of the legislative 
politics that dictated executive-legislative relationships under their watch.  
Apart from these groups of respondents, eight serving lawmakers and seven former principal 
officers of the legislature in the selected states, including all the serving Clerks of the legislature 
in the states, were interviewed. They all spoke on a variety of issues regarding the nature of 
executive-legislative relationships in their states. The Clerks of the respective state assemblies 
were initially reluctant to speak on vital issues they considered sensitive and confidential. 
Eventually, they provided valuable insights into the subject matter of research when the primary 
purpose of the interviews became clearer to them3. 
Similarly, eight senior legislative aides to the former governors as well as eight principal party 
executives across the four states were interviewed. The party officials, both serving and past, 
were selected from within the ruling and opposition political parties in the states. These include 
the Alliance for Democracy (AD), Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), All Nigeria Peoples Party 
(ANPP), Labour Party (LP), Accord Party (AP), and the All Progressive Congress (APC). In 
addition, six key informants, drawn from the academia, were interviewed. They were selected 
from the Political Science Departments of the University of Ibadan and Obafemi Awolowo 
University, Ile Ife, as well as the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, 
Adekunle Ajasin University, Akungba Akoko, all in Southwest Nigeria. 
The participants from the academia, had been engaged in researches on the legislature, and had 
served in government, either in the legislative or executive arm. Their exposure provided a 
robust mix of both practical and theoretical experience on the issues of executive-legislative 
realtionships. A combination of the views shared by these respondents provided the key 
information and insights, which formed the fulcrum for the analysis in this study.  
In summary, the total number of respondents interviewed was forty-five (45). In addition, most 
of the interview sessions took place at the offices of respondents, in legislative chambers, party 
                                                          
3
 On a number of visits to the legislative assemblies in the four states, the first point of call was usually to seek 
audience with the Clerks of the House, being the chief administrative officers and heads of Service of their 
respective assemblies. There were initial difficulties in securing the cooperation of three out of four of the officers 
on the primary purpose of my requests even in spite of all the ethical documents provided to authenticate the 
reseracher’s claim. However, after a series of persuasion and persistency, they agreed to provide the requested 
documents as well as granting interviews. They also facilitated my nteraction with some serving lawmakers.      
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secretariats, public functions and sometimes individuals’ private residences, depending largely 
on the preferences of individual respondents. 
Nonetheless, the study also made use of data from archival materials, such as government 
publications and Hansard proceedings of legislative assemblies of the selected states, in order to 
strengthen and validate data derived from the interviews. These written records served as a kind 
of cross-validation mechanism for the information obtained from the interviews. 
1.6 Structure of the Study 
In examining the main issues relating to the peculiarities of executive-legislative relationships in 
Nigeria’s presidential system, particularly, the contending issues surrounding the incessant 
conflicts and acrimonies between the executive and legislative branches, this study is divided 
into eight chapters. Chapter one presents the dominant perspectives on the nature of power 
relations in presidential systems and this provide the context and the basis for the arguments and 
analysis in the subsequent chapters. 
In chapter two, the extant taxonomies of executive-legislative relations in presidential systems 
are considered. The researcher delves into the literature to undertake a review of the contending 
scholarly perspectives on the operations and functioning of presidential systems. This is in a bid 
to situate the Nigerian experience in presidentialism within the planks of theory and practice. 
From the various standpoints, it is discovered that there is no universal standard in the way 
presidentialism as a governing system operate or ought to operate. Instead, the usual practice by 
nation-states is to adapt presidential principles that are capable of addressing their unique socio-
cultural needs, political preferences and governance philosophy. This provide the basis for my 
argument that it is essential to examine the political processes and institutional contexts of 
different nation-states in order to unravel the underlying variables and factors responsible for 
gridlocks and government immobilism in their practice of presidential systems.  
In the third chapter, the two principal theories of the study, the historical approach and David 
Easton’s input-output analysis of the system theory, are explored. The relevance of these theories 
is examined within the context of executive-legislative relationships in Nigeria’s presidential 
system. It is found out, from the literature, that none of the theories is sufficient to explain the 
nature and manner of contestations for power among the governing elites in the executive and 
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legislative branches of government. These theories are applied to the governance structures in the 
Nigerian presidential system to show the interplay of power relations that is defining the 
exchanges between the executive and legislative branches of government. The researcher 
discovers, theoretically, that there is a personal dimension to most of the disagreements fueling 
conflicts between the two organs of government, which is often hidden behind the nature, and 
scope of powers granted each of the two institutions in the constitutional scheme.  
Chapter four traces the history of executive-legislative relationships in Nigeria’s presidential 
system, starting with the Second Republic when presidentialism was first adopted as a governing 
system. It is discovered, through documentary and empirical evidences, that Nigeria’s political 
experience since independence, both in democratic practice and military dictatorships, is mired 
in executive-centred political environment where the executive arm of government is always 
stronger than the legislature in the policy making process. The researcher claims that most of the 
conflicts between the executive and legislative branches in the Nigeria’s practice of 
presidentialism are manifest evidence of political intolerance and struggles for power among the 
governing elites.  
In chapter five, some of the relevant provisions of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria are examined 
as they relate to the powers granted the two institutions of government. This begins with an 
exploration of the specific powers allotted to each of the two branches of government by 
evaluating the strengths of these provisions to provide insights into the exercise of power by the 
governing elites. The second part examines the various constitutional guarantees granted the 
legislature to enable it to monitor the exercise of executive power. The constitutional intents of 
these measures are considered as a way of strengthening the legislative capacity in a bid to 
ensure a regime of institutionalised adherence to the rule of law and the culture of accountability 
in government. The researcher claims that the nature of disagreements between the executive and 
legislative branches in Nigeria showed that most of these conflicts had little or nothing to do with 
the 1999 constitution; neither did it had to do with the demands of the principles of separation of 
powers and checks mechanism built into the country’s constitution. To justify this claim, data 
were presented to demonstrate how the constitution formally and expressly structured the 
interface between the executive and legislative branches of government but the relationship that 
exists in actual practice depend majorly on the political context as well as the characteristics of 
the governing elites.  
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In chapter six, the researcher examines the nature and character of executive-legislative 
relationships in the selected states. This is done in cognisance of the socio-cultural milieu and 
institutional contexts peculiar to these states. Empirical data are presented to show the differing 
peculiarities of these states in executive-legislative relationships, especially how their internal 
dynamics and external influence shaped the political outcomes of executive and legislative 
institutions in the states. Drawing from documentary and empirical evidences, insights from 
these states show the particularistic nature of the political elites and the varying roles and degrees 
of interventions by political parties as major determining factors defining the intensity of 
executive-legislative conflicts. These provide the basis for my claim that every phenomenon of 
executive-legislative impasse has its own unique nature, causes, implications and consequences 
for the overall democratic health and political stability of Nigeria as a nation. 
Chapter seven considers some factors promoting the recurrent executive-legislative conflicts in 
Nigeria since the adoption of presidentialism as a governing system and the implications of the 
constant acrimonious executive-legislative relations on democratic stability of the states as well 
as political stability of Nigeria. It interrogates some of the factors promoting the incessant 
executive-legislative stand-offs in Nigeria since 1999 as well as their consequences on the 
country’s democratic space. The chapter presents empirical data to demonstrate how most of the 
contending issues fueling disagreements and conflicts between the executive and legislative 
institutions in Nigeria are not particularly inherent in the practice of presidential system, but a 
manifestation of the nature of struggles for power among the country’s political elites.  
In chapter eight, which is the concluding chapter of the study, the overt struggles, and contests 
for power among powerful political forces competing in the Nigerian democratic space are 
identifed as major factors responsible for the non-collaborative and conflictual executive-
legislative relationships the country has witnessed since 1999. The study argues that these 
powerful patrons often spanned beyond the political actors in the formal structures of power. 
They operate outside the official positions of authority but their towering influence, on a large 
scale, determined the political outcomes of government institutions.  
1.7 Summary 
This chapter provided a general background of the extant principles of presidentialism as a 
governing system as well as the main issues surrounding executive-legislative antagonism in the 
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Nigeria’s presidential democracy since 1999. It highlighted and discussed the context and 
rationale for the study as well as the methods of data collection. In the next chapter, the 
researcher engages in the review of extant literature to explore the differing perspectives on the 
principles and ideals of the presidential system, including the existing the taxonomies of 
executive-legislative relationships and their implications for different contexts.       
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Chapter Two 
Executive-Legislative Relations in Presidential Systems 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the existing taxonomies of executive-legislative relations as well as 
relevant perspectives on executive-legislative relations in presidentialism as a governing system. 
The chapter closes with a review of theoretical perspectives on the trajectory of interactions and 
interchange between the executive and legislative branches in Nigeria's presidential system. 
The chapter is presented in four sections. The first part begins with a review and an appraisal of 
existing taxonomies of executive-legislative relations and their implications for different 
contexts. This includes an inquiry into the prevailing trends and patterns of executive-legislative 
relations across different governing systems. The second part probes into the literature to 
examine the contending debates about associating executive-legislative gridlocks with 
presidential democracy erected on the principle of separation of power. This incorporates the 
practice of presidentialism in the United States, Latin America and Asia. The third part explores, 
from the standpoint of existing literature, the evolution and development of legislative institution 
in Nigeria starting from the first republic until date.  
The focus of this chapter is to explore the various scholarly perspectives on executive-legislative 
rift, which is considered a common feature of presidentialism as a governing system. Most of the 
discussions are therefore devoted to providing both historical and contextual basis for the 
incessant acrimony between executive and legislature in the practice of presidential democracy 
in Nigeria. This is useful in identifying the empirical limitations of previous studies, which in a 
way neglected a consideration of the dynamics of Nigerian political environment under which 
the two institutions of the executive and the legislature operate. This is because it is difficult to 
explain the Nigerian experience in executive-legislative relations, and by extension, 
presidentialism, from a particular perspective or trend. In other words, there is no universal 
standard in the way presidential systems operate. Different political entities often adapt ideals 
and principles suitable for their political and socio-cultural inclinations.     
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2.2 Taxonomies of Executive-Legislative Relations and their Implications for different 
Contexts 
A number of scholars believe the relations between the executive and the legislature are inherent 
power relationship characterised by struggle (Lijphart 1991; Eminue, 2008). For instance, 
Lijphart (1991) distinguishes between three categories of constitutional democratic system, in 
terms of measuring the balance of power between executive and the legislature. These are, 
i. those with the executive dominance; 
ii. those with the legislative dominance; 
iii. those that were relatively balanced. 
He proceeds to identify patterns or correlation between the different models and the tendency 
towards executive or legislative dominance. Below are some of these patterns. 
a. The single party executive, in parliamentary systems, tended to have executive 
dominance, as the case in the UK. 
b. The minority and the super-majority coalitions in parliamentary systems tended to have 
legislative dominance, as the case in Italy. 
c. The standard presidential systems, with separation of powers, tended to have executive-
legislative balance, as demonstrated by the American presidential system. 
Ideally, patterns identified by Lijphart are quite revealing and instructive. Nonetheless, what 
Lijphart, does not directly address, is the role that political parties, cultures, traditional 
institutions, as well as the varying levels of resources, played in the process of creating the 
relative balance of power, between the executive and the legislature. According to the College of 
Liberal Arts and Sciences, of the University of Illinois, there are a number of resources, with 
significant impacts on the balance of power between the legislature and the executive. These 
resources provided different levels of independence, for the operations of the activities of the 
branches of government.  
These resources include the followings, salaries of individual members (including duration of 
legislative session), staff resources (such as offices, secretaries and research resources), and the 
independent sources of information (such as strong committees, libraries, etc). The level of 
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independence includes the weak party control over electoral lists (candidate-centred, open lists), 
the use of secret ballot voting within the legislature and the absence of the power of censure 
(political) but power of impeachment (legal). 
Essentially, considering that legislative power has to reside somewhere within the structures, 
Olson (2002) concludes that in the final analysis, the executive, the legislature and political 
parties, were the three principal political institutions in legislative politics. The nature of the 
balance of power depends, largely, on the interaction among these three institutions. Arend 
Lijphart also identies similar variables. In single party parliamentary systems, the political parties 
tended to be quite strong, thereby leading to the reduction in the power of the legislature. In 
supra-majority coalitions4, political parties tended to be weaker. This is generally the cause for 
the additional coalition partners (protections) so that power could flow towards the legislature. In 
standard presidential systems, where members of the the two political arms of government were 
elected separately; there was a tendency for relative power balance between the executive and 
the legislature. This is often the situation in the United States and Nigeria.  
In a similar vein, King (1976) perceives executive-legislative interaction as revolving around 
three basic factors: 
i. consideration of governmental composition or make-up (coalition or majority); 
ii. the constitutional arrangement defining powers, functions, limitations and relationship 
between the executive and the legislature; and  
iii. the legislative power and operating patterns of the legislature itself. 
Studies of legislative influence on public policies range from legislatures having influential role 
in shaping policy, including delay, rejection or modifications of executive policy initiatives or 
measures (Agor, 1971; Mezey, 1985). 
Hence, Weinbaum (1975) distinguishes among legislatures because of their decision-making 
roles and integrative functions. The decision-making roles, according to him, include the 
capacity to initiate legislation; to modify, delay or defeat bills; to influence administrative action 
                                                          
4
 Supra-majority coalitions are often a direct result of multi-party democracy under parliamentary systems. The 
strength of each party in parliament is determined by the proportion of its electoral votes and the number of seats it 
controls. In a situation where three or more political parties form the Government of the day, i.e., coalition partners 
who may default at any time, the legislature tends to enjoy dominance over the executive. For more details, see 
Lijphart 1991; Mainwaring 1993; Linz 1994; Linz & Stephan 1996.  
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through parliamentary question time and investigations; and alter ministerial departmental 
budgets, personnel and authorization. Integrative functions involve the capacity for containment 
and resolution of conflicts. Weinbaum also identifies five types of legislature, which he 
designates as 'coordinate', 'subordinate', 'submissive', 'indeterminate' and 'competitive-dominant', 
suggesting that most Third World legislatures are "submissive" institutions with weak decisional 
capacities and modest integrating capabilities. Similarly, some scholars maintain that many of 
the Third World's legislative assemblies do not have much influence or control over allocation of 
resources (Wahlke, 1971; Huntington, 1991; Olagunju, 2000). Thus, they rarely initiate, amend, 
incubate, delay, defeat or expedite public policy or budgets. Their policy function, to the degree 
it exists, was, largely, one of deliberation and legitimizing executive actions (Wahlke, 1971; 
Huntington, 1991; Olagunju, 2000; Mattes and Mozaffar, 2016). 
Nonetheless, the ability of the legislature to exercise the ultimate authority to amend or reject 
executive proposals and sometimes the amount, intensity and quality of constraint or limitation a 
legislature is capable of placing on the ‘policy-related activities of the executive’ would serve as 
a means of preventing the executive from acting unilaterally (Mezey, 1979, p.25). Olson (2002) 
emphasizes the legislature's ability to override a presidential veto. Blonde et. al (2008) also 
introduce the concept of "viscosity," the capacity of the legislature to resist legislation by the 
executive, measured by whether the legislature is non-compliant towards executive proposals 
and the number of amendments effected. 
However, Oppoenheimer (1985) maintains that from the standpoint of policy-making, the United 
States (US) Congress remains the most influential legislature. The US Congress has 
distinguished itself as a legislature involved in the process of government through active 
participation in policy formulation, as well as deliberation and oversight of executive activities 
The Congress has a highly developed Committee system, as a prerequisite for those activities. It 
is mostly regarded as one of the few of the world's legislatures that consistently oppose, reject, 
and amend presidential legislation. Whittington and Carpenter (2003) in their study on American 
politics identify the US Congress as an epic-centre of power in policymaking. According to these 
authors, this narrative of congressional dominance did not preclude the power and influence of 
the executive branch, which still has substantial resources to engage in independent 
policymaking. However, this reality has continued to shape the process of executive-legislative 
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relations in counter-balancing pattern. In comparison to other presidential democracies, the 
political system of the United States is tilted, remarkably, towards the legislature.  
Perceived in the same light is Nigeria's central legislature, the National Assembly, seen as a 
source of policy initiation or modification, and is regarded as performing incubation function in 
the development of public policy (Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016; Fashagba, 2012; Lafenwa, 2009). 
The Nigeria's National Assembly as well as a sizable number of State legislative assemblies in 
the country are portrayed as exerting a strong influence on the budget process, especially by 
increasing successive annual budgets presented by the executive (Egonmwan, 2000; Olson, 
2004; Eminue, 2008; Mohammed and Kinge, 2015). Nevertheless, they are still vulnerable to 
party pressures and public opinion to the extent of reversing itself on some matters (Egonmwan, 
2000; Olson, 2004). 
The extant taxonomies of executive-legislative relations conceived the struggle for influence 
over public policy between the two arms of government in a similar or dissimilar pattern.  
Lijphart (1991), however, contends that the nature of the executive-legislative relations often 
defines the balance of power between the two branches of government. He affirms that there 
were certain questions that determined the nature of the relationships that existed between the 
executive and the legislature. First, the nature of the overlapping of membership, whether it was 
separate or independent. Second, the level and flow of responsibility of the executive, whether to 
the legislature or directly to the members of the public. In either way, it was necessary to 
ascertain if such responsibility was political or legal.  
The third is the strength of the political parties, as well as the capacity to instil internal level of 
party discipline. Another issue is the relative balance of resources available to each of the 
branches of government in terms of information, fund allocation and expertise, including 
duration of tenures. It is also pertinent to ascertain the principal initiator of legislation, whether 
there were variations based on policy area. Similarly, it is necessary to determine the major 
decision makers in policy process, and identify veto players, capable to override or exert an 
appeal process such as judicial review or popular referendum. And finally, to ascertain those 
responsible for the actual implemention of policy, especially their levels of autonomy in the 
implementation process. 
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It is necessary to mention that efforts were made to review existing taxonomies of executive-
legislative relations in order to identify, albeit in passing, the prevailing trends and patterns. This 
is done, to situate the context of executive-legislative relations in the states under review, and, by 
extension, Nigeria, along these trends.  
2.3  Executive-Legislative Relations in Presidential Systems 
A search into the existing literature on executive-legislative relations show that the challenge of 
constructive executive-legislative relations is pronounced in presidential systems, erected on the 
principle of separation of powers (Baker, 1971; Wright, 1977; Judge, 1980; Robinson, 1980; 
Morton, 1982; Miller and Moe, 1983; Smith and Deering, 1984; Van Der Slik, 1985; Lijphart, 
1991; Mainwaring, 1993). Some scholars have contended that the high degree of power 
separation, for checks and balances, engendered executive-legislative gridlocks (Baumgartner 
and Kada, 2003; Aiyede, 2005; Perez-Linan, 2007; Fagbadebo, 2016). Efforts are being put into 
investigating the factors that account for divided government because of the challenge executive-
legislative acrimony pose to the stability of presidential regimes. A development, which often 
leads to breakdown in communication and conflict of purpose between the two arms of the same 
government (Mainwaring, 1993; Linz, 1994). 
Bassey (2006) posits that the main issue at the centre of executive-legislative acrimony were 
often the two conflicting conceptions and perception of relative institutional order, two different 
views of the constitutional process, and two variant visions of the future by the political actors 
across the executive and legislative divide. He explains further that what gave the controversy its 
tragic quality was that the view of either arm of government might have prevailed but for the 
existence of the other. In terms of institutional checks and balances, either side has the power to 
prevent each other from realizing its objectives. Neither the executive nor the legislature could 
realise its goals without the direct or indirect inputs from one another. The essence of this 
political synergy in a presidential system, as Fagbadebo (2016) has noted, is to ensure probity 
and accountability. On this same issue, Omoruyi specifically maintain that: 
Government is a web of interlocking relationships. The legislature, in other 
words, cannot function in isolation. This also applies to the executive branch. 
Herein, lies the problem of legislature- executive relationship in a presidential 
governmental arrangement, i.e., between the autonomy conferred on each arm of 
government in virtue of the principle of separation of powers and the imperative 
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of co-operation given the logic of government as an interactive process (Omoruyi 
1992, p.13). 
The view expressed by Omoruyi (1992) is particularly relevant, given the fact that democratic 
governance in a highly politicized and atomised social context, such as in most presidential 
democracies, demands a high level of consensus-building and mutual accommodation among its 
operators. This is the essence of political pluralism, which implies that decisions are founded 
upon compromise and that various facets of the society have a voice in government (Ojo, 2008; 
Bassey, 2006). 
Linz and Stepan (1996), in their study on the Latin-American experience, argue that this problem 
is the offshoot of dual democratic legitimacy of two popularly elected independent organs of 
government. The entire country elects the president, as chief executive, while the constituencies 
elect each of the members of the parliament, who together represent the entire country. 
Consequently, either the executive or the legislature may choose to be so assertive that it denied 
the other the requisite complement for an effective functioning of the democratic process. 
In addition, under the parliamentary system, the absence of legislative confidence, keeps the 
legislature and the executive in tune with each. Thus, the probability of disagreement become 
lower and if it occured, there were internal process of ensuring mutual agreement, especially in 
systems where the ruling party secured the majority of the members of the parliament. Unlike the 
parliamentary system, the executive and the legislature do not rise or fall together. Members of 
the executive and the legislative were elected, largely on the strength of their individual 
recognition. Thus, they were not strictly tied to their party position in the discharge of their 
responsibilities so that it may make no difference if the same party controls the two arms (Linz, 
1993; Aiyede, 2005). Similarly, Laski (1992, p.76) while describing the situation in the United 
States, avers that each of the legislative chambers in the Congress, the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, ‘has a separate prestige; their common prestige is, by their nature inherently anti-
presidential in character. To be something, Congress is forced to take a stand against the 
president; it cannot be anything if it merely follows his lead’. 
The fixed term of the head of the executive branch generates anxiety as they seek to deliver their 
campaign promises within the limited time provided by the Constitution. This may lead to ‘ill-
conceived policy initiative, hasty implementation, and or unwarranted anger at the lawful 
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opposition’ (Cheibub, 2002, p.116). Under the Nigerian presidential system, the president and 
governors are elected through direct election, representing the nation and their states, 
respectively while members of the legislature were also elected, directly, representing their 
various constituencies. There is a tendency for either the president or the governor to be 
preoccupied with a sense of representing a larger population than the individual legislators. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to note that while a single individual represents the executive, the 
legislature is an embodiment of the national and state representation. Consequently, such a 
situation may give little or no room for negotiation and mutual respect between the members of 
the two organs of government could be seriously abridged (Linz, 1993; Riggs, 1997).  
 Peterson and Greene (1993), in their study on executive-legislative conflicts in the United 
States, between 1947 and 1990, identify constituent and partisan reasons as the basis for the 
recurring executive-legislative face-offs during the period. According to them, the constituent 
basis for conflict was rooted in the manner in which the members of the two branches were 
elected. The executive had a national constituency, and, therefore, was more concerned with 
matters of national policy. The concern of the members of the legislature, who had smaller, more 
homogeneous constituencies, were more on the geographically distributed effects of these 
policies. Similarly, the partisan basis for conflict between the two arms of government was made 
manifest by separate and competitive political contests.    
Wilson (1992), who considers that such gridlocks in the US were linked to the disjunction 
between the interests of the two arms, suggests that the challenge was how to find a way of 
linking together the interests of the executive and legislature. So long as these two branches were 
isolated, he argues, they would be ineffective to the extent of the isolation. Nonetheless, he 
suggests the introduction of some elements of the parliamentary system through constitutional 
amendment that would allow some members of Congress to become members of the cabinet. 
Relatedly, drawing inferences from the existing taxonomies of executive-legislative power 
sharing arrangement, the main issue, often at the centre of the incessant face-off between the two 
arms of government, could be attributed to the avowed desire of each of the two branches to 
operate within their constitutional boundaries. During periods of divided government, the 
common trend is for either branch to resort to ‘self- help’ in the name of constitutionally 
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assigned responsibilities in counteracting each other (Conley, 2007). This reality comes to the 
fore considering the works of Cox and Morgenstern (2001) and Conley (2007).  
Conley’s work undertakes a comparative exploration of the strategies often deployed by the 
executive in the US and France during the period of divided government. The author concludes 
that the incentives available to the presidents in both countries far outweighed that of the 
parliamentarians, which gave the executive a relative advantage over the legislature during 
periods of institutional combat and inter-organ communication breakdown (Conley 2007). 
Against this backdrop of unequal opportunity in the executive-legislative process; and, 
apparently, to counteract the executive, legislative assemblies often enlist themselves into the 
policy-making process.  These are, ‘originative, by making and breaking executives, who then 
shoulder most of the policymaking burden; proactive, by initiating and passing their own 
legislative proposals; and reactive, by amending or vetoing executive proposals’ (Cox and 
Morgenstern, 2001, p. 171).   
While x-raying the frequent cases of disharmonised executive-legislative relations in Hong 
Kong, Lo Shiu-hing and Leung (2012) attribute the confrontational relationships to the internal 
dynamics peculiar to the country’s political system. This is occasioned by the mutual distrust 
between the executive, exclusively peopled by the pro-establishment elites, and, the legislative 
branch, dominated by pan-democratic forces. They argue that the possible way out was to 
institute a drastic overhaul of the political system by enlisting a sizable number of the pan-
democratic forces into the top-policy executive council in a response to the pluralistic public 
demands. 
It is evident that the case of Hong Kong gives credence to the unfolding debates on executive-
legislative relations that a nation’s socio-political make-up, as well as the nature and 
characteristics of its political actors, continue to predominate any meaningful discussion of 
executive-legislative impasse. It is noteworthy to mention that the development in Hong Kong 
could not have been laid bare without uncovering the internal power play peculiar to the 
country’s political system. This view is also shared by Fagbadebo (2016) when he asserts that 
there is no uniformity in the ways presidential system operates across nations of the world. Each 
political system, ‘often adopts a variant of the presidential principle suitable for their domestic 
political needs’ (Fagbadebo, 2016, p.32). In other words, the practice of presidentialism is 
29 
 
largely dependent on the nature of politics within nations. And to unravel this, each nation’s 
socio-political set-up has to be considered.  
For instance, while reviewing the place of legislative institutions in Latin American democracies, 
Saiegh (2005) contends that the legislatures are critical institutions in making a democratic 
system function. He evaluates the major factors affecting the role of the legislature in the policy 
making process, especially the way and manner, in which it exercises its powers. The author 
concludes that several factors, particularly different socio-political contexts of these countries, 
contributed to the differences among the legislatures, with respect to their ability to play an 
active role in the policymaking process. 
The Committee on the Constitutional System of the US (1992, pp.77-89) attributed disharmony 
in the diffuse structure of the executive-legislative relation and decline in party loyalty. The 
inherently conflictual relations, arising from the nature of separation of powers, needed to be 
mitigated by party cohesion; hence, the weakening of the party in the electoral arena has 
rendered it incapable of drawing the separated parts of the government into cohesion. It 
recommends electoral reforms, adoption of new party rules, as well as constitutional 
amendments to enable presidents appoint leading legislators to cabinet positions and call for 
elections in the event of a deadlock or government failure. 
However, Shugart and Carey (1992) have argued that the problem identified with presidential 
systems such as temporal rigidity (fixed terms), majoritarianism and dual legitimacy were 
overstated. After an elaborate examination of the various institutional designs of presidential 
systems across the world including vetoes, budgetary prerogatives and decree authority, they 
conclude that the real reasons for regime breakdowns are the particular configuration of power in 
the hands of the president and incoherent party systems. In other words, institutional designs 
rather than the presidential system, account for regime breakdown.  
Apparently speaking from the perspective of the American rich experience in presidentialism and 
more clear insights from his subsequent comparative studies, Shugart (2005) traces the potential 
friction in the executive-legislative relations in places such as the US and Nigeria to 
‘transactional relationship’ deliberately built into the presidential constitutional design after the 
order of ‘neo-Madisonian’ tradition. He opines that, Madison had argued, in the Federalist Paper 
Number 10, that ‘multiple agents of the citizenry must be empowered and motivated to check the 
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ambitions of one another’ (Shugart, 2005, p.9). And by so doing under the presidential system, 
both institutions of the executive and legislature are designed and intended to operate in a 
‘transactional relationship as co-equals, who have independent sources of authority, and must 
cooperate to accomplish some tasks’ (Shugart, 2005, p.16). The implication of Shugart’s 
submission is that a potential conflict between the executive and legislative arms of government 
is a deliberate institutional design for which political actors within the respective organs must 
embrace and manage well for the effective functioning of the system. 
Similarly, while expressing serious reservation about the limitations of the perspectives 
generated about executive-legislative gridlocks from the US presidential system to explain the 
happenings in the emerging democracies of Africa, Asia and Latin America, Lipset (1993) 
emphasizes the centrality of political culture on the patterns of executive-legislative interchange 
prevalent in most presidential systems. In other words, a nation’s political climate advertently or 
inadvertently determines the patterns and trajectories of conflict between the executive and 
legislative branches. According to him, as far as these twin institutions were located to function 
in different settings and political environments, empirical explanations on the recurrent or the 
potential conflict between the two should be rooted in or provided based on democratic culture 
and antecedents prevalent in such settings in order to draw valid inferences and perspectives. 
Apparently in consideration of Lipset’s position and against the backdrop of data generated from 
the Kenyan political system, Hassan and Sheely (2016) argue, that Kenyan leaders have 
succumbed to using lower level administrative unit proliferation under the guise of 
administrative reforms to undermine legislative checks against executive power. Under this 
arrangement, legislative assertiveness is traded off to secure the nod of the executive branch to 
approving creation of additional administrative units; in response to the demands and agitations 
of majority of constituents. These authors contend that this political venture had, over the years, 
turned out to be the most effective means of securing voters’ supports during parliamentary 
elections in Kenya. Hence, parliamentarians who desire to retain their seats by winning re-
election often conceded substantial leverage of influence to the executive in policymaking.  
With this clarity, it is evident that a concise and meaningful assessment of the executive-
legislative relations in Kenya could not have been achieved in isolation of the peculiarity of the 
country’s political environment. Interestingly, though, this may have provided explanations for 
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the steady increase in the number of lower-tiered administrative units since the 1990s (Hassan 
and Sheely, 2016).  
In addition, as if to corroborate Lipset’s stance, Mattes and Mozaffar (2016), in their study on the 
legislatures and democratic developments in some key African states, identify low institutional 
capacity as the root cause of continued dominance of the executive over the legislative branch, 
which, in most cases, continue to generate frictions between the two arms of government. 
However, the authors add that to ascertain the plausibility and, perhaps, generalization of their 
findings there was the need to consider the trajectory of executive-legislative face-offs in 
different settings and climes.            
It is evident from the foregoing that it is difficult to explain the Nigerian experience in executive-
legislative relations from a particular perspective or trend. Empirical assessment of any case 
should include critical evaluation of the different contexts and institutional designs as well as 
their implications for governmental effectiveness, inter-branch cooperation and democratic 
stability. Worthy of note are the effects of the quality of leadership, perception of the executive 
and legislative actors on governance and its purpose. In addition, the historical legacies, the 
political culture of the people and the power game in the larger society, should be considered 
(O’donnell and Schmitter, 1986; Lipset, 1993; Linz and Stephan 1996; Carey and Shugart, 1998; 
Cheibub and Limongi, 2002; Fagbadebo, 2016). 
2.4 Executive-Legislative Relations in Nigeria: Theoretical Perspectives 
 Existing literature on executive-legislative relations expose extensively the overlapping powers 
between the two arms of government but were largely, conducted in the developed countries 
with different political cultures and established administrative systems and practices (Austin, 
1971; Finer, 1985; Lijphart, 1991; Mainwaring, 1993; Riggs, 1997). A few studies also exist at 
the onset of presidentialism in Nigeria (Okafor, 1981; Nwabueze, 1982; Dudley, 1985).  
These studies show serious concerns about the limitations of legislative assemblies in 
comparison to the executive institutions in emerging democracies of Africa, Asia and Latin 
America; thereby revealing the futility of transplanting issues and solutions from other contexts 
and climes. It is for this reason that this study gives prominence to Nigerian literature on the 
subject matter.  
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An inquiry into the earliest literature of executive-legislative relations in Nigeria’s presidential 
system show the works to include Tamuno (1966), Okafor (1981), Oyediran (1980), Nwankwo 
(1988), Olowu (1990), Awotokun (1992), and Ojo (1998). Among these scholars, the seminar 
works of Tamuno (1966) and Okafor (1981) stood out. These two scholars, apart from providing 
the background information to the study of legislature and executive in Nigeria, situate the two 
within the larger society. Specifically, the relevance of these works is that they provide the 
fulcrum and serve as the basis for the study of the executive and legislative institutions in 
Nigeria. They both agree that the colonial government did not encourage the emergence of 
strong and virile legislature that could play a surveillance role over the executive.  
Scholarly works on the executive-legislative relations in Nigeria can be categorized into two 
broad groups. First, studies on Nigeria’s parliamentary system of the First Republic; and, 
secondly, the various works on the presidential system of the Second, Third and the Fourth 
Republics. Amongst the works devoted to the First Republic are those of Mackintosh (1966), 
Kermode (1968), Tansey and Kermode (1968), Adamolekun (1975), and Abayomi (1970). 
Mackintosh (1966) provides an advanced analysis of the structure, the age, status and occupation 
of the legislators of the First Republic. There is also a brief discussion of legislative oversight 
function and control over the administrative agencies of government under the executive. These 
aspects of Mackintosh’s study provide a link between it and the works of Adamolekun, Kermode 
and Abayomi.  
What is common to these scholars is that they all address their minds to reviewing aspects of the 
legislative functions with a particular reference to its relations with the executive branch. 
Adamolekun’s study covers the colonial period (1952) when quasi- parliamentary system of 
government was first introduced to the end of the democratic rule. The others merely span 
between 1960 and1965. Kermode’s work is general and does not look at any specific sphere of 
executive-legislative relations. This is the same position he adopts in his joint work with Tansey. 
His information is also largely derived from comments of legislators at this period, in contrast to 
the considerable archival and background details provided by Adamolekun. 
All the same, both Kermode and Adamolekun agree that executive-legislative relations were, 
overall, largely, defective and sometimes acrimonious in Nigeria. They agree that the legislators, 
instead of addressing their minds to the issues of legislation and oversight, were pre-occupied 
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with the idea of securing social amenities for their constituencies. They also discovered that 
members did not utilise the opportunity provided by question time in the parliament to ask 
genuine questions that could make ministers responsible. As Adamolekun (1975, p.73) opines, 
‘the majority of the questions were related to the distribution of amenities – postal services, 
electricity, roads, water and so on – and each questioner was primarily interested in securing one 
or more of these amenities for his constituency which was almost every case his home town, 
district or division’. 
 Kermode, on the other hand, observed that legislation was usually passed with such haste that 
little or no time was left for research and debate. Abayomi (1970) articulates this position in his 
work. The work analysed the legalistic dimension which was absent in the other studies on the 
Nigerian legislative and executive institutions in the First Republic. Awotokun (1992) spot this 
as the weakness of the work. According to him, by being legalistic, Abayomi could not address 
himself to some of the basic theoretical issues that could help bring out the real dynamics of the 
two institutions. 
Some efforts have also been made to document the works on executive-legislative relations in 
the Second Republic. The notable ones include the symposium of Oyediran (1980), Nwankwo 
(1988), Olowu (1990), Awotokun (1992), Adamolekun (1985) and several other university 
students’ academic research works. Oyediran’s symposium was written to cover the first six 
months of the presidential experiment hence very limited information was provided. The author 
warned the reader about this when he observed that the contributors did not ‘set out to write a 
strictly academic book’ (Oyediran, 1980, p.7). Contrary to mass media assessment of the 
legislators, the authors found out that the legislators concerned themselves with their personal 
comforts at the expense of other important issues. They also agreed that most of the legislatures 
in the Second Republic were ‘rubber stamp institutions’ (Oyediran 1980, p. 4, 11, 115). 
For Nwankwo and Awotokun, their studies share some basic similarities as they were written in 
form of an overview of the legislative control of administration. They raise two major issues. 
The first is how to reconcile legislative supervisory roles with the executive’s need for 
reasonable discretion in programme administration. The second problem relates to how to 
improve the legislators’ ability to carry out oversight functions without necessarily relying on the 
bureaucracy, which of course is an integral part of the executive. This, they believe, would 
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enhance the institutional capacity of the legislature and improve its standing in the executive-
legislative relations.  
The works of Adegboro (1982) and Ikelegbe (1983), which dwell majorly on the twin 
institutions of the legislature and executive in both Ondo and Bendel States respectively, attempt 
a detailed discussion of executive-legislative relationships in the states. They both agree that in 
spite of the presidential system, political parties played important and influential roles in 
determining the performance of democratic regimes. This position stands out also in the works of 
Ladan (1985), Ojo (1998), Mabudi (1984), Obianyo (1983), and Orji (1983). Political parties are 
an important institution of representative democracy (Adebayo, 2008). Modern democratic 
practice grows and survives on the basis of political parties, which tower above other groups as 
organised platforms for the aggregation and articulation of diverse interests and aspirations that 
make up the nation. As Osaghae (1998) has affirmed, political parties play some crucial roles in 
the democratic process of a nation. These include political recruitment, citizens’ mobilisation as 
well as providing alternative politico-economic agenda and electoral choices for the populace. 
Nonetheless, it is widely believed that the growth and stability of democratic regimes depend 
largely on how well political parties perform their incubating and integrating roles in the polity 
(Iyare, 2004; Omotola, 2009; Omodia and Egwemi, 2011).   
This conclusion is quite apt. It underscores the basic fact that it is not possible to examine the 
operation of Nigeria’s legislative and executive institutions in isolation of its socio-political 
environment, especially the important roles of institutions such as political parties. This 
realization is not evident in other aspects of the literature. Other works include that of 
Adamolekun (1986) and Akpan (1982). These authors, especially Akpan, devote greater parts of 
their works to reviewing the duties of ministers, vis-a-vis the administrators in both pre-
independent and independent Nigeria. Unlike Adamolekun, Akpan was generally descriptive in 
his account. 
Another category in the series includes works by Aiyede (2005) and Ehwarieme (2001). Others 
are Oyewo (2007), Aminu (2006), Osuji (2008), Ugor (2005), Bassey (2006), Eminue (2006), 
Omotola (2006), and Olojede (2006). These authors undertake critical and exploratory 
assessment of the various aspects of executive-legislative relations in the Fourth Republic. 
However, one limitation resulting from these studies is that they did not provide any detailed 
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analysis of the areas of overlapping of powers between the legislature and the executive at the 
state level. Ehwarieme’s works covers only the first eleven months of the presidential experiment 
under former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration. Similarly, Aiyede’s work did not 
include the determination of the threat(s) posed by acrimonious or unhealthy relationship 
between the two arms to Nigeria’s democratic stability and development. 
Oyewo’s work adopted a legalistic approach at unraveling the constitutionality of legislature’s 
oversight functions as provided for in the 1999 constitution. Aminu and Osuji took an insider 
stance to identify ways of improving executive-legislative relations under the administration of 
former president Olusegun Obasanjo. They both agree that a disharmonious executive-legislative 
relation constitutes a great challenge to the nation’s quest for consolidating democracy. While 
Ugor undertakes an examination of the 1999 Constitution as it affects the domains of executive-
legislative relations and other issues, Eminue dwells on the interface and areas of overlapping of 
powers between the executive and the legislative branches with particular reference to the 
budgetary process. He posits that in Nigeria, and in other presidential systems, the major 
decisions tend to be made within the executive branch in the preparation of the budget proposals 
prior to their formal submission to the legislative body. The legislatures are vested with the 
supervisory responsibility over general administration, including the ability and right to amend 
the executive’s budgetary provisions. This, according to him, remains one of the ‘hard-nuts’ in 
executive-legislative stand-offs. 
Similarly, Bassey (2006) submits that the fallout of the acrimonious relationships between the 
executive and the legislature could be fatal to the process of democratic consolidation. After 
making a preliminary contextual clarification of basic issues inherent in the theory and practice 
of the presidential system, he suggests the expansion of democratic space and system 
maintenance based on executive- legislature harmony, as the success of the system is predicated 
on mature democratic spirit and behaviours of its operators. 
Another series of works conducted on Nigeria’s presidential system in the Fourth Republic 
comprise Omotola’s work on impeachment and Olojede’s manuscript on democracy and 
corruption. Omotola (2006) undertakes a review of impeachment and impeachment threats in the 
Fourth Republic and concludes that many forces were responsible for the usual acrimonious or 
“not too healthy” executive-legislative relations witnessed in most states of the federation. These 
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include the society, the character of the state, as well as the manner of contestation for power, 
which is determined, largely, by the character of the elite. Joseph (1991), Ekeh (1975), and 
Osaghae (2002) also shared this same view. 
 In related manner, Olojede (2006) situates the untoward role of corruption in the recurring 
executive-legislative face-offs. He affirms that the seemingly corrupt management of Assembly 
finances has eroded the powers of the legislature from being an effective check on the executive; 
while the executive has also been accused of engineering impeachment of principal legislative 
officers through financial inducement in order to arm-twist the legislature to do its bidding. 
Fagbadebo (2016) also shares this similar view in his study of the politics associated with 
impeachment processes in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. The work dwells on the political forces 
and intricacies behind the incessant cases of impeachment in some selected states. The author 
identified the nature and characteristics of the Nigerian political elite as the prime factor. He 
concludes that resulting from the morbid corruption in the system, most legislative assertions, 
and, by extension, impeachment, remains a mere instrument of political vendetta in Nigeria.  
Onyebuchi (2013) explores the working relationships between the executive and the legislature 
in both parliamentary and presidential systems and affirms that neither of the two systems 
engendered conflictual executive-legislative relations. He avers that the smooth running of any 
form of government is contingent on the character, contents and understanding of the political 
actors and the role players in the system.  
In the same vein, while drawing inferences from the seminar works of Strom (1990) and Huber 
(1996), Eme and Ogbochie (2014) query the bifurcated literature on executive-legislative 
relationships along the parliamentary and presidential praxis, which tended to lay more emphasis 
on the US Congress. Having examined the executive-legislative process in Nigeria’s presidential 
democracy, they observe that the conflicts between the executive and legislature over budget, 
oversight, and vote allocation matters were not only restricted to the Federal Government but 
also a common phenomenon at the sub-national levels. They identify building of strong 
democratic institutions within which elected public officials could better understand their roles as 
the only panacea to achieving harmonious relation between the executive and legislative 
branches. Specifically, Jude and Ika (2013) identify the culture of impunity and flagrant 
disregard for the rule of law as the triggers of the conflicts between the executive and the 
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legislative arms of government in Nigeria. This, they contend, has far-reaching implications for 
good governance and smooth running of government business. To avoid frictions, the authors 
suggest strict adherence to the principles of separation of powers by both arms in ‘the discharge 
of their constitutional duties, while embracing dialogue in resolving their differences’ (Jude and 
Ika, 2013, p.6). 
In another dimension, Obiyan (2013) avers that the increasing incidences of intra-executive 
conflict in the Nigeria’s presidential system, especially at the state levels, have serious impact on 
the tone of executive-legislative relations. He submits that the situation could be remedied via 
consistent display of political maturity and patriotism on the part of the major political actors. 
The findings of the work provided insightful perspectives to pertinent disagreements and 
confrontations between the Governors and Deputy Governors, which often led to the deployment 
of legislative assemblies (usually by the State Governors) to remove their deputies from office. 
This reality shows the unfettered dominance of the executive over state legislatures in Nigeria. 
Not only that, it equally gives further credence to the trend of the existing literature on the issue 
that state legislatures apparently being an unequal partner in the executive-legislative 
relationships, have become willing tools in the hands of state governors (Oni, 2003; Fagbadebo, 
2016; Omitola and Ogunnubi, 2016).      
Obidimma and Obidimma (2015, p.72) opine that executive-legislative relation in Nigeria, since 
the enthronement of presidential democracy in 1999, has been more ‘conflictive than 
collaborative.’ They attribute this development to the prolonged military rule under which the 
legislative arm was always proscribed, and this invariably resulted in reduced capacity of the 
legislature in the new democratic dispensation.  
Similarly, Godswealth et al (2016) explore the factors influencing executive-legislative conflicts 
in Nigeria and identify the ascendancy of military political culture of impunity, over 
centralization, and abuse of power. They also note the tendency of the political actors not to keep 
faith with limits of their powers to be at the centre of executive-legislative rifts that have 
bedeviled the Nigeria’s democratic space since 1999. They, however, conclude that a 
harmonious partnership between the executive and the legislature was possible when each of the 
two arms of government operates within and keep faith with the limits of power assigned to it by 
the constitution. 
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Fawole (2013) considers the gridlocks associated with the conduct of government business at the 
central level of government. He contends that the issue of incessant executive-legislature face-
offs remained the most potent but sinister threat to the Nigeria’s fragile democracy. According to 
him, the constant feuds between the executive and legislative arms could be explained not only 
from the point of view of the cold and sometimes hostile relationships between the chief 
executives and the principal officers of the legislatures, but also has to do with several other 
factors. Among which are newness of the unfolding democratic culture in Nigeria after a 
prolonged military dictatorship, and the unnecessary demonstration of arrogance by the 
executive. Others are, belligerent and insensitive misuse of legislative powers by the legislature, 
and the failure of the ill-informed political actors from both sides of the divide to understand and 
internalize the principles and intentions of the doctrine of separation of powers built into the 
country’s constitution. These often led to the needless face-offs between the two branches of 
government. To avert or minimize both real and potential feuds in the executive-legislative 
interface, the author submits that the relevant political actors in the two branches of government 
should embrace the dictates of separation of powers in the constitution, abide by the rules of 
democratic game, and collaborate to work for the interests of the people. 
Of particular importance is Fawole’s assertion about the ill-informed legislative actors, which 
validated the theoretical insights into the adverse attitudes and dispositions of the legislative arm 
to governance issues since 1999. For the most part, both national and state legislatures have been 
vilified, excessively, by groups sympathetic to the executive describing their main role in 
governance as that of an adversary of the executive branch and have therefore resorted to 
antagonizing the executive at the slightest excuse. For instance, the current 8th National 
Assembly in Nigeria is being perceived in the court of public opinion as antagonistic for 
excessively attacking the executive branch and even portraying itself as distinct from the federal 
government; forgetting that the two branches are only interdependent parts of the same central 
government. Some observers believe that the National Assembly is currently running a parallel 
government outside the executive branch (Vanguard, 2016). 
The views, expressed by these writers, could best be described as the manipulation of public 
perception, of the individuals and groups, in favour of the executive. In presidential democracies, 
the legislature has the constitutional mandates to hold the executive arm of government 
accountable (Adamolekun 2010; Hochstetler 2011; Fagbadebo 2016). Actually, both the notion 
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of separation of powers and the doctrine of checks and balances are deliberate structural designs 
of presidentialism to promote probity, transparency and accountability in government. 
Accountability simply entails the ‘obligation to answer for the performance of duties with a view 
to rectifying failure or abuse of responsibilities through deterrence’ (Mulgan 2011, p.19). 
Essentially, at the core of accountability in a presidential system like Nigeria are the measures 
for correction such as legislative oversight and media investigation via public hearing, which 
requires that relevant units or agencies of government are sanctioned in a transparent manner 
(Jombo and Fagbadebo, 2019). 
Through the exercise of oversight power in a system of separated but shared powers, the 
legislature is recognized, constitutionally, to carry out extensive scrutiny of government policies 
and programmes in a bid to ensuring effective service delivery to the citizenry. The central theme 
of the concept of legislative oversight, Oleszek (2014) has argued, is to ensure effective 
governance through continuous monitoring of the activities of the executive by the legislature. 
Overall, the overriding objective of legislative oversight (scrutiny) is ‘to hold executive officials 
accountable for the implementation of delegated authority’ (Oleszek 2014, p.382). 
The hallmark of presidentialism as a governing system is the existence of co-equals centres of 
power, where the three main organs of government –the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary- operate within the ambit of their constitutional boundaries. They were designed to 
collaborate, as co-equal partners, in the running of government business in order to avert 
tyranny, dictatorship and arbitrariness in government (Kada, 2002; Fagbadebo, 2016). For these 
reasons or so it seems, the presidential constitution of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, recognises and 
puts the legislature in a vantage position as the ‘principal institution responsible for enforcing the 
accountability of the executive branch’ (Jombo and Fagbadebo, 2019, p.129).                     
Ovwasa and Abdullai (2017), in their assessment of the executive-legislative relationships in the 
Fourth Republic, aver that the interface has been a ‘confrontational one, characterized by 
aggressive dominance and meddlesomeness of the executive branch’ under successive 
administration since 1999 (Ovwasa and Abdullai, 2017, p.13). According to them, this has 
manifested in the high turnover of leadership in both houses of the National Assembly. However, 
they argue further that both chambers of the National Assembly appear to be strong and mature 
enough to reject unnecessary influence from the executive.  
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Oni (2013) examines the executive-legislative relations in the Fourth Republic with reference to 
some selected states. The author queries the continued dominance of the legislature by the 
executive arm, and stresses the need to address, urgently, factors that encouraged the 
subordination of the legislature to the executive. As a way out, he suggests a well-defined 
ideology and manifestoes by political parties that would facilitate effective discharge of the 
executive and legislative responsibilities. 
In the same vein, Omitola and Ogunnubi (2016), using the Osun state House of Assembly as a 
case study, explore the role of sub-national legislatures in ensuring accountability in governance. 
They conclude that state legislative assemblies operating in executive-dominated political 
environments, have failed in their responsibilities to serve as checks on executive authority, and, 
therefore, could not muster enough strength and courage to ensure probity and accountability in 
governance at the state levels.              
2.5 Summary 
The literature on the executive-legislative relations in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic asserts that 
executive-legislative relations have been generally defective and acrimonious. A cursory look at 
the various positions and submissions of scholars presented so far reveal three basic themes 
while providing perspectives to the discussion of incessant acrimony between executive and 
legislature in the practice of presidential democracy in Nigeria. These include dialogue 
procedure, cooperative approach to issues of inter-branch importance, and keeping faith with the 
limit of powers assigned to each of the two arms of government in the constitutional scheme.  
There are some limitations on the part of these studies. Aside the failure to include the 
determination of the threats posed by an unhealthy executive-legislative relationship to Nigeria’s 
democratic stability and development, these works appear to be lacking in contextual analysis of 
the socio-political milieu wherein such interactions took place. In other words, an empirical 
investigation of the executive-legislative process including factors that account for divided 
government should involve a systematic consideration of the dynamics of the political 
environment under which the two institutions operate (Perez-Linan, 2007; Oyewo, 2007; 
Omotola, 2006).  
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Similarly, most of these works focused on the Presidency and the National Assembly, which are 
arms of the Federal Government, excluding the developments at the state levels. This is 
considered a vacuum in this area of academic scholarship. It is against this that the study 
interrogates the peculiarities surrounding most cases of executive-legislative stand-offs and their 
consequences on the political systems of the selected states, using the different mechanisms 
provided in the 1999 Constitution. The study examines the peculiarities of executive-legislative 
relations in Ekiti, Ondo, Osun and Oyo States in a bid to fill this gap in the literature. 
The next chapter examines the theoretical frameworks of the study for the analysis of both the 
historical and contextual factors accentuating executive-legislative frictions in the practice of 
presidential democracy in Nigeria. 
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Chapter Three 
System Analysis of Executive-Legislative Relationships in Nigeria’s Presidential 
Democracy 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This study adopts a combination of historical approach and David Easton’s input-output analysis, 
an extract of the system theory as its framework of analysis. In this chapter, efforts are made to 
undertake a lucid exploration of the two approaches, drawing possible links between them and 
the process of executive-legislative relations. The researcher examines and analyse the operation 
of Nigeria’s presidential system within the contexts of these theories.  
The other part examines the relevant structures of governance in the Nigeria’s presidential 
system by exploring the role of each of these structures within the confines of the two theoretical 
frameworks of analysis. This is considered important to show the interplay of power relations 
between the executive and the legislative branches of government. 
However, it is needful to mention that the study adopted two theoretical models because no 
single framework on its own is sufficient to answer all the questions set out for the research. As 
argued by Ikoja-Odongo and Mostert (2006, p. 154), there are strengths and weaknesses in every 
existing model, therefore, the two chosen approaches ‘complement each other, as opposed to 
counteracting or replacing each other.’ Similarly, these frameworks provide unity and 
coordination in the study, including a connection to the previous studies (Understanding 
Research, 2004, p. 143). In other word, the combination of these theories enables deep and 
concise understanding of the subject matter of executive-legislative relations from different 
perspectives by guiding the researcher to see what has been done in previous similar studies.  
3.2  System Analysis of Executive-Legislative Relations 
The system approach is primarily concerned with the analysis of a system in its entirety. A 
system, according to Parsons (1968, p. 453), implies ‘something consisting of a set (finite or 
infinite) of entities among which a set of relations is specified, so that deductions are possible 
from relations among the entities to the behaviour or history of the system’. From the above, a 
system is a set of interdependent parts or components of a given entity. As a process, it involves 
interdependent relationship between and among the components. It also entails interaction with 
the environment. Nwankwo (1999, p. 27) states that the ‘system approach to the study of 
43 
 
organization focuses on the system as a whole; the environment of the system, and the tendency 
for the system to strive for stabilty by negotiating with its environment’. 
Easton (1965) uses this approach to analyze political life. According to him, the political system 
interacts with the environment in term of a process that involves input and output mechanisms. 
The inputs include the demands, material requests, supports and information that are being fed 
into the political system and after due processing and conversion, the products, in terms of 
policies, become the outputs in form of policy-making and implementation. This is again 
modified through the process of information feedback from the environment. 
Fig. I                         Input-Output Model of System Theory 
 
From the systems’ analysis perspective, both the executive and the legislature could be seen as 
relatively persistent entities functioning within the larger environments. The internal process of 
these entities qualified as systems because they have a set of interdependent organs and 
variables, which could be identified and evaluated. As a sub-system within the political system, 
each of the two arms of government has distinguishable boundaries setting them off from the 
environment. Nevertheless, each has a tendency towards a state of equilibrium (Easton, 1965; 
Koontz, 1980; Awotokun, 1992). 
In other words, the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances are intertwined. 
This is so intended because no system of government, which adopts separation of powers, 
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attempts to establish an absolute and total separation (Diamond, 1988; Linz, 1993). This doctrine 
is always modified through the introduction of checks and balances. Hence, the introduction of 
checks and balances provides a kind of equilibrium in the system. The two arms of government 
complement each other in order to make for an effective democracy. 
From the foregoing, executive-legislative relations can also be perceived in term of system 
analysis. The mechanism of functions, which defines the relationship between the two organs, is 
derived from the people, the constitution, political parties, constituency interests, public opinion 
and the likes. All these variables emanated from the environment and help in the determination 
of societal goals. These demands are fed into the political system through the legislature for 
processing. The lawmakers in turns authorise the executive to mobilize societal resources for the 
implementation. These processes can be diagrammatically represented as shown Figure II; 
Fig. II                  System Analysis of Executive-Legislative Relations 
 
Source: Awotokun, K. 1992. Legislative Control of the Executive in the Second Republic. 
Unpublished PhD Dissertation, Ife Library Series, p. 19. 
 
As presented in figure II, ‘A’ represents the process of transmitting information to the Executive 
branch, while ‘B’ is the Executive action. ‘C’ is the result of the Executive action on the 
Legislature, in relation to the target or societal decisions. ‘D’ represents the feedback on the 
result of the Executive action. ‘E’ is the Legislative veto or counter action if any, especially if the 
result in ‘C’ is unsatisfactory. ‘F’ is an intermittent Executive action; ‘G’ is a further Executive 
action. The result of further executive action is expected to be in conformity with the societal 
Legislature Executive C G 
Societal Decisions 
D 
A B 
F 
E 
Environment i.e. The People, 
Constitution, Political Parties, 
Constituency Interest, Public 
Opinion. 
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decisions. The environment which represents the peoples’ will, constitution, political parties, 
constituency interest, public opinion are also expected to influence the societal decisions. 
 
The influence of the environment on the legislative process is expressed in form of support for 
policy outcomes of the government and/or partial or outright rejection of a particular stance or 
policy direction of the state. These demands of the environment, on a continous basis, determine 
the trajectory of policy interactions between the executive and legislative branches of 
government. For instance, undue interference of the executive arm into the internal affairs of the 
legislature especially in selecting leadership of the legislature often attract positive response from 
the citizenry who mostly potray the executive branch as an overlord over the legislature.  
 
Without doubt, these processes aptly represent the exchanges between the executive and the 
legislative arms of government in Nigeria’s presidential system. The 1999 Constitution 
advertently prescribes a measure of power sharing between the executive and legislative 
branches, which demands mutual cooperation and interdependence of the two arms of 
government. However, since the commencement of the Fourth Republic in May 1999, the 
operation of this constitutionally enshrined interface between the two branches has continued to 
generate conflicts, feuds and needless acrimonies which tend to suffocate and slow down 
government business both at the federal and state levels.  
These conflicts are often on the nature, power and scope granted either of the two organs of 
government in the constitutional scheme. More often, in the exercise of its oversight powers, the 
public do perceive legislative scrutiny or disapproval of executive actions as unnecessary 
antagonism to the executive branch. Most Nigerians are still sceptical about the exact 
constitutional role of the legislature in the policy-making process (Fagbadebo, 2016; Fatile and 
Adejuwon, 2016). Some observers view this as one of the carryover effect of prolonged military 
absolutism characteristic of the Nigeria’s political space, which had in its wake, weakened the 
institution of parliament and eroded the decisive role of the legislature in the naion’s democratic 
process (Fashagba, 2012; Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016). 
One important advantage of using system analysis, as noted by Koontz et.al (1980) and 
Awotokun (1992), is that it forces awareness that a phenomenon could not be singled out for 
assessment without consideration of its interacting variables. It also enables one to see the 
critical variables, constraints and their interactions with one another. Oyewo (2007) has argued 
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that a more embracing view and assessment of executive-legislative relations will involve a 
consideration of healthy, acrimonious, or crisis-ridden relations of the two arms within the much 
broader context of social, economic, political and cultural milieu wherein the two institutions 
operate. 
3.3 Historical Approach to Executive-Legislative Relationships 
The historical approach, widely regarded as one of the earliest approaches in political research, is 
a process, which allows gathering of evidence and formulation of ideas about occurrences of the 
past. It is the framework of analysis through which an account of the past is construed. Varma 
(2004) argues that the historical approach to politics seeks to explain political phenomena by 
giving reference to certain facts of history. History, according to him, entails taking records of 
past incidents and facts. It also connotes what people have done, thought, or imagined in 
relations to the issue under study. Dhawan (2016) posits that one basic characteristic of the 
historical approach is that it provides explanation for present or recurrent political phenomena by 
focusing on past events. According to him, history is the storehouse of events. It tells us how 
government and public institutions worked; their successes and failures, and from which lessons 
are taken to guide us in determining the future course of action. 
As noted by Nwabuani (2014), Montesquieu, Savigny, Seeley, Maine, Freeman, Laski, and Karl 
Marx were some of the eminent exponents of the historical method in political research. Karl 
Marx particularly found in historical approach an exclusive method by constructing the origin 
and nature of the capitalist society in crucibles of history (Laski 1992). He uncovered and 
accentuated the unfolding dialectics of societal evolution as class struggle. In similar manner, 
Laski (1992) avers that the study of political institutions is nothing short of efforts to emplace the 
results of experience in the history of states. According to him; 
Political institutions grow instead of being made. They are product of history and 
to know them as they really are, we must grasp the evolution of all those forces, 
which have moulded and shaped them in their present form. Our conclusions 
remain uncertain, if they are not built on historical analysis (cf. Nwabuani 2014, 
p.13).  
 
Without doubt, Laski’s submission is particularly reflective of the Nigerian political system, 
especially when considering the development of both the executive and the legislative 
institutions from independence until date. For instance, what do we make of the seemingly 
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unending antagonisms and incessant frictions between the two organs of government since the 
commencement of the fourth republic in 1999? These developments cannot possibly be divorced 
from the country’s colonial past, which undermined the development of legislative institutions in 
favour of the executive councils reserved only for the expatriates. The country’s protracted 
experience in military dictatorship accentuated a centralist and intolerance political culture, 
devoid of responsible and accountable leadership. Interestingly, all of these variables and facts 
are locked up in the ‘store-house’ of history. Therefore, recourse to history becomes an 
invaluable analytical tool in the search for answers and greater insights into the issue of 
executive-legislative relations.  
A unique strength of the historical approach is that it allows the examination and the analysis of 
the present reality or recurrent political phenomenon based on the dialectics or antecedents of the 
past. It connects the present with the past political phenomenon in a way that provides insights 
into and understanding of the complex issue of politics. As argued by Dhawan (2016), the nature 
and tradition of the present public institutions are determined for us by past events and activities. 
Thus, institutionalisation of the political processes and and practices were consequences of the 
past. In other word, the historical model affords the researcher to see the complete picture of 
issues by allowing him to see the outcome of an event and trace it backwards to its source 
(Mackintosh, 1966; Miller and Joe, 1983; Nwabuani, 2014). Moreover, this framework of 
analysis is particularly useful for this study given the nature of executive-legislative 
relationships, which cannot be assessed, reasonably, without alluding to the events and 
occurrences of the past.   
 
3.4 Executive-Legislative Relations and Governance Structures in the Nigerian 
      Presidential System 
In the Nigerian presidential system, just like in most, if not all political systems, there exist three 
arms of government: the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Collaboratively and inter-
dependently, these three branches of government are in charge of governmental business, which 
include rule making, rule-application and rule-adjudication, respectively. However, for the 
purpose and scope of this study, attention is only given to the interface between the executive 
and legislative branches; particularly the role of each structure in the process of governance. 
First, I begin with the executive. 
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3.4.1 The Executive 
The executive is that branch of a country’s governmental structure, which applies the 
authoritative rules and policies of a society. It is the branch of government responsible for 
decision-making and implementation of the authorised legislation and rules. Ojo (1998) 
describes the executive as the branch of government, which executes the will of the people as 
enacted in the laws. Bassey (2006) conceives the executive arm of government as the aggregate 
or totality of all the functionaries and agencies that are concerned with the execution of the will 
of the state as formulated and expressed in terms of laws. The executive arm of government 
gives effect to the will of the state by executing the laws such as the constitutions, statutes, 
decrees, treaties, and other legal instruments pertaining to the state. 
 
The executive branch has a unique role of providing visibility for the actions (or inactions) of 
government and galvanizing limited societal resources for its realization. In practice, in a 
presidential system, the head of the executive is vested with the executive power, assisted by 
subordinate departments and ministries that are responsible to him. Joseph Lapalombara has 
noted that the political executive provides political directions for governmental agencies and 
institutions and exercise control over administration (Laplombara 1974). 
In the Nigerian political system, the executive arm consists of government ministries, 
departments and agencies headed by the President and Governors at the federal and state levels, 
respectively. The head of the executive branch is both the head of state and head of government. 
As the head of state, the President serves as the nation’s official ceremonial head and symbol of 
national unity.  The President, as the head of government, is the leader of public office holders 
who propose, direct and enforce the nation’s public policies. The Governors also perform similar 
functions in their respective states, but the exercise of such powers is limited to the jurisdictions 
of their states. Section 188 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria specifies 
the powers of the Executive President of the federation while section 288 relates the executive 
powers given to the governor of a state. 
3.4.2 Composition and Powers of the Executive 
The Nigerian presidential system is an adaption from the American model, in which executive 
power is vested in a single Chief Executive, the President, who exercises wide constitutional and 
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discretional powers. The President, elected by a simple majority vote for a period of four years, 
can as well seek re-election for another term but not exceeding two terms of eight years. Section 
130(1) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended stipulates that 
‘there shall be for the Federation a President’. Section 134(1a) states that ‘a candidate for an 
election to the office of the President shall be deemed to have been duly elected for a four-year 
term if he has majority of votes cast at the election; and can seek re-election for another term.’   
Once elected, the president has the entire country as his constituency and has the constitutional 
obligation to appoint at least one Cabinet minister from each of the 36 states making up the 
federation and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. Section 130(4) of the Constitution 
specifies that ‘for the purpose of an election to the office of President, the whole Federation shall 
be regarded as one constituency.’ In the same vein, section 147(1&3) states that ‘there shall be 
such offices of Ministers of the Government of the Federation as may be established by the 
President.’ Any appointment under subsection (2) of this section by the President shall be in 
conformity with the provisions of section 14(3) of this Constitution provided that in giving effect 
to the provisions aforesaid the President shall appoint at least one Minister from each State, who 
shall be an indigene of such State.’ 
The President and his ministers constitute the Federal Executive Council (FEC), which is the 
highest policy-making body in Nigeria. In the same manner, State Governors and their appointed 
Commissioners constitute the State Executive Councils (SECs) for their respective states. Just 
like the president, a state governor is elected for a period of four-year term and a maximum of 
two terms in office as governor. Once elected, the governor has the entire state as his 
constituency and is required, by law, to appoint at least one Commissioner from each of the local 
governments that made up the state. 
The President is the Chief Executive of the nation, to whom all other executives are 
subordinated, while state governors also serve as the chief executive of their respective states. 
Both the President and State Governors are elected for a fixed term, and except in the case of 
definite crime or obvious misdemeanor being judicially proved against them, they cannot be 
removed from office before the expiration of their terms. For more on the workings of the 
Nigerian presidential system, the following will suffice (Nwabueze, 1985; 1992; Nenstadt, 1976; 
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Jacobsen and Lipman, 1979, Anifowose, 2004; 2015; Akinsanya and Davies, 2002; Fagbadebo, 
2016).   
The executive arm of government derived its power from the constitution. These include the 
enforcement of law, execution of administrative policy, the conduct of foreign affairs, the control 
of armed forces and the authority to grant pardon and amnesty to offenders against the state. The 
provision as to the executive powers of the Federation is stated in section 5(1a-b) of the 1999 
constitution, as amended; ‘Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive powers of 
the Federation:  
(a) shall be vested in the President and may subject as aforesaid and to the 
provisions of any law made by the National Assembly, be exercised by him either 
directly or through the Vice-President and Ministers of the Government of the 
Federation or officers in the public service of the Federation; and  
(b) shall extend to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, all laws 
made by the National Assembly and to all matters with respect to which the 
National Assembly has, for the time being, power to make laws.’ (Section 5(1a-b) 
of the 1999 Constitution). 
 
The executive, under the Nigeria’s presidential constitution, is responsible for much of the 
planning of the state so it does not merely execute laws but must also take action on many 
matters not covered by law (Anifowose, 2015). Concisely, the powers and functions of the 
executive under Nigerian presidential system are as follows: 
 Coordination and control of administration. The chief executive has the constitutional 
responsibility to coordinate and control the administrative machinery of government, 
which includes ministries, departments and agencies that function to see to the 
enforcement of law and execution of public policies. 
 Recommendation and initiation of bills for legislative consideration. In fulfillment of its 
obligation to ensure good and orderly conduct of government business as well as meeting 
the yearnings of the citizenry, the executive often recommends and initiate bills for the 
consideration of the legislature for such to become enforceable law and instrument of 
public policy.  
 Power of appointment and removal of public officials. The executive both at the federal 
and state levels in Nigeria has the powers and authority to ‘hire and fire’ officials into its 
administrative units and agencies. Part of this mandate includes power to appoint or 
dismiss cabinet ministers, commissioners, diplomats, and higher administrative officials. 
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It directs their work, supervises their routine, and exercises disciplinary control over them 
depending on the governance philosophy and policy direction of government of the day. 
The executive also has power to appoint Judges based on the recommendations of the 
National Judicial Council (NJC) to the various courts in the country. However, it should 
be noted that most of these appointments have to be confirmed by the National Assembly 
and states legislative assemblies as it were, before they can become effective. 
 Power of delegated legislation. In some instances, the executive arm of government has 
power to issue statutory orders and rules under the power vested in it by the legislature. 
Such power is often necessary to meet changing circumstances and aids quick decision 
making especially during emergencies. 
 Control of the armed forces. The executive exercises control over the military, police, and 
other Para-military forces in the country. For example, the President is the commander-
in-chief of the armed forces and exercises direct control over the military, and this 
include the supreme command of the army, navy and air force. At the state level, the 
governors are the chief security officers in their respective states. Moreover, they 
indirectly oversee the security apparatus in their states. In Nigeria, the President is the 
chief executive of the country and has the power to declare and prosecute war. 
 Conduct of external relations. In Nigeria just like in every other state, the executive is 
charged with the responsibility of conducting relations with other nations. The President 
is the chief diplomat, oversees the formulation and conduct of foreign policy, and 
negotiates all international treaties and agreements. However, under the 1999 constitution 
of Nigeria, such treaties and agreements require senatorial approval before they become 
effective. In addition, in line with his prerogatives and the country’s national interest, the 
President can grant or withhold recognition to the government of a foreign state, 
including dismissal of the ambassador of a foreign state. He appoints, instructs and 
controls the activities of ambassadors, High Commissioners, and other officers in the 
Foreign Service; and sends country’s representatives to international assemblies and 
conferences. 
 Power of prerogative of mercy. The president or a governor as the case may be, has 
power under the Nigerian law to pardon offenders for offences committed against the 
state either before or after trial and conviction. This is often called prerogative of mercy 
or state pardon. In addition, such a pardon either releases an offender from the legal 
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consequences of his crime or remits the penalties imposed like outright cancellation of 
jail term, reduction of a sentence, conversion of death penalty to life imprisonment, or 
delay of execution. Similarly, the chief executive may as a deliberate policy issue a 
proclamation of amnesty to a group or class of persons, in which case such persons are 
relieved or freed from the legal consequences of their actions. For example, at the height 
of militancy in the oil-rich Niger Delta region in 2008, the Federal government of Nigeria 
under the administration of late President Umaru Musa Yar’adua declared amnesty for all 
the militants in the region. This led to massive surrender of cache of arms and 
ammunitions by the restive youths and relative peace and order was subsequently 
restored to the region. In addition, some states such as Benue and Rivers state 
governments under the present administration have deliberately issued amnesty to armed 
youths and cult groups in their respective states as a measure to prevent or curb crimes. 
3.4.3 The Legislature 
The legislature is a fundamental component of democratic government. Invariably, the need for 
legislatures, also known as the parliaments or people’s assembly, is reflected in the very meaning 
of democracy, ‘rule by the people’. For the people to rule, they required a mechanism to 
represent their wishes, make or influence policies in their favour and oversee the implementation 
of those policies. Blondel (2008) may have had this in mind when he conceives ‘the legislature’ 
as that branch of government made up of elected representatives or a constitutionally constituted 
assembly of people whose duties, among other things, are to make laws, control executive 
activities, and safeguard the interests of the people. The Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary defined a legislature as ‘an organized body having the authority to make laws for a 
political unit’. More often, a legislature reflects in its ranks a broad spectrum of a nation’s 
political opinion, and as such is the principal forum for debate on vital issues of national 
importance. Saiegh (2005) has avered that a legislature could serve as a demonstration of 
pluralism, and the need to tolerate diversity and dissent. It also served as a platform for 
compromise and consensus building.  
In the modern state, a legislature consisting of the elected representatives of the people, 
according to Laski (1992, p. 29), has become a vital part of the machinery of government 
because they serve their constituencies in various ways such as ombudsmen or intermediaries 
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between the government and the governed. However, the nomenclatures given to legislatures 
vary from country to country. In Nigeria, the central legislature is known as the National 
Assembly and it consists of two chambers; the Senate and the House of Representatives. At the 
State level, there is a unicameral legislature, called House of Assembly. Under the presidential 
constitution of Nigeria, the life of a parliament is four years, divided into sessions, with one 
session per year, during which it can go on vacations as it deems fit. 
In the current democratic dispensation, most of the laws in Nigeria are in the form of statutes or 
acts of parliament. The central legislature known as the National Assembly has power to make 
and repeal laws for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria or any part thereof with 
respect to matters it has powers as contained in both the Exclusive and Concurrent legislative 
lists under the constitution. In the same manner, the House of Assembly of a state has power to 
make laws for the peace, order and good government of the State or any part thereof with respect 
to any matter contained in the Concurrent legislative list under the constitution5. 
3.4.4 Composition of National and State Houses of Assembly 
The National Assembly, which is a bicameral legislature, is the highest law-making body in 
Nigeria. It consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives6.The Senate is regarded, by 
convention, as the Upper House and has 109 members. Membership and representation in the 
Senate is based on the principle of equality of all states. Therefore, each of the 36 States is 
divided into three senatorial districts and has three senators representing it in the Senate, while 
one senator represents the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. It noteworthy to mention that 
these senators are popularly elected through simple majority votes from across the 109 senatorial 
districts as well as the FCT, and they usually stay in office for four years7.  
In similar manner, the House of Representatives, which is regarded as the lower chamber of the 
National Assembly, has 360 members. Representation in the House of Representatives is based 
on population. In other words, states with larger population have more representatives than states 
                                                          
5The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria specifies the powers and scope of the National Assembly 
and the States Houses of Assembly as regards matters to which they can legislate. For more details, see section 4, 
sub-section 1-5 and 6-9 of the Constitution.  
6
 Section 47 of the 1999 Constitution establishes the National Assembly for the federation, which shall consist of a 
Senate and a House of Representatives. 
7
 Section 48 of the 1999 Constitution specifies the number of senators to be elected from each of the federation and 
the FCT. For more details on qualification and election of a member of Senate in Nigeria, see section 65 and 66 of 
the same constitution. 
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with less population. Just like the Senators, each member of the House of Representatives is 
popularly elected by a simple majority vote for a 4-year term to represent one of the 360 Federal 
Constituencies8into which Nigeria is currently divided. Moreover, the Nigerian National 
Assembly is led a leadership elected by its members and runs its affairs on a contingent of 
committee systems. The leadership usually consists of the Senate President, Deputy Senate 
President, Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Majority Leaders of both chambers, just like Deputy 
Majority Leader, Minority Leader, Whip (Majority and Minority), and Clerk of the House, 
Deputy Clerk; and Sergeant-At-Arms. The National Assembly is a bicameral legislature where 
the Senate President presides over the affairs of the Senate and the Speaker presides over the 
House of Representatives. By convention, the Senate President and the House Speaker are the 
Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the National Assembly, respectively, and they both preside 
over joint meetings of the two chambers.  
However, as against the practice at the federal level, the 1999 Constitution provides for a 
unicameral legislature for the States. This is called the House of Assembly and it has a non-
uniformed membership structure and size, depending on the population and number of Federal 
Constituencies into which such a state is divided. Just like their National Assembly counterparts, 
members of the States Houses of Assembly are popularly elected for a 4-year term9. The 
Speaker, assisted by the Deputy Speaker, presides over the affairs of the assembly10. There are 
other principal officers, such as the Majority and Minority Leaders, among others. 
Representation in the Houses of Assembly is based on population and the number of Federal 
Constituencies into which such a State is divided. In other word, States with larger population 
size and more representatives in the National Assembly do have Houses of Assembly with more 
members than those with less. In Nigeria, the membership size of Houses of Assembly varies 
from one State to another. For instance, these variations exist among the selected states for this 
                                                          
8
 Section 49 of the 1999 Constitution provides for the composition of the House of Representatives: “The House of 
Representatives shall consist of three hundred- and sixty-members representing constituencies of nearly equal 
population as far as possible, provided that no constituency shall fall within more than one State”. For more on the 
qualifications and election of members of the House of Representatives, see sections 65 and 66 of this same 
constitution.  
9
 Section 117(1) provides that every State constituency, established in accordance with the provisions of this part, 
shall be directly elected to a House of Assembly in such manner as may be prescribed by an act of the National 
Assembly. For more on the qualification, membership and election into the States Houses of Assembly, see sections 
106-119 of the 1999 Constitution. 
10
 Section 95(1) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria empowers the Speaker of a House of 
Assembly to preside over its affairs, and in his absence the Deputy Speaker shall preside. For more details on the 
conducts of legislative business of the House, see sections 94-105 of this same constitution.  
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study; Ekiti and Ondo have 26 members each in their Houses of Assembly while Osun and Oyo 
States have 26 and 33-members’ Houses of Assembly, respectively. This is presented in Table I 
as follow: 
Table I   State by State Distribution of Federal Constituencies in South Western Nigeria 
States No. of Senate Seats No. of 
Representatives  
No. of State 
Assembly Seats 
Ekiti 3 6 26 
Lagos 3 24 40 
Ogun 3 9 26 
Ondo 3 9 26 
Osun 3 9 26 
Oyo 3 14 33 
Total 18 71 177 
 
Source: Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Abuja, 2011.  
3.5    Summary 
This chapter discussed the two theories for the study. It examined and analysed the operation of 
these theories within the context of executive-legislative relations in the Nigeria’s presidential 
system. The two theories were utilized because a single theory is insufficient to undertake a 
comprehensive analysis required to cover the scope of the study. The chapter also examined the 
governance structures in Nigeria’s presidential system to show the interplay of power relations 
between the executive and legislative branches of government. It is discovered, theoretically, that 
most of the conflicts between the two arms of government are often on the nature and scope of 
power granted either of the two in the constitutional scheme. 
The hallmark of presidentialism is the safeguard against dictatorship and arbitrariness in 
government. For this purpose, the notion of separation of power and the doctrine of checks and 
balances are intertwined. The essence, as noted by Baumgartner and Kada (2003), is not to 
achieve total separation and independence for the three arms of government, rather to provide a 
kind of equilibrium in the system where the various organs of government complement one 
another to make for effective governance. 
Fagbadebo (2016, p.132) notes that ‘political institutions remain mere abstractions without the 
activities of political actors’. In other words, the ideals, and principles of the structures in the 
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system cannot translate into desired ends without the understanding and commitment of the role 
players within these structures. The theories expose the details of the intricate web of 
relationships between the executive and the legislative branches and draw attention to the events 
of the past in the operation of presidentialism as a governing system in Nigeria. To achieve a 
measure of crisis-free relationship between the executive and the legislature, the political actors 
within these structures are required to exhibit behavioural traits that promote cooperation and 
conciliation in place of overt aggressiveness and confrontation. 
The next chapter examines the evolution and development of Nigeria’s experience in presidential 
system. To achieve this, the researcher traces the history of executive-legislative frictions from 
the Second Republic when the presidential system was first adopted all through to the Fourth 
Republic. 
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Chapter Four 
Executive-Legislative Relations in the Nigerian Presidential System 
 
4.1  Introduction 
This chapter explores the dynamics of executive-legislative relationships in Nigeria from the 
Second Republic when presidentialism was first adopted as a governing system to the Fourth 
Republic. The chapter is divided into five parts. Part one examines the choice of presidential 
system for Nigeria while the second part appraises the history, evolution and development of 
Nigeria’s experience in presidential system. Parts three and four review the nation’s experience 
in executive-legislative relationships in the Third and Fourth republics. These also incorporate 
the experiences at the state levels. The final part summarises the highpoints of the discussion and 
concludes the chapter.  
 
4.2 The Choice of Presidentialism as a Governing System in Nigeria 
The colonial powers bequeathed to Nigeria at independence in 1960 the British Westminster 
parliamentary model. This system was in force until January 15, 1966, when the military took 
over the reins of power. This marked the beginning of a cycle of military rule in Nigeria for 
thirteen years, 1966 to 1979. Prior to the military coup, there was a nationwide outcry against the 
inadequacies and institutional dysfunctionality of the parliamentary system. Thus, there were 
clamours for a new system that would be suitable to address the myriads of challenges facing 
Nigeria. In other words, Nigerians were united in raising their voices against the post-
independence parliamentary system, considered inadequate and unsuitable to galvanise the 
desired oneness of the various sections and groups that make up the country.   
While decrying the inadequacies of the parliamentary system for a country such as Nigeria, 
Bassey (2006, p.129) posits that ‘the adoption of presidentialism as a constructive principle of 
government by the architects of 1979, 1989, and 1999 constitutions was a conscious decision to 
address the specificity of the country’s pluralistic social order’. According to him, in a society 
with deep primordial segmentation along ethnic and religious lines, the fusion of the executive 
and legislative powers in the Westminster model posed serious problem for constitutional 
practice.  
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In preparation for the transfer of power to the civilian government, the Federal Military 
Government set up a Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) in 1975 to help produce a 
Constitution. In an apparent reference to the ‘structural divisiveness’ associated with the 
parliamentary system of the First Republic, the government sought a constitution that would 
‘discourage institutionalized opposition to the government in power, and instead, develop a 
consensus in politics and government’ (Aiyede, 2005, p.65). The Head of State, General Murtala 
Mohammed, proposed to the CDC the consideration of an executive presidential system of 
government (Mohammed, 1976). The CDC sub-committee on the executive eventually 
recommended a presidential system. The plenary session of the CDC approved this 
recommendation and the Constituent Assembly (CA) ratified it. Thus, the Second Republic 
adopted a presidential system of democratic rule.  
However, since its first adoption in 1979, the practice of presidentialism in Nigeria has come 
with its challenges; notable of which is the recurrent executive-legislative gridlocks that have 
slowed down government routines posing serious implications for the country’s stability and 
democratic development. Others include the imbalance federal structure, indigene/settler issue, 
ethnic and religious bigotry, as well as the flawed fiscal structure, among others (Akinbobola, 
2002; Akinsanya and Davies, 2002). In the next segment, the researcher traces the history of 
executive-legislative relationships in Nigeria’s presidential system beginning with the Second 
Republic. 
4.3  Executive-Legislative Relations in the Second Republic 
The period between 1979 and 1983 ushered in the adapted version of the American type of 
presidential system. The Second Republic11 government had Alhaji Shehu Shagari, and Chief 
Alex Ekwueme, as the President and Vice President, respectively. Historically, the experience of 
Nigeria has been one of executive dominance (Aiyede (2005). Indeed, a national daily 
newspaper in 1963 referred to the federal legislature as ‘an expensive and irrelevant talking 
                                                          
11
 Nigeria gained its independence in 1960 but still retained the Queen of England as Head of State. However, by 
1963, a new constitution known as 1963 republican constitution was emplaced which removed the Queen of 
England as Head of State, and this constitution was in force until the country’s first military coup of 1966.  
Therefore, in the Nigerian constitutional lexicon, the period between 1963 and 1966, and 1979 and 1983 are 
regarded as First and Second Republics, respectively. Similarly, the era of inconclusive political transition of 
General Babangida’s military government is often unceremoniously described as the botched third republic, while 
the ongoing democratic experiment which commenced in May 1999 is regarded as the fourth republic. For more 
details, see Awotokun, 1998, pp. 189-190; Olukoshi, 1999, pp. 177-196.   
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shop’ (Oyediran 1990, p. 11). This was because, in spite of the huge cost it required to maintain 
federal assembly, the legislative body could not function actively in the policymaking process as 
envisaged by the Constitution. Most of the parliamentarians were concerned with their welfare 
and political gains. Thus, the major issue in the Second Republic was how to strengthen the 
legislature so that it could function as an effective check on the executive as well as an active, 
vigorous partner in the making of public policy. 
The Constituent Assembly had envisaged a legislature that would be empowered to make laws, 
an institution that would play the role of a protector and watchdog of the people’s rights against 
any encroachment from any quarters – be such quarters such as other branches of government or 
external interests (FGN 1987, p.209). It was in the light of this that section 135 of the 1979 
Constitution empowered the National Assembly to remove the President on the grounds of gross 
misconduct and forbade the courts to entertain any action brought before them on impeachment. 
Section 135 (11) of te 1979 Constitution also afforded the legislature to determine what 
constituted gross misconduct. However, the danger inherent in this combination of powers vested 
in the legislature did not really manifest its potential in the national government.  At the national 
level, the ruling National Party of Nigeria (NPN) did not control majority in the National 
Assembly and had to enter into an alliance with the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP). Politics in 
each of the two houses of the National Assembly was characterized by alliance forging in the 
march towards the 1983 general elections (Maduagwu and Uche, 1992).  
However, when the NPN/NPP alliance collapsed, the Second Republic began to witness friction 
in executive-legislative relations. With its limited influence in the parliament, the NPN-led 
executive began to face serious opposition from the legislature such that many executive 
proposals to the parliament were blocked (Maduagwu and Uche, 1992). For instance, the Senate 
stood down many presidential nominees sent to it for confirmation, while the House of 
Representatives consistently withdrew capital allocations to some government agencies in the 
appropriation bill until the intervention of some eminent Nigerians and elderstatemen 
(Awotokun, 1998). Many observers believed that it was as if the opposition parties in the 
parliament were ‘committed to a strategy of engineering the political paralysis of the federal 
legislature in order to render the NPN-led Federal Government ineffective’ (Ikoku 1985, p.85).   
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In Ondo State, the legislature threatened to remove the Governor, Chief Adekunle Ajasin, 
through an impeachment process, on the allegation of non-remittal of funds due to the assembly 
(Akinsaya and Davies, 2002; Omotola, 2006). Nevertheless, intervention of the leadership of the 
ruling party in the State, the Unity party of Nigeria (UPN), resolved the impasse.  Nonetheless, 
the case was different in Kaduna State, where the irreconcilable differences between the 
governor, Alhaji Balarabe Musa, and the state legislature, led to the removal of the governor 
through an impeachment process (Fagbadebo 2016).  
The Governor won the election on the platform of the People Redemption Party (PRP), which 
had only sixteen members in the 99-member legislature while the National Party of Nigeria 
(NPN) won sixty-four seats in the legislature, an overwhelming majority sufficient to fulfill the 
constitutional requirement of impeachment against the governor. The other parties in the election 
such as the Great Nigeria Peoples’ Party (GNPP), the Nigeria Peoples’ Party (NPP), and the 
Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) had ten, six, and three members respectively (Nwabueze 1985; 
Awotokun 1998). As noted by Fagbadebo (2016, p.88), the 1979 election ‘produced a divided 
government’ in Kaduna state. The divided-government in the state was the major obstacle to a 
smoothened executive-legislature relationship as the antagonistic posture of the two branches of 
government led to gridlocks (Nwabueze 1985).    
This again accentuates Juan Linz position on gridlocks as a characteristic feature of presidential 
system. Linz (1994; 2010) identifies four major pitfalls inherent in presidential systems, which 
he considers as the ‘perils of presidentialism’, among which are the independent origin and 
sources of power of the president and the legislature; gridlocks emanating from the dual 
legitimacy of the president and the legislature; and the tendency towards personality politics 
(Fagbadebo 2016; Hochstetler 2011). Linz expresses concerns about the consequences associated 
with the unipersonal nature of the office president, in this case now the office of the governor, in 
a situation of divided government where ‘parties that offer clear ideological and political 
alternatives’ (Linz, 2010, p.257) control the legislature. A situation Shugart and Haggard (2001) 
describe as a clear invitation for the executive and the legislature to pursue separate purposes in 
the political system. Separate elections for the executive and the legislature characteristic of 
presidential systems, they reason, portend a great possibility for the two arms of government to 
pursue dual purposes, even if a single party controls both executive and the legislature (Shugart 
and Haggard, 2001, pp.64-66).     
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Nevertheless, apart from the impeachment of Balarabe Musa in Kaduna state, the Second 
Republic also recorded several other cases of executive-legislative face-offs resulting into 
impeachment or its threats. In Kano state, for example, the legislature removed the Deputy 
Governor on the ground of his refusal to perform duties assigned to him by the Governor 
(Adegboro, 1982). Similarly, the legislatures in Bendel and Cross River States threatened to 
impeach their governors (Davies 1996; Ikelegbe 1983). In Gongola state, 43 members out of the 
61-member legislature tabled an impeachment motion against Governor Abubakar Barde on May 
31, 1982, on eight-count charges of gross misconduct (Mabudi 1984; Joseph 1991). The 
governor denied all the charges and the legislature subsequently discontinued with the process.  
In River State, the legislature refused to proceed with the motion of impeachment tabled by nine 
Honourable members of the assembly led by Mr Dickson Dipriye against the Governor and his 
Deputy (Akinsaya and Davies, 2002). The sponsors of the motion alleged the Governor and his 
deputy of ‘financial mismanagement, corruption, nepotism, incompetence and personal 
indiscipline’ (Akinsaya and Davies, 2002, p.150). 
The UPN-controlled states in the Second Republic adopted cooperative approach in the 
relationships between the executive and the legislature. This was largely dictated by the 
predominance of one party in the executive and legislature, and the effectiveness and 
cohesiveness of the ruling party in conflict resolution between the two arms of government.  It 
could be asserted, therefore, that a smoothened relationship between the executive and legislature 
was a function of the cohesiveness of the party leadership. On the contrary, however, the events 
in the UPN in Ondo and Bendel states, during the period contradicted this position. It also 
revived Juan Linz’s argument about gridlocks as one the ‘perils of presidentialism’ (Linz, 1994; 
2010). Linz contends that under a presidential system, the executive and the legislature do not 
rise or fall together and those who compose them are elected on their individual recognition. 
Thus, it makes no difference if the same party controls the two arms, as they are not tied to their 
party position in the discharge of their responsibilities. (Linz 1994; Aiyede 2005).  
However, Oyewo (2007) has observed the possibility of misconstruing the tendency towards 
consensus building approach, in the discharge of legislative powers, as the supremacy of the 
executive over the legislature, and the weakness of the legislature in asserting its independence 
and oversight over the executive in the states. Nevertheless, one noticeable trend in the Second 
Republic is the fact that most of the legislators, in the first legislative assemblies, could not 
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secure a reelection. As noted by Ojo (1998), this development continued to encourage the 
dominance of the executive arm over the legislature. The legislators require long period of 
serving in their role as peoples’ representatives to garner the requisite experience and pedigree 
needed to be able to serve as an effective check on the executive. However, the high turnover of 
legislative membership made it impossible for parliamentarians to accumulate relevant 
knowledge and experience that could improve their competences in the discharge of their 
legislative duties.  
At one time or the other, the civilian government could not contain the spate of violence that 
characterised the affairs of the state, especially the outcome of the 1983 general elections. 
Coupled with the feasible rampant of corruption, the military struck with another coup to 
dislodge the civilian government on December 31, 1983. This led to another round of military 
dictatorship.  
4.4  Executive-Legislative Relations under the aborted Third Republic 
Following the collapse of the Second Republic and the return of military rule in Nigeria, there 
was no initial action by the military to return the country back to democracy. The Buhari military 
regime that took over power in 1983 gave no time frame for any political transition to civilian 
rule. On August 27, 1985, General Ibrahim Babangida led another palace coup that ousted the 
Buhari regime (Ikoku 1985; Ihonvbere 1996; Agedah 1993). On assumption of power, the new 
military administration stepped up the planned programme of a return to civilian administration. 
One of such moves was the selection of a Constitutional Drafting Committee to draft a new 
constitution for Nigeria. The Committee was, however, preceded by the Political Bureau set up 
by the Military regime to organise and collate political debates throughout the country (Osipitan, 
2004, p.22; Ugoh, 2005, p.168). 
After considering the experience of the Second Republic, especially the abuse of power by the 
executive arm of government, the danger of executive dictatorship emerged as the major concern 
of the Political Bureau of 1987 (Akinsaya and Davies 2002; Awotokun 1998). Nonetheless, this 
reservation was not strong enough to stop the Bureau from recommending presidentialism as the 
best governing system to serve the need of Nigeria’s unity and cohesiveness (FGN, 1987, p. 
168).  
63 
 
The Bureau was more concerned with the unhealthy rivalry and competition for supremacy 
between the two Chambers of the National Assembly that characterised the Second Republic. To 
this end, it recommended a unicameral legislature as a way out of the imbroglio. The Bureau also 
recommended that Ministers and Commissioners should be present when the legislature is 
discussing matters affecting their ministries. Aside from this, the Bureau recommended that 
ministers and commissioners should be made special non-voting members of legislative houses 
(FGN, 1987, p. 215). The Bureau conceived these recommendations as a panacea, to improve 
legislative capacity as an effective check on the executive in a system of separated but shared 
powers. Nevertheless, the government rejected these recommendations. 
The Third Republic commenced not as a full civilian government. Elected civilians occupied the 
executive and the legislative branches of the government at the state and local government 
levels. At the national level, there was an elected legislature, which functioned along with the 
National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) headed by the military (Davies 1996; Ihonvbere 
1996). Thus, while the governments at the state and local levels were constituted, democratically, 
only the legislature at the national level was a resemblance of a democratic structure. The 1989 
constitution made provisions for a two-party system, with the formation of two political parties 
by the government: The National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP). The military government finally aborted the Third Republic when the government 
annulled the result of the 1993 presidential election (Nwokedi 1995; Awotokun 1998).  
On August 26, 1993, the military president, General Ibrahim Babangida, stepped aside and 
constituted an Interim National Government (ING) led by a selected civilian, Chief Earnest 
Shonekan (Ihonvbere 1996; Ojo 1998; Olson 2002). Three months after, on November 17, 1993, 
General Sani Abacha displaced the ING, dismantled all the democratic structures at all levels and 
assumed power as another military head of state.  
The 1989 Constitution, which was supposed to be the foundation of the Third Republic, made 
provisions for separation of powers between the executive and legislative arms of government. 
Part II comprising of sections 4, 5 and 6 of the constitution specify the powers of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria and divide such powers into legislative, executive and judicial powers of the 
Federation. Section 4(1-9) vested the legislative powers of the federation in the National 
Assembly and that of a State in the House of Assembly of the state. Section 5(1-5) vested the 
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executive powers in the President or State Governors in accordance with their jurisdictions; and 
that of Local government in the Chairman of Local Government Councils. And more 
importantly, section 5(1a and b) of the constitution specifically states that the exercise of 
executive powers by the either the president or governors shall be in accordance with the laws 
made by the National Assembly or State Houses of Assembly, respectively. While section 6(1-6) 
vested the judicial powers in the courts, as established for the Federation or the States.  
However, in contradiction to these constitutional provisions, the legislature operated by the 
provisions of Decree No. 53, which subordinated the National Assembly to the NDSC largely 
composed of military personnel (Awotokun 1998). Not only that, it divested the National 
Assembly of legislative powers and authority in twenty out of the thirty-eight items on the 
exclusive list as provided for in the 1989 Constitution, thereby limiting its power to only cultural 
and topographical matters (Nwabueze, 1985).  
The NDSC had the military President as the chairman, and composed of the Vice President, the 
Chief of Defence Staff, the Service Chiefs, the Inspector General of Police, the Chairman of 
Transitional Council (as an observer), the National Security Advisor and three other members 
(Agedah 1993; Nwokedi 1995; Olukoshi 1999). By the provisions of the Decree, the NDSC was 
the supreme lawmaking organ in Nigeria and the National Assembly was only a subordinate to it. 
It states that ‘All bills passed into law by the National Assembly shall be approved by the 
National Defence and Security Council and endorsed by the President and Commander-in-Chief 
of the Armed Forces’ (FGN: Decree Nos. 53 and 54 of 1992). 
The decree barred the National Assembly from legislating on important matters, which the 
military in its own ‘wisdom’ declared as ‘no go areas’ (Olukoshi 1999, p.180). These included 
finance (budget), defence, census, external affairs, laws, tariffs, internal affairs, banking, bills of 
exchange, imports, exports, labour, trade unions and industrial relations. It only conceded trivial 
matters such as citizenship, topography, aviation, extradition, and road construction. With this 
kind of political arrangement, the National Assembly was only ‘a toothless bulldog’ (Agedah, 
1993, p.189). 
However, in a swift reaction to Decrees 53 and 54 of 1992, the Senate set up an ad-hoc 
committee to study the provisions of the decrees and report to it (Davies 1996). The report of the 
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committee stated that as long as the provisions of the decrees were in force, the National 
Assembly stood as a moribund institution (Davies 1996, p.39).   
In view of this, the National Assembly, in its letter to the President, insisted that the government 
should abrogate the decrees (Awotokun, 1992). Aside from this, the legislators wanted the 
military President to remove the ‘no goareas’ in addition to being able to bypass the NDSC and 
have its bills sent to the President directly for his assent as provided for in the 1989 Constitution. 
Section 57(4) of the 1989 Constitution made provision that any act duly passed by the National 
Assembly must be sent to the President for his assent before it could become law. However, the 
promulgation of Decrees 53 and 54 of 1992 set aside the powers of the National Assembly to 
make law on important national matters. Even in cases where the National Assembly could make 
laws, the decrees directed that such laws should be sent to the National Defence and Security 
Council (NDSC) for vetting.   
By these actions, the National Assembly was in effect challenging the executive absolutism and 
supremacy of the Military Government over the civil order (Awotokun 1998, p. 187). The 
insistence of the military on the existence of NDSC was a ploy for the continued existence of 
military dictatorship and the need to provide a kind of basis for Babangida’s military presidency. 
The two institutions, the National Assembly and the NDSC, were diametrically opposed to each 
other, thereby heightened the political tension in the country. This state of affairs, more than any 
other things, gave rise to operational friction between the two institutions. The NDSC, as part of 
the military administration, wanted the status quo to continue while the National Assembly was 
more interested in passing populist bills such as social welfare packages that would ameliorate 
the condition of the people and would elevate the relevance and status of the legislative body. 
The experience was not so different at the state level. This was because, President Babangida, 
through Decree 50, empowered State Governors to bypass their legislative assemblies in 
deciding on issues over which there were clash of interests. The decree amended section 49 of 
Decree 50 of 1991 by substituting the existing subsection (2) with a new one, which states:  
Any appointment to the Office of Commissioner of the government of a state shall 
be made by the Governor. Any appointment to the Office of the Commissioner of 
the government of a state made after the commencement of this decree shall be 
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deemed to have been validly made under the decree and no question as to the 
validity of that appointment shall be entertained in any court or tribunal12. 
This decree, which breached the 1989 Constitution13, was a response to the claims by some State 
Governors that members of their States Houses of Assembly were demanding bribes to perform 
their constitutional duties (Olukoshi, 1999; Aiyede, 2006).  The governors complained that the 
lawmakers were fond of using blackmail to score cheap political points, especially when 
considering nominees for cabinet positions and passing of budgets submitted to the legislature 
(Olukoshi, 1999; Aiyede, 2008). 
Relatedly, the decree had the propensity to undermine the legislature, in what otherwise could 
have been a healthy political interplay of checks and balances under a presidential democracy 
(Davies, 1996; Awotokun, 1998). For instance, the Osun State House of Assembly had 
questioned the State Governor, Mr Isiaka Adeleke, over the propriety of appointing two 
commissioners rejected on the grounds of tax default (Davies, 1996).  Evidently, the Governor, 
armed with the new decree, refused to provide any plausible explanation to the legislature on the 
account that the new decree shielded the executive from legislative scrutiny. 
Throughout this period, the provisions of these decrees dampened the morale of the legislators, 
who felt that the military had unpatriotically colluded with the state chief executives to 
undermine the legislature. On the other hand, General Babangida, the ‘Military President’ never 
hid his disdain for the legislature. In his opening address at a National Seminar in 1992, he said 
Needless confrontations, undue harassment of the executive, disdain for the 
judiciary and electorate, unrealistic demands, are just a few of the things you 
legislators need to avoid if Nigeria is to make a success of a third democratic 
experiment (cf. Awotokun, 1998).   
Similarly, the needless struggle for influence between executive and legislative actors was 
considered an outgrowth of the widespread corruption at the state levels (Akinsanya and Davies, 
2002; Fagbadebo, 2016). These struggles were capable of widening the gulf between the 
executive and legislative branches. Oftentimes, the legislature would threaten to commence 
impeachment proceedings against the governors at the slightest excuse. For instance, the Lagos 
State House of Assembly at the period threatened to impeach Governor Otedola of Lagos for 
                                                          
12
 Section 49(2) of Decree 50 promulgated by the Military Government of General Ibrahim Babangida, 1992. 
13
 Section 190(2) of the 1989 constitution provides that ‘any appointment to the office of Commissioner of the 
Government of a State shall be made by the Governor after confirmation by the House of Assembly of the State’. 
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“showing disrespect” to it by revoking land allocations made to its members. In Cross River 
state, legislators threatened to remove the governor for daring to ask the basis for fixing N25, 
000.00 per annum to each legislator as salary and allowance of a personal assistant (West Africa, 
1992:1565). 
Another noticeable trait of the Third Republic legislature was the factionalisation and ‘in-
fighting’ that rocked most of the State Houses of Assembly. The legislators had the tendency to 
resort to acts of brigandage in settling disputes even among themselves. For instance, in the 
House of Assembly of Akwa Ibom state, the honourable members suspended the Speaker, 
Deputy Speaker, Majority and Minority Leaders for ‘awarding contracts to ‘themselves alone’, 
recruiting staff indiscriminately, misappropriation of funds and bad administration’ (Davies 
1996; Oni 3013). Instead of the affected officials to accept their suspension, or at best, sought for 
judicial intervention, they contested the suspension with a free- for- all fight (Olukoshi 1999).  
In the same vein, Kastina state House of Assembly witnessed a row between the Speaker, Alhaji 
Shehu Bala Zongo, and the House Committee Chairman on Education, Alhaji Bashina Babba 
Kaita (Agedah 1993; Aiyede 2005). The two of them resorted to physical combat following an 
allegation that the chairman of one of the House Committees had engaged in smuggling. In Osun 
State House of Assembly, legislators resorted to jumping the fence to avoid dastardly acts of 
hoodlums sponsored by some of them to disrupt the business of the House (Odom 1993; 
Lawrence 2000). These acts of the legislators were a common occurrence in the period with far-
reaching implications for executive-legislative relations and the overall stability of the system 
(Aminu, 2006; Omitola and Ogunnubi 2016; Fagbadebo 2016). 
Internal wrangling among members of the legislature was also seen in the crisis, which engulfed 
Cross River State House of Assembly during the period under review (Osuji 2008). The 
assembly was to be under the control of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which won 15 seats 
as against the National Republican Convention (NRC)’s 13 seats. This was never be as the NRC 
also won the governorship seat of the state thereby controlling the executive.  
The crisis originated from a court injunction against six of the 15 legislators of the SDP in the 
House. By this act there was a reversal in the 15- 13 majority hitherto enjoyed by the SDP in 
favour of NRC. The 13 NRC members of the house with the backing of the state government 
took firm control of the assembly under its new-found majority arising from the court verdict 
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against the six SDP legislators. The SDP legislators refused to respect the court injunction; 
protested and demanded a suspension of the appointment into key offices in the legislature. At 
the height of the crisis, they called on the Federal Military government to declare a state of 
emergency in the assembly. Indeed, the SDP legislators moved en masse to far away Lagos to 
protest and advertise their dissatisfactions (Olukoshi 1999; Oyediran 1999).  
The dissatisfaction of the SDP legislators in the state must have stemmed from the support and 
recognition given to their NRC counterparts by the Cross-River State Government, which was 
also under the control of the NRC. Political expediency would demand that the state government 
would prefer and use every means at its disposal to have a legislative assembly controlled by its 
own party. Nevertheless, rather than a resort to violent acts, the legislators ought to have sought 
for democratic means to resolve such issues. Democracy can only endure and survive if the 
operators of the system are committed to democratic principles, such as respect for established 
rules and procedures, tolerance, cooperation, consensus- building, mutual responsibility to 
mention but a few. Some scholars have argued that the youthfulness and inexperience of the 
majority of members of the legislatures partly provided an explanation for the shoddy 
performance of legislative politics at that time. Legislative decorum would require that the 
legislators be concerned about the consequences of their action (Nwokedi, 1995; Ihonvbere, 
1996). 
In Imo state House of Assembly, there was a serious impasse, which resulted in the emergence of 
two speakers (Odom 1993). The split in the legislature was occasioned by the desire of some 
legislators to create autonomous communities with their own recognised king. This polarised 
their ranks and pitched them against the Executive. 
During same period, the Southwestern states of Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo among which 
constitute the selected states for this study were under the firm control of the Social Democratic 
Party (SDP). The party controlled a majority of seats in the Houses of Assembly as well as the 
executive arm of government. Ordinarily, one would think that the one-party dominance in the 
states would have provided the right atmosphere for harmonious relationships between the two 
arms of government; if at all, the legislature had not been ripped of its autonomy in the first 
instance. However, as hinted earlier, the Federal Military Government had erroneously and 
unpatriotically shielded the state governors to the point that oversight functions of the legislature 
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were circumvented, and vital issues of legislative competence hijacked from the assemblies as 
‘no-go-areas’. 
The legislature at all levels in the Third republic was weak and bereft of any institutional 
relevance. They could not command the respect of the people who voted for them. They were so 
divided within, that they could not take a decisive action to avert the drift, consequent upon the 
annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections. Instead, some state legislatures, controlled 
by the NRC passed resolutions calling on the government not to ‘hand over in chaos’ (Nwokedi, 
1995). This implied that the head of the military government, General Babangida, should 
continue to administer the country as a de facto Military President.  
In view of the structural weakness of the legislature in the Third Republic, there was no 
appreciable impact of the legislative activities on governance. Indeed, the Third Republic was ‘a 
marriage of inconvenience’ (Anifowose 2004, p. 252). As argued by Aiyede and Isumonah 
(2002), at the instance of the promulgation of Decree No. 53, the protracted exchanges between 
the executive and the legislature up till the annulment of the June 12, 19993 presidential election 
‘epitomizes an epoch in legislative humiliation’ (Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016, p.100).    
Nevertheless, the history of executive-legislative relations in Nigeria would be incomplete 
without the accounts of the Third Republic. In view of the chequered political history of Nigeria, 
the legislative arm of government has not been given equal opportunity to develop along with the 
executive in terms of institutional processes, role perception as well as rules of conduct. The 
occurrences of the Third Republic, if not anything, have further affirmed this crucial fact and that 
is apposite for the core objectives of this study.  
4.5  Executive-Legislative Relations in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic 
Following the adoption of a presidential system and the commencement of the Fourth Republic 
in 1999, executive-legislative acrimony has become a major concern for democratic growth and 
sustainability in Nigeria. Fatile and Adejuwon (2016, p. 92) opine that executive-legislative face-
offs have been ‘a recurring phenomenon in the Nigeria’s political evolution’. According to these 
authors, in spite of the anticipatory provisions of the 1999 constitution aimed at rectifying some 
of the pitfalls of the previous republics, the Fourth Republic follows the same conflictual pattern 
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in executive-legislative relationships characteristic of both the Second and the aborted Third 
Republics.  
Executive-legislative impasses characterised government activities at all levels of government in 
Nigeria. Obidimma and Obidimma (2015) and Ukase (2014) have noted that a scrutiny of the 
interface between the executive and legislative branches, particularly, from 1999 until date, 
reveal a highly conflictual relationship between the two branches of government with far-
reaching consequences for the country’s democratic process. Lawrence (2000), whose view aptly 
describes the incessant frictions between the two arms of government since the nation returned to 
civil rule in 1999, had this to say: 
The executive at the Federal (and State) levels has asserted its powers many times 
without recourse to the courts, which portrays it rightly or wrongly as dictatorial. 
Some of its actions are constitutionally questionable. The legislature is no better. 
For months, it agonized about autonomy and separation of powers but happily 
coveted the executive function of awarding building and town planning contracts.  
The executive said it had no such power (Lawrence 2000, p.13). 
A number of scholars (Aiyede 2005; Fatile and Adejuwon 2016; Fagbadebo and Francis 2016; 
Kaur 2007; Omitola and Ogunnubi 2016) of executive-legislative conflicts, both at the national 
and state levels, have attributed the problem to the damaging legacy of a prolonged military 
dictatorship. During the military regimes, democratic institutions, especially the legislature, were 
rendered non-functioning. Therefore, it would take a reasonable time for the civil society coming 
from such past to accept and accord the legislature its rightful place in the democratic process. 
As Dorgu (2000) submits 
The effect of military’s myopic approach to solving problem has left almost 
indelible big scars on the psyche of the civil society. It will be delusive therefore 
to expect a swift mental change with the introduction of civil rule. We have just 
left the starting blocks. Military tendencies will decay gradually if efforts are 
made in the right direction to evolve a democratic society. Thus, the greater 
majority of our honoured legislature in this nascent democratic experience has not 
enough relevant experience to fall back (on). 
 
Similarly, Fashagba (2009) and Lafenwa (2009), in their separate studies, shared note that a 
number of miscalculations of the Obasanjo regime in relation to policy matters requiring 
legislative approval such as the deregulation of petroleum products and the Universal Basic 
Education bill, could be attributed to the ‘militaristic and authoritative mindset’ of the executive. 
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On the other hand, members of the legislative assemblies, as Ben Lawrence (2000) has noted, 
‘think they have the power of life and death. Yet only the courts can interprete whether they have 
such powers. But they won’t go to court’. This mindset and groupthink factor, according to 
Bassey (2006, p.135), have been held responsible for the ‘fiscal and legislative rascality’ 
displayed in the national and some state legislative assemblies. 
Overall, the legislature has been a major victim of the incessant military intervention in the 
politics of Nigeria. The military regimes did not only fuse legislative and executive functions; 
they also institutionalized a system and culture of government that was extremely executive-
centred. This explained the reason why the General Abdulsalami Abubakar’s regime in 1999, 
failed to make adequate provisions for infrastructure and resources required for the effective 
function of the legislature. The legislators assumed office only to find, to their dismay, that they 
lacked office space, communication equipment and library for their work (Aminu 2006; Olojede 
2006). The 1999 budget did not include a provision for the National Assembly. The situation 
worsened by the absence of the legislative tradition and culture.  Hence, the immediate 
preoccupation of the National Assembly leadership after its inauguration in June 1999 was to 
provide its own operational environment as part of the effort to establish its status as an 
important arm of government (Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016).  This, among other issues, provided 
the fertile ground for executive-legislative conflicts. 
In July 1999, the first conflict arose over the furniture allowance palaver (Fatile and Adejuwon 
2016). Members of the National Assembly were paid between 21,000 and 14,000 naira daily as 
accommodation allowance, because their official quarters were still under renovation. Once the 
houses were ready, the legislators demanded an allowance between 3 and 5 million naira to 
enable members furnished their residential quarters. These amounts were part of the allowances 
duly approved by the Revenue Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission (RMFC), an agency of the 
Federal government saddled with the responsibility of determining and fixing salaries and wages 
of public servants in Nigeria.  This demand immediately pitched the legislature against the 
executive who felt the task of furnishing the legislative quarters was the responsibility of federal 
bureaucracy. The demands were legitimate, given the fact that the legislators were only 
demanding for the implementation of rules set by RMFC. The action of the president did not go 
down well with lawmakers and it marked the beginning of the disagreement between the 
executive and the legislature (Aiyede, 2005). 
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Another noticeable conflict between the legislature and executive during this period was the 
recurrent disagreement over budgetary provisions made by parliament for the accelerated 
development of legislative infrastructure as well as conflict over the distribution and execution of 
capital projects in the country (Eminue, 2006).  
There is no doubt that the legislature explored its appropriation power to make provisions for 
infrastructural and institutional facilities to strengthen the capacity of the legislature. 
Nevertheless, these efforts further deepened its conflicts with the executive because of the 
disagreements over the limits and extent of such powers (Ehwarieme, 2001). The two organs of 
government were also at loggerheads over the allocation and execution of public projects. While 
the executive claimed an exclusive constitutional right to allocate and execute projects as 
contained in the budget proposals, the legislature believed such projects should be implemented 
in a way that reflected their interests and inputs (Aiyede 2005; Oyewo 2007). To this end, the 
lawmakers sought for the allocation of constituency projects to be executed by the lawmakers in 
their different constituencies. They maintained that this would give them the opportunity to 
provide dividends of democracy to their constituents. The members of the executive felt it was 
uncalled for, and for that reason, empirical evidences (Jogbodo, 2001; Uchendu, 2008; 
Obidimma and Obidimma, 2014; Okpe, 2014; Ukase, 2014) suggest that such projects were 
consistently being disregarded in the implementation process. 
This development brought into the fore, the debates about the desirability of the institutional and 
structural designs of presidential systems. Juan Linz (1994; 2010) revives this debate by 
identifying two principal institutional characters of the presidential system, which makes it 
susceptible to instability.  
1. Both the president, who controls the executive and is elected by the people (or 
an electoral college elected by the people for that purpose), and an elected 
legislature (unicameral or bicameral) enjoy democratic legitimacy. It is a system 
of “dual democratic legitimacy.” 2. Both the president and the congress are 
elected for a fixed term, the president’s tenure in office is independent of the 
legislature, and the survival of the legislature is independent of the president. This 
leads to what we characterize as the “rigidity” of the presidential system (cf. 
Fagbadebo, 2016, p. 35-36).  
Linz believes that in the event of a disagreement with the legislature over issues relating to 
public policy, the president could enlist the support of the unsuspecting public by claiming a 
nationwide democratic legitimacy. A development, he claims, might aggravate the conflicts 
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between the two branches, and ultimately lead to the collapse of government (Linz, 1994; 
Fagbadebo, 2016). 
In a related development, the position of Linz in relation to the ‘perils of presidentialism’, which 
he identifies as the major pitfall of presidential systems, is in a way, corroborated by Peterson 
and Greene (1993), in their study of executive-legislative conflict in the United States between 
1947 and 1990. They identify partisan and constituent reasons as the basis for the recurring 
executive-legislative impasses during the period. Apart from the partisan basis for conflict which 
manifested in their separate and competitive political contests for power, they contend that the 
constituent basis which is rooted in the manner in which the president and members of Congress 
are elected also provide potential avenues for conflicts between the two branches of government. 
The executive, they reason, has a national constituency and therefore is more concerned with 
matters of national policy while members of the legislature, who have smaller, more 
homogeneous constituencies, are more concerned with the geographically distributive effects of 
these policies. 
Expectedly, in line with the positions of Linz and Peterson and Greene, this singular factor has 
been a major source of disagreements between the Presidency and the National Assembly since 
the commencement of presidential democracy in Nigeria in May 1999.  
Even though the president and majority of members of the legislature were members of the same 
political party, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), the legislature did not perceive a 
commonality of interests between them and the president. The major source of disagreement was 
the differing perception of the roles and powers in the operation of the principles of separation of 
powers and checks and balances. This manifested mainly in matters relating to money bills. The 
budget proposal prepared and submitted by the executive to the National Assembly in December 
1999 included a provision for the running of the National Assembly during the 2000 fiscal year 
(Orluwene, 2014). Nevertheless, the National Assembly rejected the inclusion of its own budget 
by the executive in the proposal claiming it amounted to a violation of the principle of separation 
of powers and its independence (Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016). The lawmakers contended that as 
an autonomous body, it reserves the right to prepare its own budget. It, thereafter, went ahead to 
prepare its own budget without consulting the executive.  
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However, the president perceived the action of the legislature as an encroachment on executive 
powers and functions. He believed it was part of the responsibility of the executive to provide for 
the needs of the National Assembly (Aiyede, 2005). He also queried the massive adjustments in 
the budget that saw the expansion of the total size of the budget, insisting that the legislature has 
no such powers that extend to allocation of funds or translate into ‘redrawing of the budget’ 
(Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016). The National Assembly disagreed with the position of the 
executive on the matter, saying it acted within its powers. In the words of the Chairman of 
Senate Committee on Public Accounts, Idris Abubakar, ‘the constitutional thing is for the 
Presidency to prepare the executive budget, the assembly prepares its own and the judiciary does 
the same’ (cf. Orluwene, 2014). According to him, the constitution also says that the National 
Assembly vets these budgets to see how they relate to the wishes of the people. The argument 
over the allocation of funds continued to reoccur in subsequent years, such as the 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2005, 2006, 2011, 2012 budgets, and, even until date (Tell, 2000; Eminue, 2006; 
Obidimma, 2015). 
4.5.1. Executive-Legislative Relations at the State Levels  
The tension between the legislature and the executive during that period reached its crescendo on 
August 18, 2002, when the House of Representatives mooted the idea of impeachment of the 
president. The House listed 15 allegations of constitutional breaches against the president 
(Aiyede and Isumonah, 2002). A substantial part of allegation was connected with budget and 
appropriation-related matters.  
The situation was not particularly different at the state levels. The lawmakers in Taraba State 
attempted to impeach the Governor, Jolly Nyame (Ikubaje, 2000). The legislators accused him of 
dictatorial tendencies. The Vice President, Atiku Abubakar, had to intervene before the 
lawmakers back off (Ikubaje, 2000, pp. 26-29; The Punch, 2001, p. 8). In Kogi State, the 
Governor, Abubakar Audu, also faced impeachment from the members of the state legislature. 
Yet, the legislators in Osun State impeached the Deputy Governor, Iyiola Omisore, in December 
2002 (Omitola and Ogunnubi, 2016; Fagbadebo, 2016). Other Governors that also suffered the 
same fate were DSP Alamiesiaya of Bayelsa State, Joshua Dariye of Plateau State, Peter Obi of 
Anambra State, Ayodele Fayose of Ekiti and Rashidi Ladoja of Oyo State (Fagbadebo, 2016).  
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The legislatures in their respective states removed them for alleged offences that included 
maladministration, misappropriation, and embezzlement of funds, gross misconduct and abuse of 
office (Fagbadebo 2016). Nevertheless, judicial review of the impeachment process upturned the 
legislative decisions to remove Rashidi Ladoja, Peter Obi, and Joshua Dariye (Fagbadebo 2016). 
The courts invalidated their removal on the grounds of irregularities in the procedure adopted by 
the respective legislative assemblies which did not comply with the impeachment provisions as 
set out in section 188 of the 1999 Constitution (Fagbadebo 2016; Omotola, 2003; Aliyu, 2010, 
Fashagba, 2009). For more insights into the developments in the states, a sample of executive-
legislative conflicts that ultimately resulted into impeachments at the state level between 1999 
and 2015 is presented in table II. 
Table II Sample of Executive-legislative Conflicts at the State Level from 1999-2015 
States Issues Periods 
Osun The Deputy Governor, Iyiola Omisore was 
impeached after having a running battle with 
his principal, Governor Bisi Akande 
December 
2002 
Bayelsa Gov. Diepreye Alamieyeseigha was removed 
from office by the House of Assembly over 
allegations of graft and abuse of office 
December 
2005 
Oyo Gov. Rashidi Ladoja was impeached by the 
State House of Assembly over his alleged 
refusal to coast along with late Lamidi 
Adedibu, his political godfather considered 
to be the ‘strong man of Ibadan politics’  
January 2006 
Ekiti Gov. Ayo Fayose and Deputy were 
impeached by the State legislature over 
allegations of illegal diversion of public 
funds 
October 2006 
Plateau Gov. Joshua Dariye was impeached by the 
State House of Assembly over allegations of 
money laundering 
November 
2006 
Anambra Gov. Peter Obi was removed from office by 
the State House of Assembly in 
November 
2006 
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circumstances believed to be political 
Adamawa Gov. Murtala Nyarko was impeached by the 
House of Assembly over allegations of abuse 
of office and illegal diversion of public funds 
July 2014 
Ondo Deputy Governor Ali Olanusi was 
impeached over allegations of theft and 
corrupt diversion of public funds 
April 2015 
   
Sources:   Data for the table was generated by the Researcher from Ukase (2005; 2014);      
                 Fatile & Adejuwon (2016); Fagbadebo (2016).        
 
From Table II it is evident that executive-legislative conflicts in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic were 
not restricted to the federal government but equally a common feature at the state levels. As 
affirmed by Ayua (2003) and Nwaubani (2014), the incessant face-offs between the two 
branches were connected with the power struggle and attempts by either branch to establish its 
supremacy over the other. Given the motives and motivation for contesting elections and holding 
public offices in Nigeria, the political actors in the executive and the legislature were often 
caught in the web of the nature of patronage and neo-patrimonial politics characteristic of Africa, 
Nigeria in particular (Joseph, 1991; Bayart, 1993). Average Nigerian politicians see public 
offices as opportunities to gain access to public resources and accumulate collective wealth for 
personal gains and aggrandizement. It is safe to explain the acrimonious executive-legislative 
relationships within the context of unending struggles and competition, by the actors, for a 
vantage position in the power matrix of the state (Fashagba, 2009; Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016).  
4.5.2. Executive-Legislative Relationships and leadership instability in the Legislature    
The prevalent executive-legislative frictions also had its untoward effects on leadership stability 
in the legislative assemblies. There were frequent changes of leadership of the National 
Assembly and, in most states legislative assemblies. For instance, the House of Representatives 
had two Speakers in the first term namely; Salisu Buhari (1999-2000) and Ghali Umar Naa’aaba 
(2000-2003). While the Senate had its leadership changed five different times between 1999 and 
2007 (Bassey, 2008; Orluwene, 2014). These include; Evans Enwerem (1999); Dr Chuba 
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Okadigbo (1999-2000); Anyim Pius Anyim (2000-2003); Adolphus Wabara (2003-2005); and 
Ken Nnamani (2005-2007)14.  
 
The removal of each of these leaders was premised on different cases and developments. Overall, 
empirical evidence showed that official misconduct and abuse of office were usually at the centre 
of the imbroglio. Scholars have indicated that the frequent change was often as result of high 
level intrigues and power play between the President and members of the legislature (Aiyede, 
2005; Bassey, 2006; Ebenezer, 2014; Orluwene, 2014; Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016; Ovwasa and 
Abdullahi, 2017). It also explains the vulnerability of the legislature to external influence, and 
sometimes the determination of MPs to rebuff such external influence (Bassey, 2006; 
Fagbadebo, 2016).  
Ovwasa and Abdullahi (2017) assert that Obasanjo’s abrasive attitudes and disposition to the 
legislature could be traced to his military antecedent, having been a Military Head of State 
between 1976 and 1979.  Ebenezer (2014) corroborates this view in his earlier study where he 
submits that 
President Obasanjo was a former Head of State under the military regime where 
the executive and legislative responsibilities are usually coalesced and discharged 
by the executive branch of government. This act has undoubtedly given him a 
mindset of an institutionalized system and culture of government that is extremely 
executive-centred looking at the long period of time Nigeria and Nigerians 
travailed under military dictatorship (Ebenezer, 2014, p.18).  
 
Little wonder between 1999 and 2007, President Obasanjo was constantly at war with the 
National Assembly and engineered so much instability in the Senate that in a space of 8 years, 
the Senate had five senate presidents (Aiyede 2005; Fashagba 2009).  
State legislative assemblies, at one time or the other, also had their fair share of the ugly trend. 
For example, Ondo State House of Assembly, considered as one of the most stable legislative 
assemblies in Nigeria during the period under review, had its leadership changed five times 
within sessions between 1999 and 2015 (Orluwene, 2014; Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016).  
Meanwhile, Ekiti State House of Assembly, experienced change of leadership not less than six 
times within the same period (Tell Magazine, 2006, pp. 14-19; Aliyu 2013).  
                                                          
14
  For more on the leadership instability that characterised the National Assembly during the Obasanjo presidency 
and other related issues, see Aiyede, 2005; Bassey, 2008; Fashagba, 2009; Orluwene, 2014; Fatile and Adejuwon, 
2016.   
78 
 
One of the strong reasons adduced for the frequent change in leadership of the assemblies was 
the undue incursion of state executives into the internal affairs of state legislatures. For example, 
the case of Ondo state cannot be divorced from the disposition of state governors who had the 
penchant of taking sweeping controls of the assembly by installing assembly leadership 
amenable to their interests. High level intrigues and power play among parliamentarians coupled 
with politics of zoning also precipitated leadership instability in the assembly. The replacement 
of Mr Taofiq Abdulsalam with Samuel Adesina in 2009 as Speaker of the Ondo State House of 
Assembly barely after few months in office was predicated on the need to ensure balanced 
representation among the three senatorial zones of the state (Personal Interview X, April 12, 
2018).  
A former lawmaker in the state informed me that it was a collective decision among themselves 
that Speaker Abdulsalam and Deputy Governor Ali Olanusi could not come from the same 
senatorial district, Ondo North while the Southern senatorial zone was left out of the top-three 
positions in the state, hence the emergence of Samuel Adesina from Odigbo local government 
(Personal Interview VII, April 5, 2018).  It is evident, from the foregoing, that gridlocks arising 
from executive-legislative relationships are a recurring feature of Nigeria’s presidential system in 
the Fourth Republic. Scholars have viewed this phenomenon from two different perspectives.  
The first is the culture of intolerance and impunity among the political class, because of the 
prolonged military dictatorship in the country (Aiyede, 2005; Obidimma and Obidimma, 2014). 
Military regimes abhor democratic culture and institutions. They assert their powers without the 
recourse to the courts or the constitution (Dorgu, 2000; Lawrence, 2000). As Davies (2004) has 
pontificated, the political class is yet to recover from the military commandist mindset and 
dictatorial mien. They circumvented the laws and made their own will the statutes of the state. It 
will take reasonable time for the political elite coming from such ignoble past to accept and 
imbibe the dictates of democratic governance.  
Executive-legislative relation is a slow, steady but continous learning process of deepening 
democratic values (Davies, 2004). This is in addition to the spate and manner of contestations 
between the political actors in the executive and legislative branches of government, which often 
reveal the trivialities in their struggle for the control of state power and resources. Joseph (1991, 
pp. 125-126), in his study of the Second Republic describes this as ‘prebendalism, that is, a 
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situation of intensive and persistent struggle to control and exploit the offices of the state for 
personal or primordial gains.’  
4.6 Summary  
This chapter reviewed the dominant trends and patterns of executive-legislative relations in 
Nigeria’s presidential system, which provided background information for a general 
understanding of the dynamics of executive-legislative relations since 1979 when the country 
first adopted presidentialism as a governing system. These revealed Nigeria as an executive-
centred political environment where executive-legislative relations have persistently been 
defective and acrimonious. In other words, in the course of Nigeria’s political journey, both in 
democratic practice and military dictatorship, the executive branch was always stronger than the 
legislature in the policy-making process.  
As subsequent chapters will show, most of the conflicts between the executive and legislative 
branches of government are manifest evidence of political intolerance and struggles for power 
shrouded in politics of survival among powerful and strategic political actors seeking to outsmart 
one another, rather the concerns for public good.  Nevertheless, some pertinent questions, which 
must be asked at this stage, are: is the situation in Ekiti, Ondo, Osun and Oyo states different 
from the above especially since the return of presidential democracy in 1999? What are the 
peculiarities of executive-legislative relations in the selected states? What impact did 
disharmonious legislature-executive relationships had on democratic stability of these states, and, 
by extension, Nigeria? This is the essence of this study. Subsequent chapters provide answers to 
these questions and many other. The next chapter embodies an examination of executive-
legislative politics within the confines of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1999.   
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Chapter Five 
Executive-Legislative Politics and the 1999 Constitution 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines some relevant provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria, as amended, as they relate to the functions and powers of the executive, at both the 
Federal and State levels, in relation to their legislatures. The essence is to enhance the 
understanding of the principles of separation of powers and checks mechanism instituted into the 
country’s constitution. It provides for and delivers a workable platform to identifying the grey 
areas in executive-legislative interface, especially those with the potentials for conflicts in the 
policy-making process. 
5.2 The Principle of Separation of Power and the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria 
The 1999 Constitution provided the second constitutional framework for the operation of a 
presidential system in Nigeria. This was a direct consequence of the experiences of both the 
Second and the aborted Third Republics (Akinsanya and Davies, 2002; Bassey, 2006). In spite of 
the collapse of the previous Republics, the presidential system was never discredited, and this 
informed its retention in the current democratic dispensation (Osipitan, 2004). 
Prior to the collapse of the botched Third Republic, however, executive-legislative face-offs 
were becoming a major challenge for the practice of presidential system in Nigeria. Hence, the 
drafters of the 1999 Constitution made some anticipatory provisions that sought to rectify some 
of the problems identified with the executive-legislative impasse in the preceding Republics. 
These areas are money bills and impeachment of the president of the country or governor of a 
state (Aiyede, 2006). 
The 1999 Constitution provided for a clear separation of powers and functions among the three 
arms of government. Part II of the constitution, comprising sections 4, 5 and 6, specified the 
powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and compartmentalize such into legislative, executive, 
and judicial powers of the federation.  
Section 4 (1-9) vested the legislative powers of the Federation in the National Assembly and that 
of a state in the House of Assembly of the State. Specifically, section 4(1and 2) of the 1999 
Constitution conferred on the National Assembly the power to ‘make laws for peace, order and 
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good government of the Federation, or any part thereof with respect to any other matter included 
in the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part I of the Second Schedule to this Constitution’. In 
line with the federal principle, the constitution further divided the legislative powers into 
Exclusive and Concurrent Lists.  
The Nigerian constitution defined the sphere of legislative competences for the federal and state 
governments and designated these as legislative lists. Constitutionally, state governments are 
subordinate to the federal government. The exclusive legislative list has items under the 
legislative competence of the federal government and the concurrent legislative list contains 
items that fall under the legislative competence of both the federal and state governments. In any 
case, while the state government cannot act on any items listed in the exclusive list, its federal 
counterpart can legislate on any items in both lists. 
The exclusive list contains items that only the National Assembly could legislate, while the 
concurrent list comprises items that both the National Assembly and States’ Houses of Assembly 
could legislate. Section 4(3) of the 1999 Constitution states ‘the power of the National Assembly 
to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Federation with respect to any 
matter included in the Exclusive Legislative List shall, save as otherwise provided in this 
Constitution, be to the exclusion of the Houses of Assembly of States.’ Such items include 
Aviation, foreign affairs, national currency, banking, Armed forces, immigrations, population 
census, general elections, and many others. A full list of these items is set out in part I of the 
second schedule to the constitution.  
These include agriculture, education, public utilities, issues relating to health and the likes15. 
However, in case of any clash or conflict between the National Assembly and any state House of 
Assembly, with respect to the exercise of concurrent powers, section 4(5) of the constitution 
gave precedent to the National Assembly. It states ‘If any Law enacted by the House of 
Assembly of a State is inconsistent with any law validly made by the National Assembly, the law 
made by the National Assembly shall prevail, and that other Law shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be void’ (Section 4(5), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
In the exercise of its law-making powers, section 4(3 and 7) of the constitution grant the National 
Assembly the exclusive leverage to make laws ‘for the peace, order and good government of the 
                                                          
15The full list of the items is set out in part I of the second schedule to the 1999 constitution, as amended.  
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federation’ and states’ Houses of Assembly reserve the right to make laws for peace, orderliness 
and good government of their respective states. However, such acts of the legislature require the 
assent of the executive before they can have the force of law.  
Presidential assent is required for the bills passed by the National Assembly to become law, 
while in the case of a House of Assembly of a State, the final process of passing legislation is the 
presentation to the executive arm for governor’s assent. According to sections 58 and 100 of the 
1999 constitution, bills passed by the National Assembly and a State House of Assembly must be 
assented to by the president and governors respectively for it to become law. However, in the 
events that the president or governor declines his assent, after 14 days, the legislative assembly 
can override the executive by passing it into law via the mandatory two-third majority of 
members in parliament. 
 
Similarly, in the conduct of its oversight functions, sections 88 and 89 empowered the National 
Assembly to conduct investigation as well as the powers to take evidence and summon any 
person in Nigeria to give evidence. It can also issue a warrant to compel the attendance of any 
person, and failure to comply with such summon may lead to his compulsion. This also includes 
the power to order such a person to pay the ‘cost’ of such compulsion or imposed fine for such 
failure or neglect. The National Assembly also has power to approve (or disapprove) the 
appointments made by the President to such positions as ministers, ambassadors and the likes. In 
respect of appointments and law making, this also applies to the States except that such matters 
to which the House of Assembly of a state could legislate must not be included in the exclusive 
legislative list. Section 4(7a) of the 1999 constitution only empowers a State House of Assembly 
to legislate on items not listed in the exclusive legislative list. It reads ‘the House of Assembly of 
a State shall have power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the State or 
any part thereof with respect to the following matters, that is to say, any matter not included in 
the Exclusive Legislative List set out in Part I of the Second Schedule to this Constitution.  
Section 5(1-5) vested the executive powers of the Federation on the president, and that of States 
on the governor of a state. Section 5(1) of the constitution stated that 
subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive powers of the 
Federation shall be vested in the President and may subject as aforesaid and to the 
provisions of any law made by the National Assembly, be exercised by him either 
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directly or through the Vice-President and Ministers of the Government of the 
Federation or officers in the public service of the Federation. 
Sub-section 2 under this same section provided that  
subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive powers of a State shall 
be vested in the Governor of that State and may, subject as aforesaid and to the 
provisions of any Law made by a House of Assembly, be exercised by him either 
directly or through the Deputy Governor and Commissioners of the Government 
of that State or officers in the public service of the State (Section 5(2), 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
Such powers extend to the execution and maintenance of the Constitution as well as all laws 
made by the National Assembly and states’ Houses of Assembly, respectively. In the exercise of 
executive powers of the federation, granted by the constitution, the President cannot declare a 
state of war between the Federation and another country except with the sanction of the National 
Assembly sitting in a joint session. Nor can the President deploy the armed forces on combat 
duty outside Nigeria except with prior approval of the Senate. Nevertheless, in the case of 
imminent threat or danger, the President, in consultation with the National Defence Council, may 
deploy members of the armed forces of the federation on a limited combat duty outside Nigeria.  
Section 6(1-6) of the constitution vested the judicial powers in the courts. This section 
empowered the courts to determine the legality and constitutionality of actions (or inactions) of 
the other two organs of government. Sections 315 (3) and 6(d) conferred on the courts or any 
tribunal established by law, the power to declare invalid any provisions of any existing law on 
ground of inconsistency with the constitution or Act of the National Assembly. For these 
reasons, and by virtue of section 4(8) of the Constitution, the legislature is forbidden from 
passing laws that oust the jurisdiction of the courts. It states: 
Save as otherwise provided by this Constitution, the exercise of legislative powers 
by the National Assembly or by a House of Assembly shall be subject to the 
jurisdiction of courts of law and of judicial tribunals established by law, and 
accordingly, the National Assembly or a House of Assembly shall not enact any 
law, that oust or purports to oust the jurisdiction of a court of law or of a judicial 
tribunal established by law (section 4(8), Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria 1999). 
As noted by Ugor (2005), the combined effect of sections 4(8), 6(6), 251 and 315(3) of the 
Constitution is to make acts of the National Assembly or a State House of Assembly and the 
President or the Governor of a State subject to judicial review.  
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As regards money bills, sections 80-83, in case of the National Assembly, and sections 120-123, 
in case of the House of Assembly of a state, under the powers and control over public funds, 
provided a budget process, typical of a presidential system of government. The executive and the 
legislative arms of government are to operate as interdependent institutions in a system of 
separate but shared powers. Section 81(1) assigned the responsibility of drafting budget 
proposals to the executive. However, section 80(4) precluded the executive from discountenance 
the input of the legislature16. This is emphasised by the clause, ‘except in the manner prescribed 
by the National Assembly.’ Nevertheless, section 82 provided a way out for the executive for the 
period of six month in the event of a deadlock between it and the legislature as would be seen in 
the subsequent sections of this chapter. 
At the state level, section 176(1-2) of the Constitution established the office of the governor for 
each state of the federation and vested in it the executive powers of the state. These powers 
extend to the maintenance of the constitution and the execution of all laws made by the State 
House of Assembly. Under section 192(1), the governor is empowered to appoint 
Commissioners in order to form the Executive Council of the state, but the State House of 
Assembly must confirm such appointments. According to section 192(2): 
Any appointment to the office of Commissioner of theGovernment of a State 
shall, if the nomination of any person to such office is confirmed by the House of 
Assembly of the State, be made by the Governor of that State and in making any 
such appointment the Governor shall conform with the provisions of section 14(4) 
of this Constitution. 
 
In the same manner, section 90 of the Constitution created for each state of the Federation a 
House of Assembly and conferred on it the power to make laws for good governance of the state 
with respect to any matter included in the concurrent legislative list. As to the control of public 
funds, section 120(1-4) and 121(1) of the 1999 Constitution vested in the House of Assembly 
power to authorise funds from the Consolidated Revenue Fund. It reads in parts: 
(1) All revenues or other moneys raised or received by a state (not being revenues or 
other moneys payable under this Constitution or any other public fund of the State 
established for a specific purpose) shall be paid into and form one Consolidated 
Revenue Fund of the State. 
                                                          
16No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund or any other public fund of the Federation, 
except in the manner prescribed by the National Assembly.  
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(2) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State 
except to meet expenditure that is charged upon the Fund by this Constitution or 
where the issue of those moneys has been authorised by an Appropriation Law, 
Supplementary Law or Law passed in pursuance of section 121 of this 
Constitution. 
(3) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the any public fund of the State, other than 
the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State, unless the issue of those moneys has 
been authorised by a Law of the House of Assembly of the State. 
(4) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State 
or any other public fund of the State except in the manner prescribed by the 
House of Assembly. 
Section 121- (1) stated that the ‘Governor shall cause to be prepared and laid before the House of 
Assembly at anytime before the commencement of each financial year estimates of revenue and 
expenditure of the State for the next following financial year’. 
Relatedly, the 1999 Constitution empowered both the National Assembly and the State Houses 
of Assembly to initiate proceedings for the removal of erring Chief Executive of the Federation 
and the State from office, respectively, before the expiration of their terms. Specifically, sections 
143 and 188 of the constitution prescribed the manner and circumstances under which the 
President and or his vice, a Governor and or his deputy may be removed from office. The 
impeachment power is the height of the oversight powers of the legislature over the executive 
(Fagbadebo and Francis, 2016). For the purpose of clarity, a detailed account of the 
impeachment powers of the legislature is presented in the concluding segments of this chapter.  
Nonetheless, going by the various sections and provisions concerning the powers of both the 
executive and the legislative arms of government in the 1999 Constitution, there are certain 
functions assigned to the legislature, which also required the inputs of the executive. These areas 
of power overlaps include; law making and policy formulation, oversight and investigative 
functions of the legislature, power over appropriation and the budget process, and the 
impeachment powers of the legislature. I shall beam a searchlight on these roles as they affect 
executive-legislative relations since the commencement of the current presidential democracy in 
1999. This reality necessitates the interdependence of the two arms of government operating in a 
system of separate but shared powers. However, these overlapping powers, especially on fiscal 
policy, have proven to be a source of incessant strains in the executive-legislative relations since 
1999 (Ojo, 2006; Osipitan, 2004; Ugor, 2005). As affirmed by Eminue (2006), there was not a 
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single appropriation bill passed or executed between 1999 and 2005 that did not result into 
executive-legislative feud. 
5.3 Executive-Legislature Interface in the Law-making Process 
By and large, the legislature is regarded as the chief organ of any democratic government. In 
Nigeria, both the National and States legislative assemblies have the power to make laws, and 
this is considered as their main role in the process of government. As pointed out by 
Lapalombara (1977) and noted by Anifowose (2015), the universal duty of the legislature is law 
making but in the Nigerian presidential system, they do more than simply write laws. They 
examine and discuss in detail bills on various subjects that are brought before them. In addition, 
they can repeal, alter or add to the provisions of existing laws and make them applicable to 
changing conditions. 
The law-making powers and procedure of the National Assembly, as contained in sections 4, 58 
and 59 of the 1999 Constitution (and for the House of Assembly of a State, section 100), can be 
used to control the executive and its administrative agencies. Executive policies and programmes 
must have legislative budgetary backing before they can be implemented. The consideration of 
executive and administrative bills affords the legislature the chance to inquire into the workings 
of government agencies. For example, the National Assembly, during the debates and passing of 
the Niger Delta Development Commission Act, subjected the executive proposals to public 
scrutiny thereby resulting in some significant changes to the Act.  
The elaborate law-making process served as checks and enhances the transparency and 
accountability in the exercise of governmental powers that accords with constitutionalism 
(Agbese, 2004; Salim, 2001). Nevertheless, in the discharge of its law-making function the 
legislature is bound to interact with the other arms of government, especially the executive. 
Moreover, the exercise of the primary function of lawmaking and policy formulation is part of 
the oversight function of the legislature.  
Going by the various provisions of the 1999 constitution which define the lawmaking process, 
Oyewo (2007) observes that the legislative oversight functions for a sustainable and virile 
democracy was inherently embedded in the discharge of its law-making and policy formulation 
functions, especially where such legislations are initiated as executive bills. During the eight 
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years of Obasanjo’s administration, the independence of the National Assembly was most 
evident in its exercise of legislative power to thwart the tenure elongation attempt of the 
president in the form of, constitutional reforms, and amendments. This is because under the 
Obasanjo’s presidency, the legislature experienced avalanche of executive incursions into its 
affairs, especially on the choice of its leadership as well as the performance of its oversight 
responsibilities. Moreover, the integrity snag on the parliamentarians made them susceptible to 
executive manipulation. For instance, former presidents of the Senate such as Evans Enwerem, 
Chuba Okadigbo, Adolphus Wabara as well as former speakers of the House of Representatives, 
Salisu Buhari and Patricia Etteh lost their positions to corruption scandals and other 
malfeasances (Ajani, 2003; Banjo, 2013; Odunlami, 2016; Yax-Nelson, 2016). 
Executive power, by its very nature in Nigeria’s presidential system, is inherently prone to 
arbitrary use (Bassey, 2006; Nwabueze, 1982). Therefore, in order to entrench popular 
sovereignty and ensure leadership accountability, the constitution of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, 
reposed in the legislature enormous powers to be able to limit the proclivity of the executive 
towards arbitrary and oppressive actions against the people. For these reasons, executive actions 
are legitimized and required authorization by laws made by the legislature. In spite of this, 
executive impunity continues to thrive under a compromised legislature (Odunsi, 2017; Ajibewa, 
2008). The reason is not far-fetched. A good number of factors add up to provide the political 
environment where executive dictatorship pervaded. One of such is the loss of integrity of the 
legislature, which makes it vulnerable to manipulation of the executive branch (Aziken, 2009; 
Odunlami, 2015; Jombo and Fagbadebo, 2019). 
For instance, at the onset of democratic rule in 1999, there were allegations that members of the 
National Assembly yielded to an inducement of #850, 000 each to ensure the emergence of 
legislative leadership that is amenable to the interests and preferences of the executive branch 
(Ekeremadu, 2006; Aliyu, 2013). This is contrary to the provisions of section 50(1a-b) of the 
1999 constitution which make the composition of the assembly leadership the prerogatives of 
members. As Aziken (2009, p.131) has rightly noted, by yielding to the financial inducement, the 
federal lawmakers ‘set the precedent for the culture of legislative vulnerability to manipulation’. 
In Nigeria as of today, one of the biggest challenges facing the legislature in the discharge of its 
constitutional responsibilities is the self-inflicted integrity crisis (Jombo and Fagbadebo, 2019).  
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Over the years, the legislature has struggled to convince the Nigerian public of its importance, as 
an institution of accountability, in Nigeria’s presidential system. The negative public perception 
is not borne out of ignorance but rather a direct consequence of the various unethical practices, 
scandals and allegations of corruption that have characterised the conducts of parliamentarians in 
the country (Jombo and Fagbadebo, 2019). As a result, the citizens have always construed 
legislative opposition to executive actions as unnecessary antagonism driven by primordial 
consideration rather than the concerns for public good.     
Section 5(1) stipulated that the exercise of executive powers of the federation, vested in the 
president, must be in accordance with the laws made by the National Assembly. 
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive powers of the 
Federation:  
(a) shall be vested in the President and may subject as aforesaid and to the 
provisions of any law made by the National Assembly, be exercised by him either 
directly or through the Vice-President and Ministers of the Government of the 
Federation or officers in the public service of the Federation; and (b) shall extend 
to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, all laws made by the 
National Assembly and to all matters with respect to which the National 
Assembly has, for the time being, power to make laws.  
 
In the same vein, sub-section 2 of this same section made provision that the state governors, 
vested with the executive powers of their respective states, should exercise the power in line with 
the laws and authorisation of the House of Assembly of such state.  
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive powers of a State: (a) 
shall be vested in the Governor of that State and may, subject as aforesaid and to 
the provisions of any Law made by a House of Assembly, be exercised by him 
either directly or through the Deputy Governor and Commissioners of the 
Government of that State or officers in the public service of the State; and (b) 
shall extend to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, all laws made 
by the House of Assembly of the State and to all matters with respect to which the 
House of Assembly has for the time being power to make laws.  
 
These provisions, without doubt, highlight the importance of the law-making function of the 
legislature in the practice of constitutional democracy in Nigeria. As one of the three organs of 
government, the main function of the legislature is to legislate for the peace, order, and good 
government of the country, or state, or any part thereof with respect to any matter within its 
legislative competence as guaranteed by the constitution. Section 4(2 and 7) of the Constitution 
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empowered the legislature at the national and state levels ‘to make laws for the peace, order and 
good government’in their respective domains as contained in the legislative list. 
The legislative process is a means of empowering the executive to carry out its policies and 
programmes, including the mechanisms for checking and controlling the exercise of executive 
powers of the government (Malemi, 2012). It entails the procedure followed by the parliament in 
passing a bill into law. To this end, ‘laws can be enacted, reformed or abolished in order to limit, 
modify, or check the powers of the executive arm of government’ (Malemi, 2012, p.348). 
The legislature at the national and state levels, exercise their law-making powers through bills 
assented to by the president (Section 58, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). 
Thus, as stipulated by sections 58(1-2) and 100(3), the assent of the president and the governor, 
respectively, is a requirement for any bills passed to become laws. The section expressly stated; 
(1) The power of a House of Assembly to make laws shall be exercised by bills 
passed by the House of Assembly and, except as otherwise provided by this 
section, assented to by the Governor. (2) A bill shall not become Law unless it has 
been duly passed and, subject to subsection (1) of this section, assented to in 
accordance with the provisions of this section. (3) Where a bill has been passed 
by the House of Assembly it shall be presented to the Governor for assent(4) 
Where a bill is presented to the Governor for assent he shall within thirty days 
thereof signify that he assents or he withholds assent.(5) Where the Governor 
withhold assent and the bill is again passed by the House of Assembly by two-
third majority, the bill shall become law and the assent of the Governor shall not 
be required (Section100(1-5) of the 1999 constitution). 
Nonetheless, nothing in these sections foreclosed the power of the legislature to override the 
Governor if he refused to assent the bill. Upon the submission of a bill for assent, the governor 
has thirty days within which to sign, or withhold his assent. When the governor signs the bill, as 
sent by the legislative house, it then becomes law. In the event that the governor withholds his 
assent, the House of Assembly could override the veto. In other words, the legislature could pass 
the bill into law, by a two-third majority vote of the assembly. Thus, the assent of the Governor 
would no longer be required for the bill to become law. 
In a related manner, in situations where the governor hinges his refusal to sign a bill on certain 
grey areas and proposes an amendment to the bill, the House of Assembly would, in an executive 
session, deliberate on the proposed amendment. If approved, the legislature would send the bill 
back to the governor for his assent.  
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This interface between the executive and legislative branches of government in the law-making 
process has been found to be a major fertile ground for the acrimonious relationship between the 
two since the nation returned to democratic rule in 1999 (Oyewo, 2007; Bassey, 2006; Fashagba, 
2009). Adejumobi (2002) argues that most of the conflicts between the two branches may 
necessarily have little or nothing to do with the 1999 constitution but largely with the attitudes of 
the operators of the system manifesting as competition for power. As construed by the 
constitution, the two separate but interdependent institutions are designed to operate in a system 
of shared powers (Ojiako, 1980). Fagbadebo and Francis (2016, p.7) note that presidentialism 
presupposes the operation of the notion of ‘separation of powers in a system of checks and 
balances’. In other words, governmental structures must operate within the limits of their 
boundaries as guaranteed by the constitution. 
Literature is replete with submissions about executive-legislative conflicts as one of the most 
problematic issues of Nigeria since the advent of presidential democracy in 1999 (Aiyede, 2005; 
Oyewo, 2007; Bassey, 2006; Fashagba, 2009; Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016). Between 1999 and 
2007, the National Assembly overturned a presidential veto over a sizable number of bills it 
earlier submitted to the President for assent. These included the Independent Corrupt Practices 
and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) Bill, the Niger Delta Development Commission 
(NNDC) Bill, Order of Precedence Bill, and the 2002 Electoral Bills (Aiyede, 2005, p.66). In 
addition to these, Anyim (2003) and Fashagba (2009) affirm that the president vetoed more than 
ten of the 36 bills passed and transmitted to the executive for assent between 2003 and 2007. 
Over the years, relentless acrimony between the executive and the legislature over appropriation 
bills, especially at the national level, has ensured that national budgets could not be approved 
until at least four to five months into the fiscal year. 
Meanwhile, Fagbadebo and Francis (2016) submit that legislative scrutiny of government 
policies and programmes is a routine constitutional responsibility of the legislature rather than 
antagonism to the executive branch. The omnibus power granted the legislature under section 
4(2) of the 1999 constitution enables it to legislate on all the sixty items listed under the 
Exclusive Legislative list and the thirty-eight items set out in the Concurrent Legislative list. 
Taking that into cognisance, the legislature is a key player in the democratic process.  
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5.4 The Legislature and Oversight Function 
In democratic settings, the oversight function of the legislature presupposes the exercise of its 
constitutional powers to monitor and keep the executive and its administrative machinery under 
checks and control. It affords the legislative institution the opportunity to play a prominent role 
in monitoring the exercise of executive power (Obidimma and Obidimma, 2015). This 
understanding is necessary to enable the legislature to set its agenda right in the exercise of its 
lawmaking and appropriation powers. In other words, legislative surveillance on the activities of 
the executive affords the legislature the opportunity to understand the operations of the executive 
branch, with a view to making informed judgement on the implementation of the enacted laws 
and policies. 
Fagbadebo and Francis (2016) opine that the exercise of oversight power by the legislature was a 
statutory responsibility that emboldens the legislature ‘to ensure an effective, efficient, and frugal 
executive’. According to them, oversight serves as a measure of accountability in presidential 
systems. Through a process of continuous review of government policies and programmes, they 
reason, the citizenry is ‘presented with an opportunity to assess the performance of government’ 
(Fagbadebo and Francis, 2016, p.8). 
Just like in most democracies, the Nigerian National Assembly and the States Houses of 
Assembly perform investigative and oversight functions. For this purpose, legislative committees 
are set up to dig up desired information by holding hearings, subpoena witnesses, keep records 
and correspondence, and also report findings to the assembly for legislative action. Similarly, the 
legislature also exercise control over the executive and its administrative agencies on behalf of 
the citizenry. The supervisory and oversight functions of the legislature extend to public 
institutions established by laws such as public corporations, administrative agencies of 
government or other activities which are supported by public funds. Since most existing 
departments and other administrative agencies were created by the legislature, it also supervise 
the operation of such institutions to see if they are meeting the goals set out for it, if the funds 
allocated are being well-spent, and or if their activities are being carried out within the limits 
prescribed for such acts. The legislature may in the process alter or abolish them at will, it may 
grant them more, less or no money; just to ensure that such institutions are brought under 
legislative control. 
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Going by its extensive scope and coverage, oversight is, no doubt, a measure that enables the 
legislature to detect and fix shortcomings in the implementation of laws and policies. While 
appraising the oversight role of the legislature in the American presidential system, Oleszek 
(2014) argues that the process enabled Congress to uncover and query ‘unwarranted assertions of 
the executive power to raise funds and ask the tough fiscal and policy questions from public 
officials, and help administrative leaders fix (or avoids) mistakes’ (Oleszek, 2014, p.382). A 
notable nineteen century utilitarian philosopher, John Stuart Mill, identified oversight as the key 
for a meaningful representative entity when he asserted that ‘the proper office of a representative 
assembly is to watch and control their government’ (cf. Obidimma and Obidimma, 2015, p.76). 
 
In Nigeria, the legislature is considered an important mechanism for achieving some form of 
representation for all spheres and strata of the society. It includes among its members, more than 
any other government institution, individuals representing the broadest range of interests and 
wide range of viewpoints. In other word, while the legislature or parliament as a body is 
representing the people of the country as a whole by upholding and protecting the welfare and 
interests of the people, each of its members is elected to represent the respective constituencies 
that make up the country or state as the case may be. A member is in the legislature not to speak 
for himself but to seek and speak for the interests and welfare of the people of his constituency. 
Moreover, this is considered an important role in Nigerian presidential democracy because it 
brings to bear the popular notion of government of the people, by the people, and for the people. 
Recent discourses on deepening democracy in Africa, anchored on the informed and active 
participation of the people. The legislature, as the symbolic representation of the people, is the 
driving force for equal and wider representation (Yaqub, 2004). For it to perform this onerous 
task, Poteete (2010) affirms that the legislature not only make laws for the peaceful and orderly 
ways of administering society, but also ensure that the executive does not violate or abuse the 
laws. This, it can achieve by acting as the watchdog over government policies and programmes. 
For this purpose, Odinga (1994) identifies the oversight role of the legislature as one of the 
cardinal principles of representation in a democratic setting, without which democracy becomes 
a hoax. He asserts:  
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If the constitution is the embodiment of the aspirations, ideals and collective will 
of the people, the parliament is the collective defender and watchdog of the 
aspiration, ideals and collective will of the people. If the constitution is the social 
contract between the people and government, the parliament is the advocate for 
the people and the arbiter of the national interest. If the constitution is like the 
Bible, Quran, and other religious treatises defining the covenant between the 
people and their leaders, the parliament is the repository and protector of the 
oracles of the political covenant and social contract between the people and 
government (cf. Ewuim et al, 2014, p.141).    
Legislative oversight is an important ingredient in the promotion of public interest, and, it 
thereby constitutes a vital element in process of executive-legislative relations (Akinbobola, 
2005). It engenders an interface between the legislature and the executive in promoting public 
interest. For the purpose of this study, oversight means the exercise of constitutional powers by 
the legislature to check or control the exercise of constitutional powers of the other arms of 
government. More specifically, oversight is a mechanism to check or control the exercise of 
executive powers or to make the executive accountable and responsible to the electorate through 
their representatives in the legislature, in between elections. In Nigeria’s presidential system, the 
elected government officials have fixed term of four years. Thus, the government cannot be 
dissolved, like the cases in parliamentary systems, before the expiration of the tenure (Salim, 
2001; Oyewo, 2007; Tell, 2000, pp.16-20). 
An oversight of the executive and its administrative agencies is premised on the ground that the 
legislature enacts the laws that create administrative agencies, assigned with function and 
responsibility by enabling laws. The legislature may decide to change the statutes or the enabling 
laws of an administrative agency if the outcomes are at variance with the intended purposes 
(Keefe, 2003; Fagbadebo and Francis, 2016). 
Obidimma and Obidimma (2015) aver that the term oversight function is not in the Nigerian 
constitutional lexicon, neither is it defined or described by the 1999 Constitution. However, it is 
a principle that finds relevance in sections 88, 89, 128, and 129 of the 1999 constitution. Under 
these sections, the legislature has powers to investigate or probe into any matter that falls within 
the purview of its legislative competence. Both the National Assembly and the State Houses of 
Assembly can probe into the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry, or government 
department charged with the responsibility of administering laws passed by the legislature. 
Section 88(1) states: 
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Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, each House of the National 
Assembly shall have power by resolution published in its journal or in the Official 
Gazette of the Government of the Federation to direct or cause to be directed 
investigation into   
(a) any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to make laws, and  
(b) the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or government 
department charged, or intended to be charged, with the duty of or responsibility 
for -  
(i) executing or administering laws enacted by National Assembly, and  
(ii) disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be appropriated by the 
National Assembly.  
In a similar version, section 128(1) of the constitution ceded the same power to the state House 
of Assembly for carrying out similar responsibility within the purview of its legislative 
competence at the state level. It reads; 
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, a House of Assembly shall have 
power by resolution published in its journal or in the Office Gazette of the 
Government of the State to direct or cause to be directed an inquiry or 
investigation into; (a) any matter or thing with respect to which it has power to 
make laws; and (b) the conduct of affairs of any person, authority, ministry or 
government department charged, or intended to be charged, with the duty of or 
responsibility for: (i) executing or administering laws enacted by that House of 
Assembly, and (ii) disbursing or administering moneys appropriated or to be 
appropriated by such House. 
In addition, in giving effect to the powers granted under sections 88 and 128 of the 1999 
constitution, the legislature both at the federal and state levels is vested with the power to 
summon any persons to give evidence on any matter relating to the administration of public 
affairs. Even in the events of any refusal of such persons, groups, or organisations to appear 
before it, the House has the power to compel their appearance during the process of 
investigation. Section 129(1c-d) states that the legislature shall have power to 
(c) summon any person in Nigeria to give evidence at any place or produce any 
document or other thing in his possession or under his control, and examine 
him as a witness and require him to produce any document or other thing in his 
possession or under his control, subject to all just exceptions; and  
(d) issue a warrant to compel the attendance of any person who, after having 
been summoned to attend, fails, refuses or neglects to do so and does not 
excuse such failure, refusal or neglect to the satisfaction of the House of 
Assembly or the committee, and order him to pay all costs which may have 
been occasioned in compelling his attendance or by reason of his failure, 
refusal or neglect to obey the summons and also to impose such fine as may be 
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prescribed for any such failure, refusal or neglect; and any fine so imposed 
shall be recoverable in the same manner as a fine imposed by a court of law. 
The main purpose of conferring this wide range of powers on the legislature, as noted by 
Fashagba (2009), is to enable the people’s representatives to be able to carry out its 
responsibilities more efficiently and effectively. The importance of this is to expose corruption, 
check waste or inefficiency in the execution of laws enacted by the legislature, including the 
disbursement or utilisation of funds appropriated by it17. 
The oversight responsibilities of the legislature cover its appropriation powers to raise and 
control the spending of public funds. By implication, this power enabled the legislature to 
scrutinise government spending and annual estimates. It also has its investigatory powers to 
enquire into the activities of any erring president, vice president, governor, or deputy governor, 
by initiating impeachment process toward their removal from office before the expiration of their 
terms. 
Aside from the investigative power, the legislature also has power to confirm and approve 
certain appointments made by the executive into important administrative, judicial, and 
ambassadorial positions (Sections 147(2); 153,154(1); 171(4); 192(2); 197, and 198 of the 1999 
constitution, as amended). At the federal level, the Senate exercises this power while the various 
States’ Houses of Assembly exercise it at the state levels18. Taft (1989) affirms that while the 
executive has the power of appointment, the exercise of such powers is not to the exclusion of 
the legislature, which can, in the course of the confirmation process, ‘impose rules within which 
appointees are to be selected’ (Taft, 1989, p.413). The essence of this, as Malemi (2012) submits, 
                                                          
17Sections 88(2) and 128(2) of the 1999 constitution give reasons for the wide range of oversight powers granted 
both the National Assembly and the State Houses of Assembly under sub-section (1) of these same sections. For 
instance, sub-section (2) of section 128 states that ‘the powers conferred on a House of Assembly under the 
provisions of this section are exercisable only for the purpose of enabling the House to (a) make laws with respect to 
any matter within its legislative competence and correct any defects in existing laws; and (b) expose corruption, 
inefficiency of waste in the execution or administration of laws within its legislative competence and in the 
disbursement or administration of funds appropriated by it. The National Assembly has similar powers in section 88 
(2) of the constitution.  
18Section 147(2) states that ‘Any appointment to the office of Minister of the Government of the Federation shall, if 
the nomination of any person to such office is confirmed by the Senate, be made by the President. While section 
171(4) maintains that ‘An appointment to the office of Ambassador, High Commissioner or other Principal 
Representative of Nigeria abroad shall not have effect unless the appointment is confirmed by the Senate’. In a 
related manner, section 192(2) provides that ‘Any appointment to the office of Commissioner of the Government of 
a State shall, if the nomination of any person to such office is confirmed by the House of Assembly of the State, be 
made by the Governor of that State.’ 
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is to avert proclivity of the President or Governor towards lopsidedness, mediocrity, favouritism, 
nepotism, or clannishness in making appointment into high public offices.   
In addition to that, the President requires the approval of the National Assembly for proclamation 
of a state of emergency, declaration of war, as well as deployment of the armed forces for 
combat operations outside the shores of Nigeria. Going by the provisions of the constitution, 
there is no doubt that the oversight functions overlaps, shades into and involves the discharge of 
the legislative functions of law-making, watchdog of public finance, investigative functions and 
even constituency responsibilities. The 1999 Constitution diffused this oversight functions in the 
legislative role in all its relevant provisions. As noted by Ahmadu and Ajiboye (2004) and 
reaffirmed by Fashagba (2009), the whole process of executive-legislative interface in Nigeria’s 
presidential system is dictated by the oversight powers of the legislature as guaranteed in the 
constitution. In other words, the constitution grants wide range of powers to the legislature to be 
able to check and counter-balance any abusive use of executive power in order to promote the 
culture of accountability in government.  
Precisely, the oversight functions of the legislature can be categorised into four main aspects 
namely; 
a. Power and control over public funds. This indicates the power to raise and control spending of 
public funds granted both the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly. This is 
provided for in sections 80 and 81; and 120 and 121 of the 1999 constitution, respectively. These 
provisions, combined with the power of the legislature to remove heads of the executive, are 
important oversight powers available for the legislature.  
b. Control over administration: The powers granted the legislature by the constitution to supervise 
and monitor, on a continuous basis, projects, programmes, and operations of the executive and its 
administrative agencies in order to ensure that project executions are done in line with the 
legislative intent. In other words, the legislature made and appropriated resources for the laws 
guiding the policies and programmes of the government. It, then, follows that the same body 
ensure non-violation of the laws in the exercise of executive powers. Sections 88 and 128 of the 
constitution guaranteed these powers. 
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c. Approval and confirmatory powers: The constitution authorises the legislature to confirm and 
approve executive nominees into some high public offices. This is to ensure that the executive 
arm, in exercising its powers of appointments, comply with the Fundamental Objectives and 
Directive Principles of the Nigerian State as stated in sections 13 and 14 of the 1999 constitution. 
By virtue of section 12 of the constitution, legislative approval is also required for the 
domestication of treaties, declaration of war, state of emergency, or deployment of the armed 
forces for combat duties.  
d. Impeachment powers of the legislature: As provided for in sections 143 and 188 of the 
constitution, this is the height of oversight powers of the legislature, which states the procedure 
for the removal of the President and or his vice, and a Governor and or his deputy. As will be 
seen shortly, by these provisions, any erring president, vice president, governor, or deputy 
governor can be removed from office before the expiration of his term if tried and found guilty 
of allegations of gross misconduct.  
Essentially, all these categories of oversight functions of the legislature are given effect to under 
the investigatory powers stated in sections 88, 89, 128, and 129 of the 1999 constitution. Put 
differently, the goal of legislative scrutiny of executive activities as indicated in all these aspects 
of oversight powers are achievable courtesy of the widespread investigatory powers vested in the 
legislature. However, in spite of the constitutional basis for the exercise of oversight powers by 
the legislature, the discharge of such appears to have continued to hamper smooth and 
harmonious process of executive-legislative relationships. Pius Anyim, a former President of the 
Nigerian Senate, had argued that the ‘National Assembly’s attempts at fulfilling its constitutional 
roles including the oversight functions were undermined by the executive on several occasions’ 
(Anyim, 2003, p.24).  
Scholars have noted that the wide range of powers granted the legislature by the 1999 
constitution is, no doubt, a potential fertile ground for executive-legislative rifts and acrimonies 
(Ojo 1998; Akinsanya and Davies 2002; Aiyede 2005; Oyewo 2007; Bassey 2006; Fashagba 
2009; Oni 2013; Ukase 2014; Obidimma and Obidimma 2015; Fagbadebo and Francis 2016; 
Fatile and Adejuwon 2016). This is not because the powers vested in the legislature are counter-
productive but the preceding era of long-drawn centralist nature of military autocracy, where 
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both the executive and legislative powers are fused and exercised by de facto military elites, 
portends great potentials for conflict in an evolving presidential democracy such as Nigeria.   
Davies (2004) and Oyewo (2007) have noted that the enthronement of presidential democracy 
would not translate the military centralist mien into a democratic culture overnight. The process 
of conforming to the democratic norms and practices is usually a long, tortuous, and enduring 
journey for societies with prolonged dictatorial past such as Nigeria.  
Nevertheless, according to Agbese (2004), the legislature could employ several methods to make 
the executive behave and conform to the constitutional and political order. These include 
establishing autonomous sources of finance independent of the executive branch to fund its 
oversight activities, setting an agenda of budget defence that priortise giving of open and detailed 
accounts of implementation profiles of previous estimates, as well as constantly subjecting any 
untoward executive action to judicial interpretation. He, however, reason that this process would 
involve the interpretation of the constitutional powers of the legislature, which may either be in 
conflict with or conduce to the executive scheme but must pass the test of judicial review. 
5.5 Legislative Powers and Control over Public Funds 
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended, accords the legislature a 
prominent position of influence to exert considerable control over public funds. This has to do 
with the vital role of the legislature as an institution of accountability (Jombo and Fagbadebo, 
2019). Tom and Attai (2014) have noted that the legislature plays a very crucial role in enforcing 
accountability and promoting good governance in democratic regimes. Nevertheless, the 
achievement of this role is possible with the preponderance of power vested in the legislature 
over fiscal and appropriation matters. 
Both the National Assembly and States Houses of Assembly hold the basic financial power. 
They determine the nature and amount of taxes and control public spending through legislative 
appropriations. Although budget proposals for the spending of public money must come from the 
Executive, which usually accommodates inputs from the other arms of government, the passing 
of annual as well as supplementary budgets to finance government’s activities and programmes 
is a cardinal function of parliament, as such spending cannot be undertaken without approval by 
the legislature.  
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Sections 80, 81, and 82 of the 1999 constitution empower the National Assembly to exert 
substantial control on public spending within its legislative competence. In similar version, 
sections 120-121of the constitution vested the House of Assembly of each state with the powers 
and control over public funds in their respective states. Section 120(1-3) established the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF)19where all resources of the state should be kept. 
(1) All revenues or other moneys raised or received by a State (not being revenues 
or other moneys payable under this Constitution or any Law of a House of 
Assembly into any other public fund of the State established for a specific 
purpose) shall be paid into and form one Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State.  
(2) No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the 
State except to meet expenditure that is charged upon the Fund by this 
Constitution or where the issue of those moneys has been authorised by an 
Appropriation Law, Supplementary Appropriation Law or Law passed in 
pursuance of section 121 of this Constitution.  
(3) No moneys shall be withdrawn from any public fund of the State, other than 
the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State, unless the issue of those moneys has 
been authorised by a Law of the House of Assembly of the State (Section120 (1-
3), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999).  
Specifically, section 120 (4) of the constitution stipulated that ‘no money shall be withdrawn 
from the CRF of the state or any other public funds of the state except in the manner prescribed 
by the House of Assembly’. Moreover, for this reason, the constitution20 provided that the 
Governor of a state should prepare and submit the Appropriation Bill to the House of Assembly, 
containing estimates of the revenues and expenditures of the State before the commencement of 
each financial year. Constitutionally an Appropriation Bill is the basis of the executive’s plans 
for the running of government within the fiscal year.  
                                                          
19The CRF is a financial pool established by the constitution for the pooling together of all resources of the state out 
of which funds could be drawn to execute and finance government projects as contained in the appropriation law 
passed by the legislature. The constitutional requirement of legislative authorization, before funds can be drawn 
from the CRF, is a measure to ward off indiscriminate access to the public treasury by the executive and its 
agencies. For more details, see Fagbadebo 2016. 
20
 Section 121(1-2) of the 1999 constitution states that (1) ‘The Governor shall cause to be prepared and laid before 
the House of Assembly at any time before the commencement of each financial year estimates of the revenues and 
expenditure of the State for the next following financial year. (2) The heads of expenditure contained in the 
estimates, other than expenditure charged upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State by this Constitution, 
shall be included in a bill, to be known as an Appropriation Bill, providing for the issue from the Consolidated 
Revenue Fund of the State of the sums necessary to meet that expenditure and the appropriation of those sums for 
the purposes specified therein.’ This constitutional requirement effectively brought the powers and control over 
public funds under the legislature and gives more decisive credence to section 4(2 and 7) of the constitution which 
empowers the legislature ‘to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the State or any part thereof’. 
And operationally, the constitution subsumes the exercise of executive powers vested in the President and State 
Governors within the legislative actions of the National Assembly and State Houses of Assembly, respectively.    
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The interface between the executive and the legislature over appropriation bill constitutes a 
major factor to explain the constant acrimonious relationships between the legislature and the 
executive in Nigeria (Akinsanya and Davies, 2002; Davies, 2004; Aiyede, 2005; Aminu, 2006; 
Eminue, 2006; Ojo, 2006; Fashagba, 2009, 2012; Lafenwa, 2010). This is because, the 
legislature had most times made its preferences felt on the budget estimates submitted to it by the 
executive, but this had often led to disagreements and friction between the two branches of 
government (Eminue 2006; Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016; The Daily Trust, 2018).  
There has been contention over the appropriateness of the legislature to adjust estimates in the 
appropriation bill submitted by the executive. Section 121(1-2) of the 1999 constitution stated 
thus: 
(1) The Governor shall cause to be prepared and laid before the House of 
Assembly at any time before the commencement of each financial year estimates 
of the revenues and expenditure of the State for the next following financial year. 
(2) The heads of expenditure contained in the estimates, other than expenditure 
charged upon the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State by this Constitution, 
shall be included in a bill, to be known as an Appropriation Bill, providing for the 
issue from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State of the sums necessary to 
meet that expenditure and the appropriation of those sums for the purposes 
specified therein. 
However, section 120(3-4) of this same constitution maintained that no moneys shall be 
withdrawn from the CRF or any public fund of the State, ‘unless the issue of those moneys has 
been authorised by a Law of the House of Assembly of the State’; and in ‘the manner prescribed 
by the House of Assembly’. It may then be argued that the ‘Appropriation Bill’, though 
emanated from the executive arm of government, is still subject to legislative actions as provided 
by section 4(2 and 7) of the 1999 constitution. There have been different perspectives on 
legitimacy of the legislature in the alteration of the fiscal bill submitted by the executive for 
appropriation. Proper interpretation of this action lies at the judicial interpretation of some 
relevant provisions of the 1999 Constitution (Davies, 2004; Fashagba, 2009; Obidimma and 
Obidimma, 2015; Fatlie and Adejuwon, 2016).  
During the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo, one of the major contentions was the 
allegation of selective implementation of fiscal policies appropriated for by the legislature. For 
instance, one of the reasons for the attempted impeachment proceedings against the president in 
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2002 was his unremorseful conduct in selective implementation of the 1999, 2000, and 2001 
Appropriation Acts (Eminue, 2006).  
Faced with similar problems of budget impoundment and control in the past, the U.S. Congress 
created a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to give the Congress meaningful staff assistance 
for coordination that the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provided for the executive. 
This was in addition to the budget committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
charged with the responsibility of preparing tentative budget recommendations to be adopted as 
concurrent resolutions each may so furnish as targets to guide other Congressional Committees 
(Tribe, 1988, p.258). 
Though the National Assembly secured its autonomy in 2010, its budget office is yet to be 
established. However, there exists an Office of Management and Budget, created for the 
executive under the administration of former President Olusegun Obasanjo (Fatile and 
Adejuwon, 2016). At the state level, the situation is not different. The legislative assemblies still 
depend largely on the executive arm for the approval and release of funds to finance their 
activities. A situation considered deliberate ploy of governors to weaken the surveillance and 
oversight functions of the legislature (Fashagba, 2012; Fagbadebo, 2016).   
Similarly, the drafters of the Nigerian constitutional did not envisage the problem associated with 
executive transfer, budget re-ordering, or impoundment of funds already authorized and 
appropriated by the legislature, except to deal with it through the post-appropriation control 
mechanisms such as auditing of public accounts by the Auditor-General (Tell, 2003, p.55). The 
power of appropriation vested in the legislature also empowered it to conduct investigations into 
the expenditure patterns of the executive through the Auditor-General21. Sections 85 and 125 
required the Auditor-General to cause to be laid before the legislature audited accounts of the 
government within ninety days of such receipts from the Accountant-General. This is in line with 
the oversight powers of the legislature to investigate the extent to which execution of 
                                                          
21Section 85(1) of the constitution specified ‘there shall be an Auditor-General for the Federation who shall be 
appointed in accordance with the provisions of section 86 of this Constitution’. In the same version, section 125(1) 
stipulates ‘there shall be an Auditor-General for each State who shall be appointed in accordance with the provisions 
of section 126 of this Constitution. While section 126(1) states that ‘the Auditor-General for a State shall be 
appointed by the Governor of the State on the recommendation of the State Civil Service Commission subject to 
confirmation by the House of Assembly of the State 
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government projects and policies conformed to laws passed by the legislature. These sections 
stated: 
(2) The public accounts of a State and of all offices and courts of the State shall 
be audited by theAuditor-General for the State who shall submit his reports to the 
House of Assembly of the State concerned, and for that purpose the Auditor-
General or any person authorised by him in that behalf shall have access to all the 
books, records, returns and other documents relating to those accounts. (4) The 
Auditor-General for the State shall have power to conduct periodic checks of all 
government statutory corporations, commissions, authorities, agencies, including 
all persons and bodies established by a law of the House of Assembly of the State. 
(5) The Auditor-General for a State shall, within ninety days of receipt of the 
Accountant-General's financial statement and annual accounts of the State, submit 
his report to the House of Assembly of the State and the House shall cause the 
report to be considered by a committee of the House responsible for public 
accounts (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). 
Over the decades, the role of the Auditor-General, under the presidential constitution of Nigeria, 
has been commended as an effective mechanism for the realisation of the oversight goals of the 
legislature (Davies, 2004; Eminue, 2006). For instance, the submission of the Audit Report 2001 
on January 10, 2003 to the National Assembly, by the Auditor-General (AG) of the Federation, 
Mr. Azie, and the revealed information contained therein, about the expenditure pattern of the 
executive, demonstrated the usefulness of the audit report as an effective instrument for 
legislative oversight over public finance. Apparently, acting in line with constitutional 
provisions22, the AG neither consulted nor deferred to the executive before submitting his report 
to the National Assembly for legislative action. This infuriated President Obasanjo, who did not 
renew Mr. Azie’s tenure or submitted it to the Senate for confirmation. The president claimed 
that the AG was ‘functioning in an acting capacity and still failed in his duties’ (Davies, 2004, 
p.211). However, many observers believed that the harsh treatment meted out to the Auditor-
General was connected with the adverse publicity and hostile public criticism generated by the 
revelations of the prolificacy of government in the audit report presented to the National 
Assembly (Eminue, 2006). 
Without underestimating the importance of the other oversight functions, there is a convergence 
of views in the literature that the oversight role of the Public Account Committee of any 
parliament is the most vital means of ‘ensuring prudence, transparency, accountability, and 
                                                          
22
 Section 85(6) of the constitution maintains that ‘in the exercise of his functions under this Constitution, the 
Auditor-General shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority or person’. 
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efficient management of public resources, especially monies appropriated by the legislatures’ 
(Fashagba, 2009, p.448). The exercise of the oversight power of the purse by the legislature, as 
affirmed by Davies (2004), beholds on the legislature not only to consider and approve either 
increases or decreases in expenditure presented by the executive but also ‘to reject the entire bill 
and insist on more efficient ways of managing public funds’ (Davies, 2004, p. 211). 
5.6 Impeachment Powers of the Legislature  
The legislature’s ultimate powers of removal of the President, Vice President, Governor, or 
Deputy Governor, through impeachment proceedings are parts of the oversight instruments. In 
other words, the provisions are constitutional guarantees for ensuring accountability in the face 
of section 308 where these chief executives are protected against any civil or criminal 
proceedings. 
(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Constitution, but subject to 
subsection (2) of this section - (a) no civil or criminal proceedings shall be 
instituted or continued against a person to whom this section applies during his 
period of office; (b) a person to whom this section applies shall not be arrested or 
imprisoned during that period either in pursuance of the process of any court or 
otherwise; and(c) no process of any court requiring or compelling the appearance 
of a person to whom this section applies, shall be applied for or issued: Provided 
that in ascertaining whether any period of limitation has expired for the purposes 
of any proceedings against a person to whom this section applies, no account shall 
be taken of his period of office. (2) The provisions of subsection (1) of this 
section shall not apply to civil proceedings against a person to whom this section 
applies in his official capacity or to civil or criminal proceedings in which such a 
person is only a nominal party. (3) This section applies to a person holding the 
office of President or Vice-President, Governor or Deputy Governor; and the 
reference in this section to "period of office" is a reference to the period during 
which the person holding such office is required to perform the functions of the 
office (Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). 
 
Section 188 of the 1999 constitution outlined the process of removing a governor or deputy 
governor of a state through the legislative process. Impeachment, in essence, presupposes 
indictment of chief executive over misconducts in the discharge of his constitutionally assigned 
functions. Section 188(2b) of the constitution described impeachable offence as ‘gross 
misconduct in the performance of the functions of his office’. The constitution defined ‘gross 
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misconduct’ as ‘a grave violation or breach of the provisions of this constitution or a misconduct 
of such nature as amounts in the opinion of the House of Assembly, to gross misconduct’23. 
However, the vague and ambiguous nature of the definition of ‘misconduct’ provided by the 
constitution has made it susceptible to abuse and misuse by the Nigerian legislative actors 
especially at the state levels (Lawan, 2010; Lafenwa, 2009; Ukase, 2014). In the exercise of its 
power of judicial review to forestall further abuse and misuse of the word, the Supreme Court of 
Nigeria defined gross misconduct ‘as a grave violation of the constitution such as corruption, 
breach of the provisions, abuse of fiscal provisions as well as interference with statutory 
functions of the legislature’24. Awotokun (1998) describes the impeachment provisions in the 
1999 constitution as a useful mechanism to avert arbitrariness in the use of executive power and 
ensure accountable government. Akinsanya (2002) contends that the provisions were the most 
potent weapon against possible abuse of state power by the executive. The impeachment power 
wielded by the legislature is necessary to provide effective checks on the exercise of executive 
power.  
Essentially, for the purpose of impeachment of a state governor or his deputy, section 188(2) 
requires that a notice of allegation in writing should be signed by not less than one-third of the 
members of the House of Assembly. Section 188(2a) also required that the notice of allegation 
be presented to the Speaker of the House of Assembly, outlining the details of gross misconduct 
so specified. The Speaker shall within seven days, serve the notice to the governor or deputy 
governor and each member of the House of Assembly. Within 14 days, the house will then 
resolve ‘without any debate whether or not the allegations should be investigated’ and this 
requires the support of two-thirds majority of all members of the House of Assembly25. 
Moreover, section 188(5) states that within seven days of passing the motion under section 
188(4), the Chief Judge of the State would then appoint ‘a panel of seven persons who in his 
opinion are of unquestionable integrity, and not politicians who would then investigate the 
allegation’. The panel of seven men is then required to sit for three months, and the governor is 
allowed to defend himself, either in person or by his own lawyers. If at the end of the exercise, 
                                                          
23Section 188, sub-section (11) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. 
24
 The judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Inakoju& 17 Ors vs. Adeleke& 3 Ors (2007) 1 S.C.; 
cf. Fagbadebo and Francis, 2014, p.24. 
25Section 188(3), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended. 
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the panel found the governor guilty; and the House of Assembly adopted the panel’s report 
within 14 days, the governor stands impeached. The adoption of the report cannot be a subject of 
appeal in any court of law. Contrary to the 1979 Constitution; the 1999 Constitution did not 
leave the whole exercise of impeachment entirely to the legislature but also gave the Judiciary a 
role to play26. 
The incessant use of impeachment powers by the state legislatures has been identified as a 
practice that poses great threats to the nation’s constitutional democracy (Lafenwa, 2010; 
Fashagba, 2012; Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016). However, the Supreme Court in 2007 took 
Nigeria’s practice of constitutionalism to a new height in Inakoju & 17 Ors vs. Adeleke & 3 Ors., 
when it quashed the impeachment of a former governor of Oyo state, Rashidi Ladoja citing some 
fundamental breaches of the 1999 constitution.  
This judgment, as affirmed by Oyewo (2007) and Aliyu (2010), dampened the inclination of the 
legislature to resort to their impeachment powers to score political points. Nevertheless, before 
then, other governors that suffered similar fate within that period were Peter Obi of Anambra 
state, D.S.P. Alamieseigha of Bayelsa state, and Ayodele Fayose of Ekiti. (Aliyu, 2010). A 
detailed account of the impeachment crisis in Oyo state and the circumstances surrounding the 
acrimonious legislature-executive relations in Ekiti State that eventually culminated into the 
impeachment of former Governor Ayodele Fayose is a major subject of discussion in chapter six. 
5.7    Summary  
This chapter examined the issue of executive-legislative impasse within the context of the 1999 
constitution in a bid to ascertain whether the recurrent conflicts between the two branches of 
government could be linked to any contradiction inherent in the constitution. It was discovered 
that the constitution formally structured the interaction between the executive and legislative 
branches but the relationships that exist, in practice, depend largely on the political context as 
well as the characteristics of the governing elites.  
                                                          
26Section 188(5) of the 1999 constitution requires the Chief Judge of a State at the request of the Speaker of House 
of Assembly to set up a ‘panel of seven persons who are of unquestionable integrity’ to investigate allegations of 
gross misconduct against any erring governor or his deputy.  Sub-section 8 of this same section provides that ‘where 
the Panel reports to the House of Assembly that the allegation has not been proved, no further proceedings shall be 
taken in respect of the matter.’ This implies that the Judiciary also plays a crucial role in the process of impeachment 
under the 1999 constitution. 
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In line with the principle of separation of powers and checks and balances characteristic of 
presidential constitutions, the 1999 constitution stated the powers allocated to the different 
organs of government. Specifically, sections 4, 5, and 6 of the constitution allocated and divided 
the powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria into the legislative, the executive, and the judicial 
powers of the federation and the states. Fatile and Adejuwom (2016) have noted that these 
provisions were comparable and compatible with what exist in established presidential 
democracies such as the United States, Canada, Germany and Australia. Hence, the incessant 
executive-legislative feuds that have characterised the country’s democracy, as argued by 
Adejumobi (2002), have little or nothing to do with the structures provided by the 1999 
constitution.  
In Nigeria, the constitutional provisions that listed the areas of interface between the executive 
and the legislature are instruments for the promotion of accountability and good governance. 
These provisions stated that the executive should implement policies for the good governance of 
the nation while the legislature, construed as the custodian of the constitution, is empowered to 
monitor activities of the executive to ensure government is accountable to the people (Sections 
4(1-7), 5(1-2), 88, 89, 128 and 129, Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999). It is 
however doubtful whether the political actors have really come to terms with the original intents 
of the drafters of the constitution. 
In consonance with the submissions of Oyewo (2007), Fagbadebo (2016), and Fatile and 
Adejuwon (2016), the constitutional provisions defining the interface between the executive and 
legislative branches are adequate to engender stable and accountable government. There is, 
therefore, the need for the governing elites in the executive and legislative institutions to re-work 
their strategies to comply with the basic rules of the game. A cursory look at the nature of 
conflicts between the executive and the legislature revealed that most of these acrimonies had 
little or nothing to do with so-called contradictions in the 1999 constitution, neither does it have 
to do with the demands of the principles of separation of powers and checks mechanism built 
into the country’s constitution. On this note, emphasis should be on respect for constitutionalism 
and the rule of law by the governing elites.  
In the next chapter, the researcher examines the peculiarities of executive-legislative gridlocks in 
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. This entailed an analysis of the institutional contexts of each of the 
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selected states with a view to identifying factors responsible for varied developments of 
executive-legislative relationships.    
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Chapter Six 
Peculiarities of Executive-Legislative Gridlocks in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic 
 
6.1     Introduction 
Turbulent and conflictual relationships between the executive and legislative branches of 
government in Nigeria are not a recent development. It has its roots in the British colonial rule, 
which over-developed and unduly strengthened the executive branch compared to the other arms 
of government (Zoaka, 2003). This development, as Alavi (1979) has noted, was due to the 
authoritarian posture of the British colonial regime. This culture of executive dominance 
dovetailed into the post-independence era, accentuated by the military interregnum, and 
continued to find manifest expression under the presidential democracy of the Fourth Republic 
(Akinsanya, 1978; Akinbobola, 2002; Akinsanya and Davies, 2002; Ukase, 2014). 
For this reason, Fatile and Adejuwon (2016) argue that the omnibus explanation for the 
conflictual relationships between the executive and the legislature in Nigeria could be found in 
the ‘context of the struggles for a vantage position in the power matrix of the state by both arms 
of government’ (Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016, p.100).  The nature of conflicts between these two 
branches of government has often revealed the trivialities and the intense struggles for 
supremacy among the governing elites in the power equation of the state. There is no doubt that 
this is a reflection of the nature and forms of the patrimonial politics characteristic of Africa in 
general and Nigeria in particular, which often manifest in vicious and fierce battles and 
competition to gain control of public office and the attendant benefits it carries (Joseph, 1991; 
Ukase, 2014; Fagbadebo, 2016; Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016). 
At both the national and state levels in Nigeria, there is an increasing proclivity towards the 
culture of impunity and flagrant disregard for the rule of law among political actors in the 
executive and legislative assemblies. There is a clear but gradual jettisoning of the principles of 
separation of power and checks and balances built into the nation’s constitution which construe 
the three branches of government- executive, legislature and judiciary- to operate in a system of 
independent but shared powers; the essence of which is to provide a responsible, transparent and 
accountable government to the people.  
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Rather than embrace dialogue and cooperative approach in defence of public good, the elites in 
the executive and the legislature often demonstrate their penchant for pecuniary interest. The 
consequences, thereof, manifest in the continuous acrimonious relationships and the attendant 
governance crisis in the country (Momodu and Matudi, 2013; Orluwene, 2014). 
Fatile and Adejuwon (2016) have noted that the elites failed to offer true and genuine 
democratisation agenda that could serve as pillar for good governance and political stability. 
Persistent conflicts and contradictions between the executive and legislative actors in Nigeria 
have made effective budget formulation and implementation a difficult task with far-reaching 
political and socio-economic consequences for the nation’s body politic. On a large scale, and for 
a long time, prospects for sustainable democracy on the altar of inclusive growth, political 
stability, and economic emancipation of the citizenry remained elusive (Okpeh, 2014; Ukase, 
2014). 
This chapter presents the research findings on the peculiarities of executive-legislative relations, 
in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, in the four selected states. The chapter has five sections. While the 
first section embodies the introductory part, the second section presents an assessment and 
analysis of the relative executive-legislative harmony witnessed in Ondo state, save the 
impeachment of a deputy governor in 2015. The third section explores the development of 
executive-legislative institutions in Ekiti state. This also interrogates the place of external 
influence versus executive arrogance in the impeachment crisis of Governor Ayodele Fayose and 
his deputy, including the post-impeachment era of executive-legislative relationships in the state. 
The fourth section contains an analysis of the case of divided executive and subjugated 
legislature in Osun state. The final section interrogates the role of godfatherism in the executive-
legislative crisis that led to the impeachment of Governor Rashidi Ladoja of Oyo state. The 
researcher considers most of these issues as representing the high points of executive-legislative 
impasse in the selected states. 
Nonetheless, my claim in this chapter is that every phenomenon of executive-legislative impasse 
has its own unique nature, causes, and implications for the democratic stability of Nigeria as a 
nation. Since the commencement of the Fourth Republic, the governing elites, in the executive 
and legislature, have considerably displayed their impatience and inability to keep faith with the 
limits of power available to the respective organs of government. They circumvented the 
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cooperative approach and dialogue procedure in favour of constant antagonism and 
confrontations. It is evident that whenever the two arms of government showed the determination 
to invoke their constitutional powers, it had negative effect on the stability of the political 
system. 
6.2 The relative Executive-Legislative Harmony in Ondo State, 1999-2015 
The period between 1999 and 2015 witnessed the emergence of three democratically elected 
governments in Ondo State. There were three elected governors and four legislative sessions 
within the period. These governments were elected under the platforms of three different 
political parties: The Alliance for Democracy (AD), the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), and 
the Labour Party (LP).  
6.2.1 Executive-Legislative Relations under the Adefarati Administration (1999-2003) 
With the return of the country to civil rule, the stage was set once again to inaugurate the fourth 
legislative assembly in Ondo State, having had three previous legislative assemblies in 1979, 
1983, and 1992 (Ukase, 2014). The general election of 1999 led to the emergence of Adebayo 
Adefarati and Afolabi Iyantan, as the Governor and the Deputy Governor of Ondo State, 
respectively, under the platform of Alliance for Democracy (AD). The Fourth legislative 
assembly was inaugurated on May 31, 1999 with the AD securing 24 out of the 26 seats 
assembly. The remaining 2 seats were won by the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Ayo 
Agbomuserin, from Ifedore Constituency, became the speaker, while V.A. Akinwe, representing 
Odigbo State Constituency, emerged as the deputy speaker. The Speaker and the Deputy were 
also of the AD. However, the members later replaced them, on April 1, 2001, with Kenneth 
Olawale, as the Speaker, and, Samuel Adeboroye, as the Deputy Speaker. The Speaker and his 
deputy lost their positions to the high level intrigues and power play within the ruling AD in the 
state over the period (Personal Interview XVI, April 18, 2018). 
The relationships between the executive and legislative branches under the Adefarati 
administration were relatively peaceful and harmonious. The governor and the leadership of the 
ruling party, AD, were able to resolve any disagreement through the machinery of the political 
party. Aside from this, the leadership of the Pan-Yoruba socio-political group, the Afenifere 
played visible roles in ensuring stability of the government.  
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Executive-legislative politics during the period was largely dictated by the prominent role played 
by the Afenifere socio-cultural and political group serving as the stabilizing force for the AD, the 
ruling party in the state. The peaceful and unassuming posture of the state governor, Adebayo 
Adefarati who many regarded as a fatherly figure in the politics of the state, also contributed to 
the subsisted executive-legislative harmony. A respondent who was a senior member of the 
administration summed it up this way; 
There were hardly any disagreement between the executive and the legislature 
during Baba (Adefarati)’s administration. This I can confirm to you was as a 
result of the governor’s peaceful disposition to members of the House of 
Assembly who saw him as a respected leader. The Afenifere group led by Pa 
Abaraham Adesanya also played active role in ensuring peaceful governance of 
Ondo state under (Baba) Adefarati (Personal Interview III, February 20, 2018). 
Nonetheless, observers believed that the harmonious executive-legislative relations witnessed 
under the Adefarati’s administration were a sad reflection of the culture of executive dominance, 
characteristic of Nigeria’s political system. They argued that the legislature was subordinated to 
the executive branch, and, could hardly muster the needed institutional strength to challenge or 
withstand the executive in the process of policy-making (Akinbobola, 2005; Omitola and 
Ogunnubi, 2016). A party chieftain in the state conceded that the harmonious relations between 
the executive and the legislature experienced during period was partly because of the active role 
of the hierarchy of the AD and the prompt approval and release of funds due to the legislative 
assembly. According to him, ‘the legislature was easily persuaded to accept and support the 
policies and programmes of the governor because their financial demands and welfare package 
were being promptly approved and released as at when due’ (Personal Interview XII, April 10, 
2018). 
These revelations accentuate the position of Omitola and Ogunnibi (2016) that the relationships 
between the executive and, most states legislative assemblies, in Nigeria is being defined by 
executive dominance, manifesting through continuing financial dependence of the assemblies on 
the executive branch for the performance of their legislative assignments. Although the period 
under review in Ondo state witnessed a stable and cooperative approach to governance, there is 
no doubt that the crucial role of the legislature in ensuring prudent and efficient mobilisation of 
state resources for the public good as well as exerting controls on the exercise of executive 
powers was seriously abridged (Oni, 2013).    
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6.2.2 Era of Deliberate Alliance under the Agagu Regime (2003-2009)  
The 2003 general election enthroned the administration of Dr Olusegun Agagu of the Peoples 
Democratic Party (PDP) in Ondo State. The party also won all the 26 seats in the state House of 
Assembly. Subsequently, on the June 6, 2003 when the fifth Ondo State House of Assembly was 
inaugurated, Victor Olabimtan, from Akoko South West Constituency II, was elected Speaker, 
and, Mayowa Akinfolarin, representing Odigbo Constituency I, emerged as the Deputy-Speaker. 
Executive-legislative relations under the administration of Dr Olusegun Agagu were conducted 
with the ambience of maturity and understanding between the two arms of government. Even 
though there were few skirmishes, the hierarchy of the ruling party in the state wielded a strong 
influence on its members in the House of Assembly, which ensured a measure of moderation and 
stability in the executive-legislative relationships (Anifowose, 2004). It is widely believed that 
Governor Agagu, the Speaker, Victor Olabimtan, and the state chairman of the PDP, Ali Olanusi, 
had an agreement, which facilitated the adoption of cooperative and dialogue approach over any 
issue of inter-branch importance. 
A member of the Ondo State House of Assembly between 2003 and 2007 revealed to me in an 
interview that the harmonious relations witnessed between the legislators and the Governor was 
the outcome of the cordial relationships between the presiding officers of the legislature and the 
state PDP leadership led by Ali Olanusi. The Governor’s liaison officer to the assembly under 
the Agagu administration corroborated this    
Governor Olusegun Agagu understood the prime place of the legislature in the 
functioning of a presidential system. For this reason, the Governor had always 
allotted valuable time and resources to maintain harmonious working 
relationships with the State House of Assembly (Personal Interview X, March 16, 
2018).   
Executive-legislative relations in the state, during the period under review, derived its peculiar 
nature and characteristic from the manner and approach employed by both the executive and the 
legislature. Findings revealed that the seemingly executive-legislative accord and cooperation 
witnessed during that period were built on the triangular friendship and alliance between the 
Governor, Dr Olusegun Agagu, the Speaker, Victor Olabimtan, and the State Chairman of the 
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), Alhaji Ali Olanusi.  
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On this particular issue, a former legislator, and chairman of the Assembly’s Committee on 
Finance and Appropriation said, 
The relationship between the Governor and us was most cordial; this was 
facilitated by the unassuming posture of House leadership, the transparent 
conduct of the governor, and the credibility of PDP leaders at the state level under 
the guidance of our most respected leader, Alhaji Ali Olanusi (Personal Interview 
VII, April 5, 2018). 
A similar view expressed by the Governor’s former liaison officer to the House of Assembly, 
appeared to have also affirmed an established political relationship between the governor and the 
state chairman of the PDP, who was an ally of the Speaker.  According to him, the Speaker was a 
long-standing ally and political ‘godson’ of the State PDP Chairman, Alhaji Ali Olanusi. He 
further revealed that at the inauguration of the assembly in June 2003, Alhaji Olanusi ‘almost 
single-handedly facilitated the installation of Victor Olabimtan as the Speaker with little or no 
input from the Governor, who believed the state chairman of his party was acting in his favour’ 
(Personal Interview XI, April 14, 2018). 
Similarly, peculiarity of the executive-legislative relations in the state was noted in fund 
appropriation. This is particularly noteworthy, given the fact that this is one thorny issue that 
provoked, often, conflicts and acrimony between the executive and the legislature in other states, 
and, most especially, at the federal level. 
A former bureaucrat at the legislature disclosed that “behind the scene” mechanism adopted by 
the legislators, and the members of the executive facilitated the conflict-free appropriation 
regimes in the state. The bureaucrat told me that the executive usually takes the legislature, 
through its leadership, to confidence, before the official submission of Appropriation Bill, 
containing the budget proposals, to the House of Assembly. ‘It was done to address any area of 
differences in the appropriation bill before it is taken to the public domain’ (Personal Interview 
XIII, April 15, 2018). 
In the same vein, a senior administrative member of the Ondo State House of Assembly, in an 
interview corroborated the view earlier expressed by assembly clerk. Asking him what his 
opinion was, as regards the relative stability enjoyed in the state between the executive and the 
legislature contrary to the prevailing situation in most states of the federation, and even Ekiti, a 
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very close neighbour with almost the same political history and past democratic credential. He 
asserted thus: 
In my own candid view, executive-legislative relations depend largely on the 
character strength and personal disposition of individual actors involved. In Ondo 
state, level of political maturity of members of the House of Assembly must have 
been responsible for the relatively stable relations. Added to this is the elevation 
of public good far above party affiliation or personal pecuniary considerations 
(Personal Interview XIV, April 14, 2018).  
 
Nevertheless, this is not to say that there were no areas of strains in the relations between the 
executive and the legislature during that period. A major test of confidence between the two arms 
of government occurred in October 2005, when a faction of the House, led by Felix Okereji, 
revolted against the leadership of the House of Assembly under the speakership of Victor 
Olabimtan. The group alleged that members of the legislature had lost confidence in the ability 
of the speaker to continue to as the presiding officer. They further alleged that the speaker 
encouraged the subordination of the legislative house to the executive branch of government. 
Consequently, the members removed the Speaker and replaced him with Oluwasegunota 
Bolarinwa from Akoko North West Constituency II.  
In spite of the change in leadership of the House of Assembly, the existing harmonious 
relationships between the legislature and the executive remained cordial. They also retained the 
confidence-building mechanisms, earlier embraced by the House in relation to the executive, 
until the expiration of the term of the Fifth Legislative Assembly. 
Thus, executive-legislative relations in Ondo state were conducted under an atmosphere of 
dialogue, consensus-building and inter-branch consultation. The period between 2003 and 2009 
in the state, was an era of deliberate alliance forging and confidence building rather than 
confrontation and mutual suspicion that often characterized the relationships between the two 
arms of government in other states. A former PDP Chairman in the state alluded to this saying 
that the stability enjoyed during that era was attributed to the ‘conscious efforts made by party 
leadership and the sacrifice made by the governors to continually carry the legislature along in 
the formulation and allocation of public goods and services in the state’ (Personal Interview XV, 
April 17, 2018). 
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During this period in the state, the governing elites, in the executive and the legislature knew the 
importance of executive-legislative harmony to the performances of government and the overall 
stability of polity. This also underscored the place of individual idiosyncrasies in promoting or 
preventing executive-legislative conflicts. A respondent affirmed this thus: 
 
Executive-legislative harmony (or disharmony) does not exist in a vacuum; it is 
often a product of the actions and inactions of the characters involved. In addition, 
sometimes some other qualities such as character strength, political maturity and 
institutional competence of the relevant actors in the executive- legislative game 
largely define the nature of interface that exists between the executive and 
legislative branches (Personal Interview XVI, April 18, 2018). 
 
This submission found credence in the views of scholars such as Aiyede (2005), Bassey (2006), 
Fashagba (2012) and Ukase (2014) that legislative institution in the country should be accorded 
its prime place in the political process to ensure stability and accountability in government. Ondo 
state, over the period under review, exhibited a model in executive-legislative cooperation, 
which is worth emulation. The political actors made conscious and deliberate efforts to ensure 
smoothened relationships and avoid unwarranted confrontations in a system of separated but 
shared powers. 
As remarked by a senior legislative aide to the governor, every political party has a party caucus 
and the ruling party has a ruling caucus, which was allowed a wide range of freedom thereby 
wielding a strong influence in the executive-legislative scheme. He said this of the Governor:  
The Agagu administration was very democratic. Therefore, he allowed the party 
caucus to be and it was influential, attended by the governor and other top party 
and government leaders, but chaired by the party Chairman (Personal Interview 
XVII, April 20, 2018). 
 
All through this time, the party hierarchy and other stakeholders were given the necessary 
leeway to perform advisory, mediatory and conciliatory functions between the various sectors of 
governance. A former lawmaker affirmed this thus:  
The House of Assembly, from 2003, set about doing its work including law 
making, budgeting, oversight functions, confirmation and investigation. Conflicts 
often developed over these and they could have become centres of controversy 
but for the quick and responsible intervention of respected party leaders who often 
see things from the perspective of the legislature (Personal Interview XVIII, April 
17, 2018). 
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It is then discovered that the real issues in executive-legislative relationships is not the 
elimination of conflicts but how to develop a conflict management or reduction mechanism 
capable of mitigating potential conflicts or disagreement between the two arms of government. 
In spite of the change in the leadership of the legislature in 2005, the assembly maintained and 
sustained the existing working relationships with the executive (Akinbobola, 2005).  
6.2.3 Executive-Legislative Politics under the Mimiko Government (2009-2017) 
In February 2009, the Agagu administration ended abruptly when the Court of Appeal nullified   
his re-election and declared Olusegun Mimiko, the candidate of the Labour Party (LP), as the 
validly elected governor of Ondo state27. This followed the protracted legal battle which arose 
over the irregularities recorded during the 2007 gubernatorial elections in the state. The LP’s 
candidate had rejected the election’s result declared by INEC, Nigeria’s electoral umpire and 
approached the Election Petition Tribunal for leave to be declared as the duly elected Governor 
of Ondo state. After about two years of legal fireworks at the courts, the Appeal Court sitting in 
Benin, Edo state, granted the relief sought by the LP’s candidate and declared him the winner of 
the 2007 gubernatorial election in the state. Mimiko was sworn in on February 24, 2009 but 
inherited a PDP-dominated House of Assembly. The twenty-six-member assembly consisted of 
one member of the AD, nine LP members and sixteen members of the PDP. 
Nevertheless, over a short period, the only AD member and eight PDP members in the assembly 
defected to the ruling Labour Party. Consequently, ruling LP gained control of the assembly with 
18 the majority seats in the legislature while the PDP membership strength dropped to 8 seats. 
There was no incident of disagreement or confrontation between the two arms of government 
during this legislative period of the sixth assembly in Ondo State. 
Observers have attributed this development to the governor’s foresight and political dexterity in 
managing the interface between the executive and the legislature in the state (Odunlami, 2015). 
In addition, part of the strategies was the active role the governor played in ensuring the 
                                                          
27Under the Electoral Act 2002, the disputes arising from gubernatorial elections in Nigeria begins at the 
governorship Election Tribunal, an equivalence of a Federal High Court in the Nigerian legal structure and ends at 
the Appeal Court as the final court of justice on such matters. The election tribunals are special courts set up by law 
to ensure speedy adjudication of election related disputes. However, the 2010 amendments to the electoral act have 
since extended the scope of litigations arising from governorship elections in Nigeria to the Supreme Court as the 
final court of justice on the matter. For details, see Malemi, 2012. 
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emergence of an assembly leadership amenable to his interests. One of such strategies was the 
Governor’s pledge to sponsor the re-election bid of any PDP member willing to join the LP. As a 
result, many PDP members of the assembly could not resist the bogus gift hence their swift 
defection to the LP (Personal Interview X, March 16, 2018). Subsequently, the House of 
Assembly was always at the ‘peck and calls of the governor’ and could not muster the needed 
strength to assert its independence (Odunlami, 2015).  
Although there was no tension between the two branches of government that could vitiate the 
smooth running of government business in the state, it appeared the legislature was stripped of 
the requisite autonomy and institutional stamina to exercise its oversight power over the 
executive branch. A serving lawmaker in the state said 
 
As experiences did show under Mimiko, the governor’s sinister attempt at eroding 
the autonomy of the state’s legislative assembly stemmed beyond reducing the 
institutional and operational capacities of the legislative body. It dovetailed into 
the political arena where the governor often mobilise state resources to ensure the 
selection of politically naïve individuals bereft of informed minds, intellectual 
capacity and visible electoral base needed to understand and pursue legislative 
oversight agenda capable of checking any possible infractions in the exercise of 
executive power (Personal Interview XIX, April 15, 2018).      
This ploy, according to the lawmaker, often began with party primaries, where the state governor 
manipulated the selection process in favour of the preferred candidates and ensured their 
electoral victory in the general election. In addition, the result of all of these is a ‘legislature 
operating as an extension of the executive branch’ (Personal Interview XIX, April 15, 2018). 
With this, the governor had full control of the members of the legislature.   
Apparently, this was what played out in the run-up to the 2015 general elections in the state. The 
Governor, elected on the platform of the LP, defected to the PDP in January 2015. However, his 
Deputy refused to join him but later defected to the All Progressive Congress (APC) few days to 
the 2015 presidential election (Akintomide, 2015). The PDP lost the presidential elections to the 
APC. The deputy governor’s defection, especially the lost of presidential election by his party in 
the state to the opposition APC, infuriated Governor Mimiko, who hurriedly deployed the state 
legislative assembly to impeach him (Akintomide, 2015). 
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The seven-count allegations of gross misconduct preferred against the deputy governor, Ali 
Olanusias contained as in the Notice of Impeachment, dated 20th April 2015 and signed by 
twenty (20) out of the twenty-six (26) members House of Assembly are as follow: 
i. That Alhaji Olanusi, being the holder of the office of Deputy Governor permitted and 
condoned the perpetration of fraudulent activities in the office of the Deputy Governor in that 
one Alhaji Bolaji Idris Olanusi, the younger brother and Special Assistant in the office of the 
Deputy Governor procured false LPO’s with knowledge of Alhaji Ali Olanusi and obtained from 
one EHISO RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL LIMITED, two (2) Trucks of AGO with forged 
documents and for personal benefits, thereby putting the office of the Deputy Governor into 
disrepute.  
ii. That Alhaji Ali Olanusi being the holder of the office of the Deputy Governor of Ondo State 
and having full knowledge that his younger brother, Bolaji Idris Olanusi, who at all 
material time was his personal staff had engaged in activities unbecoming of officials of 
Government refused to sanction, query, or discipline the said staff, thus, bringing the 
office of the Deputy Governor into disrepute. 
iii. That Alhaji Ali Olanusi, being the holder of the office of Deputy Governor of Ondo State 
engaged in Press Release and interviews with various media outlets especially at pages 50 and 51 
of the Saturday Punch of April 18, 2015 publication wherein false allegations were levelled 
against the Governor who was falsely portrayed as: 
a. A person who instigated the carting away of ballot boxes. 
b. A person who instigated the killings of people in Ondo State. 
c. A person who disrespect the Judiciary. 
d. A person who worked against the interest of the President. 
e. A person who bribed the electorate. 
iv. That Alhaji Ali Olanusi, being the holder of the office of Deputy Governor of Ondo 
State, engaged in absenteeism and truancy by regularly absenting himself from office, place of 
work and all other official engagements specifically on 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th, and 17th of April and 
Monday, 20th of April, 2015 without lawful excuse or authorisation but generally acting in a 
manner inconsistent with the dictates and expectations of the high office of the Deputy Governor 
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of a State, thus, undermining the governance process, an act, which amount to gross misconduct 
under the Constitution. 
v. That Ali Olanusi, being the holder of the office of Deputy Governor on or about 
Wednesday 15th April 2015 caused his security aides to shoot indiscriminately at peaceful 
protesters along Fiwasaiye/Oba Adesida Road in Akure thus creating panic, breakdown of law 
and order, and general sense of insecurity within the State under the pretext that the said 
protesters disrepute his convoy, an act unbecoming of the holder of the high office of the Deputy 
Governor. 
vi. That Alhaji Ali Olanusi, being the holder of the office of Deputy Governor at various 
dates collected various sums of money for the purpose of travelling and medical bills as follows: 
2009 (#8,175,410), 2010 (#8,952,600), 2013 (#10,833,200) and 2014 (#11,328,100) when in 
actual fact, the said Alhaji Ali Olanusi did not travel on the said specified dates or did not travel 
at all and, or did not expend the approved medical bills as appropriate, thereby unlawfully 
enriching himself and/or causing loss to the State Government. 
vii. That Alhaji Ali Olanusi, being the holder of the office of Deputy Governor engaged in 
political conduct designed to undermine the office of the Governor by causing political 
disaffection and deliberately working at cross purposes with the Governor and the Executive 
Council of the State with a view to destabilising the State government by openly canvassing for 
the impeachment of the Governor following the Presidential Election conducted on 28th of 
March, 2015 which amounts to an act of gross misconduct under the provisions of the 
Constitution (Votes and Proceedings, Ondo State House of Assembly, April 21, 2015).                        
Section 188 of the Constitution stipulated the process for the impeachment of a Governor and or 
the Deputy-Governor. The Constitution provided the opportunity for the Deputy Governor to 
respond to the allegations contained in the notice within stipulated time before the lawmakers 
could proceed with the proceedings. In this case, the lawmakers did not allow the Deputy-
Governor to respond to the allegations within the stipulated time or given enough opportunity to 
defend himself at the panel set up by the Chief Judge of the State. The Panel only sat for two 
days. Subsequently, the panel found him guilty of the allegations and the assembly removed him 
from office on April 27, 2015 (Fagbadebo, 2016). 
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Nonetheless, political consideration motivated the removal of Ali Olanusi as Deputy Governor of 
Ondo state (Odunlami, 2015). A member of the assembly who spoke with me on the issue 
disclosed that the governor’s political aides drafted the allegations against the Deputy Governor 
and handed them down to the legislature (Personal Interview X, April 12, 2018).  He added that 
the impeachment was because of the fallout between the Governor and his Deputy, over his 
defection to the opposition party, the All Progressive Congress (APC) against all entreaties 
(Personal Interview X, April 12, 2018).  
The legislature, going by the notice of allegation, had accused Ali Olanusi of complicity and 
negligence amounting to abuse of office, frequent absenteeism from work, insubordination to the 
Governor, and other unsavoury conducts capable of undermining the state government. 
Nevertheless, as Fagbadebo (2016) has noted, most of the offences were allegedly committed 
long before the period of the impeachment of the Deputy Governor. According to him, even if 
those allegations were true, the legislators would not impeach the Deputy Governor if he had 
defected with his principal to the PDP. It is evident, therefore, that the ‘impeachment of Olanusi 
was politically motivated, rather than a result of any breaches of the constitution’ (Fagbadebo, 
2016, p.230).  
In view of this, the removal of the Deputy Governor was not fallout of any acrimonious 
relationship between the executive and the legislature in Ondo state. It was a clear case of 
lawmakers compromising the integrity of the legislative institution to please the Governor. This 
claim was further supported by the Appeal Court judgment on the issue which set aside the 
impeachment of Ali Olanusi as Deputy Governor of the state, citing irregularities in the 
procedure adopted by the assembly which contradict the purpose of the constitutional provisions 
on impeachment (Premium Times, 24/04/2017).  
It is important to note that in Nigeria, deputy governors do not have specific constitutional roles 
to play in government. They only function in line with the instructions handed down to them by 
the Governors (Fagbadebo, 2016). In other words, the official duties of a Deputy Governor are at 
the pleasure of the Governor who is the head of the executive branch. Thus, any attempt by 
Deputy Governors to operate outside the influence or directive of their principals could attract 
severe sanctions, one of which could be mobilisation of the legislature to remove them from 
office (Odivwri, 2004). 
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6.3 The Development of Executive and Legislative Institutions in Ekiti State (1999-2007) 
In response to the agitations for a separate state, the former Ekiti Province was carved out of old 
Ondo State on October 1, 1996 as a separate state28. The new state had 16 local governments. 
Subsequently, following the return of the country to democratic rule in May 1999, Adeniyi 
Adebayo was elected, on the platform of the Alliance for Democracy (AD), as the first civilian 
governor. On June 1, 1999, the first Ekiti State legislative assembly was inaugurated. The 
assembly speaker, Kola Adefemi, and, his Deputy, Opeyemi Ajayi, were from the same political 
party with the governor, the AD. 
The executive and the legislature under the new democratic era were under the firm control of 
the same political party, the Alliance for Democracy (AD). There were relative stability and 
understanding in the relationships between the executive and legislative branches. The strength 
of the ruling party and the pivotal role played by Afenifere, the Yoruba socio-political group, 
facilitated the cordial relationships between the executive and legislature branches of 
government. 
Throughout the administration of Governor Niyi Adebayo in Ekiti, the state experienced 
sustained accord and harmony in executive-legislative relationships (Akinbobola, 2005). The 
harmonious relations between the executive and the legislature over the period were attributed to 
the disposition of the Governor who consistently approved and released all funds requested by 
the State House of Assembly at regular intervals (Aliyu, 2010). This must have informed the 
threat of impeachment issued to the Governor Adebayo’s Deputy in 2002 when he was Acting 
Governor in the absence of Adebayo who was away in Japan. The deputy governor was reluctant 
in releasing the money already approved by the Governor to the state lawmakers (Odunlami, 
2015).  
                                                          
28Agitations for the creation of more states have been a common feature of Nigeria’s political evolution since the 
colonial period and the push continued even after independence. The country’s federal structure inherited at 
independence consisting of the Federal government and three regional governments was expanded in 1963 when an 
additional region, the Mid-western region, was created. The military government changed the nomenclatures for the 
Nigerian constituent units in 1967 when the four regions were sub-divided into twelve states. The intervention of 
successive military juntas increased the number of states to nineteen, twenty-one, and thirty in 1977, 1987, and 
1991, respectively. The last exercise of state creation took place on 1st October 1996 when additional six states were 
created one of which is Ekiti state that was carved out of the old Ondo state. Thus, bringing the total number of 
states in the Nigerian Federation to thirty-six (36). For more details see, Agedah, 1993; Akinsanya and Davies, 
2002; Anifowose 2004; Akinbobola, 2005.   
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However, a smoothened executive-legislative relationship witnessed over the period was not 
enough reason to conclude that the Ekiti State first legislative assembly was a rubber stamp 
institution. A septuagenarian who served as member of the assembly between 1999 and 2003 
asserted thus: 
The fact that there was a smooth executive-legislative relationship did not  mean 
that the legislature was a rubber stamp. Acrimonies between the executive and the 
assembly are by no means a justification for legislature’s assertiveness. What 
transpired between the House and Governor Niyi Adebayo was mutual 
understanding for the smooth running of the  state (Personal Interview XXI, April 
25, 2018). 
Apart from this, the period under review was the early stage of democracy in the country 
following a prolonged military interregnum. Thus, the political actors in the executive and 
legislative branches of government lacked the necessary experience that could have informed 
‘legislative assertiveness or executive rascality’ in the legislative process (Oyebode, 2006, p.9).       
In the 2003 election, the opposition party, the PDP won the gubernatorial election in the Ekiti 
State. Governor Ayodele Fayose was elected under the platform of the People’s Democratic 
Party (PDP) and was sworn in on   May 29, 2003. The AD also lost the gubernatorial elections in 
other South-West States, with the exception of Lagos.  The Second Legislative Assembly of 
Ekiti State was inaugurated on the June 2, 2003, with Patrick Sola Akingbolamu, from Ikole 
Constituency I, and, Taiwo Olatunbosun, representing Irepodun/Ifelodun State Constituency II, 
elected as Speaker and Deputy Speaker, respectively.    
With these developments, the PDP firmly took control of both the executive and the legislative 
arm of government in the state. Executive-legislative relations under the Fayose administration 
commenced on a stable note, predicated on the existing understanding between the governor and 
the leadership of the legislature. The Governor won the confidence of the legislature through 
prompt release of funds due to the assembly. However, things began to change between the two 
branches of government when the governor incurred the anger of the former President, Olusegun 
Obasanjo (Aliyu, 2010). 
Executive-legislative relations under the Fayose regime started on a bright note following the 
inauguration of the Ekiti State Second Assembly. The Speaker, of the House of Assembly, 
Patrick Ajigbolamu, was lodging at the Government House while his official residence was 
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under renovation (Oyebode, 2006). The leadership of the two arms of government had good 
working relationships. Notwithstanding the dilapidated infrastructure inherited by the legislature, 
members of the legislature continued to cooperate with the executive for the smooth running of 
the affairs of the state. A former majority leader of the Assembly attested to this, when he stated 
that ‘executive-legislative cooperation and accord was the order of the day when the House came 
on board; no rancour, no disagreement, but understanding and cooperation’ (Personal Interview 
XXI, April 20, 2018). 
A former Chairman of the PDP in the state shared the same sentiment. According to him, the 
party hierarchy in the state was aware and indeed was very pleased with the harmonious working 
relationships that existed between the executive and the legislature at the commencement of 
Fayose administration in May 2003. He, however, conceded that ‘the same party structure was 
put under pressure when things began to change’ (Personal Interview XXII, April 20, 2018).  
The respondents agreed that there was no strain in the executive-legislative relationships in the 
state in spite of the confrontational approach of the governor, who arrogated all available powers 
in the state to himself becoming like a de facto chief executive. However, the political events of 
the state took a new turn following the fallout between Governor Fayose and former President 
Olusegun Obasanjo. 
Governor Fayose had prior to their disagreements, been a close ally and political confidant of the 
President. Fayose as the Chairman of the Nigeria Governors Forum had always championed the 
interest of Obasanjo and his government. However, the fallout between the two leaders led to a 
swift turn of event in the politics of Ekiti State and altered the sustained confidence and harmony 
that characterised executive-legislative relationships (Fagbadebo, 2016; Aliyu, 2010). The 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), an agency of the Obasanjo-led Federal 
Government notorious for its penchant to fight perceived enemies of the President, moved into 
the state and accused Fayose of embezzlement of public funds and abuse of office (Odunlami, 
2015). A respondent in the state informed me that the issue did not stop at that. ‘The EFCC 
directed the state legislature to commence impeachment proceedings against Fayose but when 
the lawmakers resisted the anti-graft body issued a threat of incarceration against them’ 
(Personal Interview XXV, April 22, 2018).   
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 The complicity of the former President in deploying the EFCC, the nation’s foremost anti-graft 
agency to bully or fight his perceived political enemies manifested largely in the use of state 
legislatures to remove state governors believed to be opposed to his government. For instance, 
since the return to democratic rule in 1999, the nation recorded the highest cases of impeachment 
under the Obasanjo regime (Fagbadebo, 2016; Lawan, 2010). 
The pressure mounted on the state lawmakers led to the commencement of impeachment 
proceedings against the Governor on September 29, 2006 but the state legislature eventually 
impeached the Governor and his Deputy on October 17, 2006 (Aliyu, 2010). Subsequent 
developments and other substantive issues relating to the impeachment crisis of Fayose and his 
deputy are the focus of discussion in the next section of this chapter.                    
6.3.1 The Impeachment Crisis of Governor Fayose and his Deputy in Ekiti State 
Under the Ayo Fayose administration in Ekiti State, the peculiar nature and characteristics of 
executive-legislative relations stemmed from the unique approach of the Governor to the 
legislature and the influence of external forces in determining the political outcomes of 
government institutions in the state.  
Executive-legislative relationships during the administration began and continued smoothly until 
the middle of the year 2006 when the disagreement between the Governor and former President 
Obasanjo reached its climax as a result of the fallout over the third term bid of the President. 
Prior to that time, Governor Fayose was widely regarded as ‘Obasanjo boy’ because of the 
enormous goodwill he enjoyed from the President (Fashagba, 2012). As Oyebode (2006) has 
noted, at the time Fayose was the Chairman of the Nigeria Governors Forum (NGF)29, he had 
always championed the cause of the President and his government, sometimes to the 
consternation of his Governors colleagues. For this reason, Obasanjo was believed to have seen 
in Fayose a dependable ally and towering figure among the Governors for the realisation of his 
tenure elongation bid (Odinkalu and Osori, 2018). 
                                                          
29The Nigeria Governors Forum (NGF) is a political forum consisting of the 36 States Governors in Nigeria. 
Established in 2002, the Governors use this forum as a unifying platform in their interface with the Federal 
Government to negotiate policy options and political trade-offs favourable to their respective states. Though not an 
enactment of the law, the forum has since inception served as a veritable structure of intergovernmental relations 
under the Nigerian Federation.   
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Back home in Ekiti, the Governor’s leadership style had pitched him against some notable 
traditional rulers and opinion leaders in the state. This, notwithstanding, the Governor was 
having a smooth sailing with the legislature. Observers attributed this to his regular approval and 
prompt release of funds due to the state lawmakers (Aliyu, 2010). At some point over the period, 
some traditional rulers and influential leaders in Ekiti had approached Obasanjo and appealed to 
him to call Fayose to order because of the manners the Governors was running the affairs of the 
state, especially his confrontational approach to governance. However, the former President 
ignored the plea until the President himself failed in his bid to use Fayose for his own ambition 
(Aliyu, 2010; Lawan, 2010). 
Just like the similar fate that befell Governor Rashidi Ladoja of Oyo State, Fayose’s ordeal 
started after the former President lost his third term bid30 largely, due to the opposition mounted 
by his Deputy, Atiku Abubakar in connivance with some State Governors (Lawan, 2010). Chidi 
Odinkalu and Ayisha Osori described the development in this way: 
 Following the collapse of the agenda, Obasanjo went after some of those   
 he held responsible. Top on the list was Atiku Abubakar, his vice president.  
 Others were state governors who supported Atiku in mounting a successful  
 campaign against the failed bid (Odinkalu and Osori, 2018, p. 162).   
Many observers have pointed out that Fayose was not specifically in the camp of State 
Governors who were overtly opposed to Obasanjo’s tenure elongation bid. However, the camp of 
the former President considered the Governor’s outspokenness on the contrived role of Obasanjo 
in the failed campaign as amounting to his tactical disapproval of the President’s ambition 
(Odinkalu and Osori, 2018). As a close ally of the former President, and a frontline member of 
the Nigeria Governors Forum, Fayose’s major offence was that he publicly admitted the 
clandestine moves of Obasanjo to perpetuate himself in power. An allegation the former 
President had consistently denied (Odinkalu and Osori, 2018; Oyebode, 2006).  Obasanjo had 
always dismissed his alleged complicity to use the constitutional amendment bill submitted to 
                                                          
30The ‘Third Term Bid’ was an attempt by former President Olusegun Obasanjo to extend his tenure beyond the 
maximum two terms limit of 8 years the 1999 Constitution guarantees. For this to materialise, the President had 
submitted an omnibus constitutional amendment bill to the National Assembly, Nigeria’s central legislature and 
enlisted some of his cronies to mount both clandestine and overt campaigns for its actualization. However, the 
proposed amendment caused uproar in the elite circles and among the larger populace. Thus, as a result of the 
widespread disapproval the bill had generated among Nigerians, the National Assembly threw out the proposed 
amendment on May 16, 2006 when it failed to secure the need support in parliament. For more details, see Edigin, 
2010; Lawan, 2010; Oarhe, 2010; Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007.   
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the legislature as a ploy for his tenure elongation bid. Following the fallout between the 
Governor and the former President, Fayose had come out openly to say that President Obasanjo 
actually, schemed for a third term in office (Aliyu, 2010; Oyebode, 2006). 
As Odinkalu and Osori (2018) has noted, this development ensured that Fayose was found 
among those who were held responsible by the former President’s camp for the failure of the 
tenure elongation project and thus penciled down him for annihilation. Shortly after, the 
country’s foremost anti-graft agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
moved into Ekiti and accused Fayose of mismanaging state funds. The agency alleged the 
Governor of diverting the fund appropriated for the Ekiti State Integrated Poultry Project, which 
amounted to 1.6 million naira to the purchase of choice properties for himself and some of his 
cronies (Aliyu, 2010). Thus, the EFCC directed the state legislature to commence impeachment 
proceedings against Fayose but the lawmakers resisted.  
Under the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, the State House of Assembly is the only recognised 
body to investigate the financial dealings of the state government (Sections 128 and 129 of the 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended). However, the directive given to it 
by the EFCC is unknown to law and amounted to political vendetta because the legislative 
assembly possesses the constitutional guarantees to conduct its affairs independently of any 
agency of government. Nonetheless, having determined to remove Fayose from office at all cost, 
the anti-graft body descended on the state lawmakers and threatened to incarcerate them if they 
failed to impeach Fayose (Aliyu, 2010; Oyetayo, 2006). 
Thus, the lawmakers eventually succumbed to the pressure mounted on them by the EFCC and 
commenced impeachment proceedings against the Governor in September 2006. A respondent 
who served as an administrative staff in the state assembly during the impeachment of Governor 
Ayo Fayose confirmed to me that the EFCC actually prepared and handed down the Notice of 
Allegations served on the Governor by the assembly on September 29, 2006. ‘I can tell you that 
the lawmakers were in disarray following the threats of incarceration by the EFCC and could not 
muster enough courage to put Fayose’s offences to paper. The allegations served on the 
Governor were handed down by the anti-graft agency’ (Personal Interview XX, April 20, 2018).              
In a related manner, the Governor had hinged his impeachment plot on forces, outside the 
legislature, who were determined to remove him from office as the Governor of the State. 
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According to him, none of his predecessors could equal what he had done for the House of 
Assembly. He believed that the members of the legislature succumbed to the pressure by his 
detractors to remove him31. Nevertheless, the legislators claimed their action was premised on 
the need for the Governor to clear himself of the allegations of corrupt practices levelled against 
him. On September 29, 2006, the legislature served the Governor with a Notice of Impeachment. 
The allegations of gross misconduct against him are as follows: 
(i) that the award of the integrated poultry project did not follow due process; 
(ii)    that MD Biological Concepts Limited spent over #150 million to acquire properties for 
the Governor, Ayodele Fayose at both Ibadan and environs; 
(iii)   that Mr Gbenga James, owner of Biological Concepts Limited who later turned out to 
be Personal Assistant to the Governor acquired eight cars for the Governor and the 
Governor’s mother; 
(iv)  that Mr Gbenga James built a house for the Governor through an architect; 
(v)   that two houses were built for the Governor at Afao and Ibadan by one Mr Biodun Fari- 
Arole, a contractor, from the proceeds of the Government Secretariat, Ado-Ekiti for 
#25 milliom and #20 million respectively; 
(vi)  that the sum of #42 million was transferred to the Governor through Mr Ayoola of 
FCMB, Ibadan; 
(vii) that Banquet Hall and Ekiti State Hotel were re-awarded at over #1 billion without 
due process; 
(viii) that the Governor in 2004 transferred $100,000.00 to one Mr Tony through Mr 
Abiola Ayoola while he was at Standard Trust Bank; 
                                                          
31A former commissioner under the Fayose government disclosed in an interview held on 22nd April 2018, that the 
removal of his principal from office in 2006 had little or nothing to do with the disagreements between the governor 
and the legislature. According to him, forces outside the state, especially the country’s president, Olusegun 
Obasanjo, who used the EFCC to blackmail the assembly members into agreeing to remove Fayose, orchestrated the 
governor’s ordeal, majorly. 
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(ix)   that the accountant-General and Chairmen of the sixteen local government in the state 
were unable to account for a whopping #11.8 billion out of the #17.8 billion received 
between 2004 – June, 2006 due to illegal deductions by the Governor; 
(x)     that over #500 million had been paid into the account of Ayo Fayose Foundation; 
(xi)    that over #100 million was being deducted monthly by the State Government from the 
Joint Account and Allocation Committee; 
(xii) that a total of #265 million classified as EKROMA expenses was deducted between 
July and August 2005 while the Project Manager claimed he only got a paltry sum of 
#17 million for the period; and 
(xiii) that Mr Fayose operates several foreign accounts which he opened after he became 
Governor in 2003 (Votes and Proceedings, Ekiti State House of Assembly, September 
29, 2006).   
Constitutionally, the Governor had the opportunity of responding to these allegations within 
fourteen days. However, Governor Fayose did not respond to the impeachment notice within the 
stipulated time, thereby making his removal from office easier and quicker than normal (Aliyu, 
2010; Odunlami, 2015). In accordance with the provisions of the law under section 188(5) of the 
1999 Constitution, the House Speaker requested the State Chief Judge to constitute a panel for 
the impeachment trial. The lawmakers however rejected the panel constituted by the Chief 
Judge, Justice Bamisile, accusing him of stocking the panel with pro-Fayose figures (Odunlami, 
2015).  
For that reason, the assembly removed the State Chief Judge and appointed a replacement, 
Justice Jide Aladejana, contrary to the constitutional guidelines regarding the appointment of 
Chief Judge of a State. According to section 27(1) of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, ‘the 
appointment of a person to the office of Chief Judge of a State shall be made by the Governor of 
the State on the recommendation of the National Judicial Council (NJC)32 subject to 
                                                          
32The NJC is a body established by law under section 153 of the 1999 Constitution. As stated in part 1 of the Third 
Schedule to the constitution, the body is headed by the Chief Justice of Nigeria and has the power to recommend to 
the Governor of a State persons to be appointed as Chief Judge of the States. Under article 21, paragraph a(g) of the 
Constitution, the NJC is the only body that has the lawfully responsibilities to ‘appoint, dismiss and exercise 
disciplinary control over members and staff of the Council’. 
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confirmation of the appointment by the House of Assembly of the State’. Thus, by removing the 
state Chief Judge and appointing a replacement, the lawmakers breached the 1999 Constitution.  
Nonetheless, the legislature disbanded the panel constituted by Bamisile and directed Justice 
Aladejana, the new Acting Chief Judge, to constitute another panel, which was headed by 
Kayode Omotoso (Aliyu, 2010). Omotoso’s panel found Fayose, and his deputy, guilty of the 
allegations. Subsequently, on October 17, 2006, the legislature considered the report of the panel 
and removed the Governor and his Deputy, Abiodun Olujimi from office. 
The desperation of the state lawmakers however came to the fore in the inclusion of Fayose’s 
Deputy in the impeachment plot. This is because, in the notice of impeachment served on the 
Governor on September 29, 2006, the lawmakers did not accuse the Deputy Governor of any 
wrongdoing. Neither was she served the Notice of allegations as a requirement of the law. Thus, 
many observers believe that the inclusion of the deputy governor in the impeachment trial was an 
afterthought on the part of the lawmakers who saw a great opportunity for one of them to 
become the acting governor33 (Aliyu, 2010; Lawan, 2010; Oyebode, 2006). A development, 
which negates the impeachment provisions as, spelt out in the Constitution. A respondent who 
was a senior member of the Fayose’s administration corroborated this claim when he said; ‘the 
legislature acted on unfounded allegations given to them by EFCC to remove Fayose. In 
addition, the lawmakers were inordinately ambitious’ (Personal Interview XXVI, April 22, 
2018). 
Consequently, these developments threw the impeachment process into avalanche of 
controversies and generated palpable tension in the state. Mr Fayose had faulted the processes 
that led to his impeachment as a breach of the constitution and thus, insisted he remained the 
Governor of the state. Meanwhile, the legislature had appointed the Speaker of the House of 
Assembly, Friday Aderemi, as the Acting Governor. This decision led to a political imbroglio, as 
the Deputy Governor, Mrs Abiodun Olujimi, also rejected her removal and laid claim to the 
governorship seat, as the rightful successor to the impeached Governor. The political instability 
that followed called for the intervention of the Federal Government with the declaration of a 
state of emergency in the state on October 26, 2006. 
                                                          
33The 1999 Constitution under section 191 provided for the Speaker of a House of Assembly of a State to become 
Acting Governor in the event that the office of the Governor and the Deputy Governor become vacant in accordance 
with the provisions of the Constitution.  
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 To halt the spate of uncertainty that pervaded the political atmosphere of the state, the federal 
government announced the appointment of a sole administrator to administer the state for six 
months as stipulated by the Constitution. Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution empowers the 
President of Nigeria to issue a proclamation of a state of emergency in the Federation or any part 
thereof when: 
(a) the Federation is at war (b) the Federation is in imminent danger of invasion 
or involvement in a state of war (c) there is actual breakdown of public safety 
in the Federation or any part thereof to such extent as to require extraordinary 
measures to restore peace and security (d) there is a clear and present danger 
of an actual breakdown of public order and public safety in the Federation or 
any part thereof requiring extraordinary measures to avert danger….(Section 
305(3), Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as 
amended).        
The emergency rule declared on the state did not last beyond the six months stipulated by the 
Constitution34. This was nonetheless before the expiration of the tenure of Fayose’s government, 
and which informed the appointment of the House Speaker, Adetope Ademuliyi, as the Acting 
Governor who led the state until May 2007 when Mr Segun Oni was sworn-in as the new 
Governor of Ekiti State (Lafenwa, 2010; Lawan, 2010). However, long after that, the Judiciary 
had set aside the impeachment of Fayose and his deputy for violating the provisions of the 
Constitution (Aliyu, 2010).   
6.3.2 Executive-Legislative Relationships in the Post-impeachment Era in Ekiti State 
(2007-2015) 
Mr Segun Oni of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) assumed the governorship seat of Ekiti 
State on May 29, 2007 following his victory at the 2007 general election in the state. However, 
the 26-member State House of Assembly inaugurated on June 6, 2007 had its membership 
evenly split between the PDP and the opposition party, the Action Congress (AC). The two 
political parties had 13-members each in the House, but the PDP used its influence as the ruling 
party in the state to produce both the speaker and deputy speaker of the assembly. This 
development generated heated controversy and bickering between the PDP and opposition 
lawmakers in the state.  
                                                          
34
 Section 305(6c) of the 1999 Constitution. 
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Thus, the immediate challenge of the Segun Oni-led administration in the state was how to 
resolve the bickering and leadership crisis in the state legislature. This is because, apart from the 
speaker and the deputy speaker’s posts, the PDP produced all other presiding officers of the 
assembly. An action the AC lawmakers, who were equally 13 in number, vehemently resisted. 
This development created serious divisions and contentions in the state legislature and paralyzed 
the activities of the House of Assembly. 
The first test of the imbroglio emerged over the list of Commissioner Nominees submitted to the 
assembly by Governor Oni for confirmation. The AC lawmakers resisted the move to consider 
the screening of the nominees on the floor of the House and demanded parity in the assembly 
leadership based on membership strength of the two parties. However, to the consternation of 
opposition AC members, the PDP lawmakers pronounced the nominees’ confirmation at the 
slightest opportunity without the usual legislative scrutiny. This again generated heated 
arguments among lawmakers from the two parties, which prompted the leadership of the House 
to suspend some of the AC legislators, including barring them from gaining entry into the 
assembly complex.  
This regime of bickering and polarisation among members of the assembly along party lines 
continued until August 2007 when some respected traditional rulers and opinion leaders in the 
state intervened in the leadership crisis that have rocked the assembly since inauguration. 
Following this intervention, the PDP lawmakers ceded the deputy speakership seat to the 
opposition lawmaker, Saliu Adeoti but retained the speakership of the House. Eventually, the 
lawmakers agreed to do away with the position of majority and minority leaders and chose two 
leaders from both parties. At the end, these measures appeared to have served as permanent 
solution to the internal wrangling in the legislature as members from then onward continued to 
work together and in accord with executive branch. A former lawmaker in state said: 
The resolution of the internal leadership crisis of the House also translated into 
harmonious relationships between it and the executive branch. I can confirm to 
you that after the resolution of the leadership crisis, there were no serious rancour 
between the lawmakers and the State Governor until Segun Oni lost the state 
governorship seat to opposition candidate, Dr Kayode Fayemi (Personal Interview 
XXI, April 20, 2018). 
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As the respondent rightly said, in October 2010, the Appeal Court nullified the election of Mr 
Segun Oni and declared the gubernatorial candidate of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN)35, 
Kayode Fayemi, as the duly elected Governor of Ekiti State. Fayemi assumed duty as Governor 
on October 16, 2010 and continued to enjoy harmonious working relationship with the 
legislature until the legislative session of the Third Assembly ended on June 5, 2011. However, 
Ekit State Fourth Assembly with a new set of lawmakers was inaugurated on June 6, 2011 
following the conduct of parliamentary election in the state while Fayemi continued to serve as 
Governor, having just been sworn-in in October for four-year tenure. 
Nonetheless, the ruling party in the state, the ACN, controlled an overriding majority in the 
assembly having secured 25 out of the 26-member legislature. Executive-legislative relationships 
under the Fayemi administration sailed smoothly with no recorded impasse or serious 
disagreement between the branches of government over the period. A respondent attributed this 
to the ‘mutual understanding that existed between Governor Fayemi and the state lawmakers 
over policy and appropriation-related matters’ (Personal Interview XXV, April 22, 2018). 
Fayemi completed his four-year tenure in October 2014 but lost re-election bid to Ayodele 
Fayose, the governorship candidate of the PDP in the state. Fayose was sworn-in as Ekiti State 
Governor for the second time on October 16, 2014. Observers believed Fayose’s second coming 
as Governor of the state was made possible by the court intervention, which had earlier nullified 
the 2006 impeachment of Fayose and his deputy.                        
Although two successive administrations of Governors Segun Oni (2007-2010) and Kayode 
Fayemi (2010-2014) under two different political parties have since served in the state, there was 
no recorded impasse, which is at least known in the public domain, between the executive and 
legislative branches. Nonetheless, Fayose’s personality trait and confrontational approach to 
governance came to the fore as the history of adversarial executive-legislative relations yet again 
resurfaced in his second term, where seven (7) PDP lawmakers in a 26-member assembly backed 
by the governor purportedly impeached the assembly speaker, Adewale Omirin and also 
suspended all the 19 APC lawmakers in the House. 
                                                          
35
 By the time the Appeal Court declared its candidate, Kayode Fayemi, winner of the governorship election in Ekiti 
State in October 2010 after a protracted legal battle, the party had change its name from Action Congress (AC) to 
the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN). Recalled that the gubernatorial election in Ekiti State was conducted in April 
2007. 
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One other peculiar nature of Ekiti state under the governor was the influence and impacts that 
other relevant stakeholders, such as traditional rulers, opinion leaders, and, even the presidency, 
could have on executive-legislative relations. The experiences of the executive and the 
legislature in the state had been varied and impacted by various factors. These include the 
particularistic nature of elites’ behaviour toward the exercise of power, the varying roles and 
degrees of interventions by political parties, the influence of forces outside the two branches of 
government, and intra-arm conflicts, among other factors. The point earlier raised by Oyewo 
(2007) reaffirmed this development that 
A more embracing view of executive-legislative relations will involve a 
consideration of the acrimonious or crisis-ridden relations of the two arms within 
the much broader context of social, economic, political, and cultural milieu 
wherein the two institutions operate (Oyewo, 2007, p.12). 
In Ekiti state, at the height of the impeachment crisis in 2006, the conflicts between the executive 
and the legislative branches of government could not be isolated from the demands from the 
socio-political environment. Even though the Governor was doing ‘his best possible’ to satisfy 
the legislature, as he had claimed, the lawmakers were still under pressure from other powerful 
forces such as the presidency, traditional rulers, opinion leaders and a segment of the enlightened 
and articulate public. According to Oyetayo (2006, p.17), this sets of stakeholders could no 
longer condone the ‘impeccably garrulous and unrepentantly confrontational approach’ of 
Fayose to governance.  
The Governor ignored the interplay of these critical factors before the most challenging moments 
of his administration. He curried the favour and allegiance of the House of Assembly through 
consistent cash allocation and other patronages but failed to realise the decisive roles of external 
forces on the legislature. Commenting on this particular issue, a serving lawmaker in the Ekiti 
State House of Assembly, had this to say: 
Fayose might have pocketed the House of Assembly through persistent patronage 
of its ranks and files and subsequently gone to sleep forgetting that the legislature 
is like a clearinghouse where inputs from outside largely determine the outcome 
of policy action or inaction of parliamentarians (Personal Interview XXIV, April 
22, 2018). 
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However, it appears Mr Fayose have come to the realisation of the interplay of these factors in 
his second coming as governor when he inherited the opposition All Progressive Congress 
(APC) dominated legislative assembly in 2014. Immediately he began to have issues with the 
Assembly, he warmed himself into the heart of Ekiti people, including traditional rulers, opinion 
leaders and, most especially, the masses comprising of the civil servants, artisans and the 
peasantry (Sahara Reporters, June 4, 2015). The Governor unknown to constitutional practice, 
had backed a 7-member PDP led House of Assembly to sack the 19 All Progressive Congress 
members from the legislative Assembly including removal of Speaker Adewale Omirin and other 
principal officers of the legislature (Odunlami, 2015). The ensuied developments threw the state 
into another around of apprehension, uncertainty and perpetual anxiety occasioned by the 
impeachment notice issued to the Governor by the 19 All Progressive Congress members in the 
assembly. Consequently, the entire state was in perpetual turmoil while it lasted (Odunlami, 
2015). 
The Governor resorted to self-help at the tail end of the session of the legislative assembly by 
‘mobilizing motorcycle riders, hired political thugs and members of transport workers’ union to 
block all entry routes into Ekiti state on so many occasions’ (Personal Interview XXIV, April 22, 
2018). This was apparently to prevent the 19-APC lawmakers from gaining entrance into state to 
carry out their purported impeachment plot; having been bullied out of state by the governor. 
Meanwhile the Assembly complex was sealed by the security operatives as a result of the 
barricade mounted by the people believed to be agents of the Governor and the incessant claims 
by the two factions of the assembly on who occupies the hallow chamber. Fortunately, all of 
these disappeared when the tenure of the fourth legislative assembly ended on June 3, 2015.  
Overall, the basic fact thrown up by all these revelations is that government is a collective 
business and not a one-man soap opera. There is the need to nurture and allow governance 
structures to perform their constitutionally assigned functions. Under the extant principles of 
presidentialism, the three arms of government; the legislature, executive, and judiciary are given 
constitutionally recognised roles to play for the effective functioning of the system. Moreso, the 
stabilising roles of some recognised institutions in the society such as traditional institutions, 
civil society organisations, enlightened segment of public and other relevant groups cannot be set 
aside in shaping the political outcomes of formal institutions of governance. Thus, the pluralist 
tenets of democratic dispensation such as tolerance, consensus building, conciliation, and 
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dialogue should be allowed and nurtured. Executive-legislative relation is a slow, steady but 
continuous learning process of deepening democratic values (Davies, 2004).    
6.4 Executive-Legislative Relations in the Era of Divided Executive in Osun State (1999-  
           2003)  
The successful completion of the transition programme that returned Nigeria to constitutional 
democracy saw to the emergence of Bisi Akande and Iyiola Omisore of the Alliance for 
Democracy (AD), as the Governor and the Deputy Governor, respectively, in Osun state. At the 
inauguration of the State Legislative Assembly on May 31, 1999, Mojeed Alabi from Ejigbo 
state constituency was elected speaker while Moses Oladapo Gbotoso from Ilesa East 
constituency emerged as the deputy speaker. The 26-member assembly comprised of 23 
members of the Alliance for Democracy (AD), 2 members of the All People’s Party (APP), and 1 
from the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Thus, the AD was in control of the executive and the 
legislative branches of the government. 
Nevertheless, in spite of the dominance of a single party, which produced the governor and 
controlled majority seats in the House of Assembly, the acrimony between the executive and the 
legislature in the state over the period appeared to be on the ascendancy right from inception of 
the administration (Omitola and Ogunnubi, 2016). The persistent conflicts that characterised 
executive-legislative relationships under the Akande administration was said to found its origin 
in three principal factors; the crisis between the Governor and his Deputy; the dictatorial 
orientation of the Governor; and the position of party leaders, both within and outside the state, 
who had wanted a docile legislature (Personal Interview III, February 20, 2018). 
A respondent linked the genesis of the crisis between the executive and legislative branches to 
the position of the ruling party in the state, the AD, and Governor Akande who had wanted the 
legislature to operate as an extension of the executive branch. A development the state 
lawmakers vehemently resisted; 
The party and the executive wanted the legislature to be a rubber stamp, but the 
leadership of the House resisted the move. Then they resorted to blackmail until 
the crisis led to the larger crisis in the state, which rendered the legislature 
ineffective and subsequently led to the loss of the party in the 2003 election 
(PersonalInterview III, February 20, 2018). 
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The disagreement between the Governor and his Deputy began prior to their assumption of 
office. The crisis had its roots in the intra-party squabbles and pre-election tradeoffs, which 
trailed the emergence of the two political figures as governorship and deputy governorship 
candidates of the Alliance for Democracy (AD) in the state. In 1998, prior to the period when the 
military lifted ban on party politics in the country, Omisore, with his formidable political 
machinery and strong financial standing had positioned himself to aspire for the governorship 
seat of Osun State (Zoaka, 2003). However, in the wake of the electioneering process, the 
leadership of the AD was said to have prevailed on the young Omisore to yield his political 
structure to Chief Bisi Akande as the governorship candidate of the party while he settled for the 
deputy governorship slot. After much persuasion, the young politician acquiesces to run with 
Chief Akande as deputy governorship candidate but having in mind to actualize his governorship 
ambition after Akande’s four years in the saddle. 
A party chieftain in the state corroborated this position 
The Deputy Governor bankrolled the electoral campaign of his party, the  AD in 
the state. Prior to their election, he had wanted to be Governor of the state, but the 
party leaders prevailed upon him to support Bisi Akande for the governorship 
while he accepted to be Deputy Governor (Personal Interview XXXIV, May 10, 
2018).  
Subsequently, the duo contested the governorship election in the state and won. Even before the 
swearing-in ceremony, Akande’s camp within the AD had detested Omisore as being too 
ambitious for the position of a deputy governor. They appeared to have preferred a more 
amenable and subservient figure as Akande’s deputy. Upon their inauguration in May 1999, 
Omisore had left no one in doubt through his activities as to his readiness to succeed Bisi 
Akande as the next Governor of Osun State. Beginning from then, Omisore’s political posture 
began to unsettle the camp of Governor Bisi Akande. This resulted to loss of confidence between 
the two leaders and caused disaffection in government as well as polarisation within the party in 
the state. 
The impasse led to intra-executive conflict; the type that had a proclivity towards a situation of 
divided executive in the state. A situation of divided executive arises when acrimony between 
the Governor and the Deputy Governor degenerates to divisions in government and 
factionalisation within the party (Fagbadebo, 2016; Obiyan, 2013). The disagreement between 
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the Governor and his Deputy led to political skirmishes, which extended to the legislature. One 
of the reasons for the fallout between the Governor and his Deputy had links with pre-election 
issues involving the Governor and his Deputy.  
The crisis between the Governor and his Deputy started before the inauguration. It 
all started when party leaders imposed Akande as the gubernatorial candidate 
instead of Omisore whose political structure became the platform for the AD in 
the state (Personal Interview XII, April 10, 2018).   
Soon after their assumption of office, Omisore continued with his political activities ahead of his 
ambition as the next governor of the state, as promised by the leaders as the condition for his 
acceptance of the deal to allow Bisi Akande to be the Governor (Personal Interview XXXII, May 
4, 2018). However, this move infuriated the Governor, who also was looking forward to contest 
for the second term. This development degenerated into an internal crisis in the executive, and 
eventually precipitated intra-party squabbles and factionalisation (Personal Interview XXXII, 
May 4, 2018). This, nonetheless, confirmed the positions of scholars on the nature and sources of 
intra-executive conflicts and confrontations. While Fagbadebo (2016) opines that conflicts 
within the executive often lead to divisions in the party, Obiyan (2013) maintains that schism 
within the party offers a potential fertile ground for intra-executive conflicts. This, he reasons, 
often occurs when the governor and his deputy belonged to different factions of the party.  
A respondent acquiesces to this description when he said that, 
The crisis between the Governor and his Deputy started long before the two 
leaders were sworn-in. The Akande’s faction did not want Omisore at all, because 
they felt he was too ambitious. They were looking for a subservient deputy and a 
docile legislative leadership (Personal Interview XXX, May 2, 2018). 
The craving of the Akande’s faction of the AD for a docile legislature stood in contrast to the 
provisions of the 1999 Constitution which granted substantial powers to the legislature to serve 
as check on the exercise of executive power. An aide to a former Speaker of the State House of 
Assembly gave this as the reason why the lawmakers over the period ‘had always resisted any 
move by the Akande-led executive branch to encroach on its oversight powers’ (Personal 
Interview XXXII, May 4, 2018). This, in a way, explains the incessant friction and acrimony 
between the executive and legislative branches of government in the state over the period.                  
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 Another twist to the executive-legislative feud during the period under review was Governor 
Akande’s penchant for taking unilateral policy decisions without due recourse to the legislature, 
especially exercising unilateral control over state funds. This is not in tandem with the principles 
of the country’s presidential constitution, which ceded the power of control over public funds to 
the legislature. Section 120 of the 1999 Constitution gave the powers and control over State 
Funds to the House of Assembly of the State. Specifically, sub-section (4) of this section 120 
states that ‘No moneys shall be withdrawn from the Consolidated Revenue Fund of the State or 
any other public fund of the State except in the manner prescribed by the House of Assembly’ 
(the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended). Added to this were the 
Governor’s dictatorial tendencies, which more often pitched him against the state lawmakers. 
This found manifest expression in some of the ‘unpopular policies’ of the government such as 
the retrenchment of teachers, insensitivity to the plight of workers among others (Bodunrin, 
2000). The state legislature had always wanted to exercise its oversight powers over the activities 
of the state government as the constitution guarantees but that often resulted into feuds. A former 
lawmaker in the state said: 
 Governor Akande and his Commissioners had often wanted to override the state 
legislature. For instance, there was a fraud case in the civil service and the House 
had wanted to investigate it but the Finance Commissioner was busy
 frustrating the lawmakers. He set up an inquiry, which amounted to usurpation of 
power of the legislature (Personal Interview XXX, May 2, 2018). 
Without doubt, the Commissioner’s action was unconstitutional usurpation of the investigative 
powers of the legislature. Sections 128 and 129 of the 1999 Constitution vested in the legislature 
powers to make an inquiry or investigation into any matter that falls within the purview of its 
legislative competence. Section 129(1c) states specifically that: 
The House shall have the power to summon any person in Nigeria to give 
evidence at any place or produce any document or other thing in his possession or 
under his control, and examine him as a witness and require him to produce any 
document or other thing in his possession or under his control, subject to all just 
exceptions.  
Thus, the Commissioner appeared to have erred by deliberately frustrating the lawful mandate of 
the legislature, especially his refusal to turn in the details of the infractions as demanded by the 
lawmakers because that violated the provision of the Constitution. Subsequently, the assembly 
passed a resolution calling on the Governor to relieve the Finance Commissioner of his 
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appointment. From then on, the question of the legality of House resolutions became a subject of 
contriving debates. The executive branch and its sympathizers would quickly argue that House 
resolutions were merely advisory and for that reason, the executive may choose to ignore such if 
it so desires (Akinbobola, 2005). However, if this is true, why did the Constitution say that no 
Commissioner could be appointed until legislative confirmation36? It should be noted that 
confirmation of Commissioner Nominees is usually done by House resolutions not by any law 
(Lafenwa, 2010; Lawan, 2010).  
Therefore, why a resolution of the legislative assembly passed on a subject matter should be 
described as mere advice or without the force of law when the constitution had placed such 
matters under the purview of its legislative competence. It appeared illogical, when it is 
constitutional, that the appointment of Commissioners would be valid only by the resolution of 
the House but becomes mere advisory when the resolution of the same body demanding for the 
termination of such appointment.  
As standard practice, most important decisions of parliament in Nigeria and elsewhere were 
taken because of legislative resolutions. For instance, the impeachment powers of the legislature 
guaranteed under the 1999 Constitution in sections 143 and 188 is exercisable only by 
resolutions not by law making. There is no section in the procedures for impeachment in the 
constitution that requires the legislature to make law. All the important decisions in the process 
were taken via resolutions. Thus, legislative resolutions cannot be wished away as not having the 
force of law, which the executive can choose to ignore, especially when the constitution provides 
that executive powers of a State are exercisable subject to the laws and directives made by the 
House of Assembly37 
The frosty relationships between the executive and the legislative in the state culminated in the 
Impeachment Notice signed by 21 out of the 26 members of the state House of Assembly and 
served on the Governor on November 1, 2000 (Official Report, Osun State House of Assembly 
(OSHA), November 1, 2000). The Notice of Impeachment contained 13 allegations of gross 
misconduct against the Governor, bordering on violation and breaches of the provision of the 
                                                          
36Section 192(2) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, as amended. 
37Section 5(2) of the 1999 Constitution states that executive powers of a State (a) shall be vested in the Governor of 
that State and may, subject as aforesaid and to the provisions of any law made by a House of Assembly……. and (b) 
shall extend to the execution and maintenance of this Constitution, all laws made by the House of Assembly of the 
State and to all matters with respect to which the House of Assembly has for the time being power to make laws.  
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1999 Constitution. However, the lawmakers failed to have the necessary vote to proceed and this 
heightened the crisis between the governor and his deputy. However, as Fagbadebo (2016) had 
argued, the idea of removing the State Governor was not intended to succeed. Rather, it was a 
ploy by the state lawmakers to whittle down the unbridled and dictatorial disposition of the state 
Governor, Bisi Akande, ostensibly to make him amenable towards an enhanced welfare package 
for the legislators. 
Fagbadebo’s assertion was premised on the submission made by the Minority Leader of the 
assembly during the impeachment crisis, Adejare Bello, who, in 2011 had publicly admitted that 
the intention of the legislators was not to outrightly impeach the governor but to show him the 
power of the legislature.  
We never wanted to impeach Chief Bisi Akande…[he] was giving us Ninety 
Thousand Naira a month. Many of us with a lot of indebtedness, we were 
managing that amount of money. At a point in time, the governor just said “you 
people cannot be earning more than a Permanent Secretary, so I am reducing your 
salary from Ninety Thousand to Sixty Thousand Naira….We now said it was 
because we had not shown this governor the power of the House of Assembly; he 
could not remove us, but we could remove him. We now said we should shake 
him. It was to shake him (cf. Fagbadebo, 2016, p.120). 
According to a respondent, who is a former lawmaker in the state, the relationship between the 
Governor and the Assembly became frostier after the completion of official quarters of the 
lawmakers. As a result, the governor had ‘unilaterally stopped the payment of housing and 
transport allowances to the legislators; an action which infuriated many of the lawmakers who 
felt slighted and shortchanged by the Governor’s decision’ (Personal Interview XXX, May 2, 
2018). 
Thus, the intent of the impeachment process was a clear case of pressure to force the governor to 
do the bidding of the legislature. There was no doubt that the Governor might have been poised 
to prudently manage the resources of the state but failed to understand the prime place of the 
legislature in the scheme of things.  
This development revived the argument put forward by Richard Joseph about the nature and 
orientation of Nigerian political elites, which revolved around what he described as ‘clientelism 
and prebendal politics’ (Joseph 1991). According to him, ‘access to the state remained 
disproportionately important for the elites who struggle to appropriate the state resources for 
141 
 
private use’ (Joseph, 1991, p.55). This is also similar to the concept of ‘strategic political elites’ 
highlighted by Fagbadebo (2016). This group of elites comprises politicians who construe their 
involvement in the political process as a veritable means to achieving or furthering some 
personal decisive ends and interests. He remarks: 
These ends are achieved once they gain power and become able to influence rules 
and public opinion. They use all the means at their disposal to ensure their 
continuity in power. The Nigerian political elite, particularly in the legislature 
strategically exert their powers to advance their personal interests at the expense  
of the public good (Fagbadebo, 2016, p.119). 
In Nigeria, at the behest of primordial considerations, ‘party politics is devoid of principles or 
any known ideology’, and political leaders often act without a recourse to party position on any 
issue (Omitola and Ogunnubi, 2016, p.164). Therefore, it does not matter anymore whether the 
same party controls the two branches of government. 
Subsequently, the conflicts between the two leaders in the state, which had polarised the 
government, and the ruling party, the AD, also split the State House of Assembly, into two 
opposing camps. The height of the disagreement led to the impeachment of the Deputy 
Governor. Many believed that some powerful forces within the party opposed to the Deputy 
Governor’s overt moves to succeed his principal mounted pressure on the state lawmakers to 
remove him from his position (Personal Interview XXX, May 2, 2018). 
Most often, the impeachment of a Deputy Governor is less difficult and swifter than that of a 
Governor, especially when the governor is the chief architect of such plot. This is contrary to the 
design of the drafters of Nigerian presidential constitution, which provided for the office of the 
deputy Governor and assigned responsibilities to it. However, in actual practice, the Governor, as 
the custodian of executive power, wields strong influence in the allocation of state resources and 
distribution of political patronage. Thus, a large segment of the citizenry and majority of 
legislators often support the Governor during intra-executive conflicts, which usually speed up 
the process of impeachment of the Deputy Governor. A former Majority Leader of a State House 
of Assembly, who spoke with me, confirmed that the impeachment of the Deputy Governor in 
his state was an outcome of acrimony between the governor and the deputy rather the itemized 
breaches of the constitution put forward by the legislature (Personal Interview XXXI, May 4, 
2018). 
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The developments during the administration of Bisi Akande in Osun State showed that the 
relationships between the executive and the legislature were beclouded by incessant acrimony 
and intra-executive conflicts, which polarised the state political elites. A close scrutiny of these 
developments revealed that apart from the surreptitious interventions by some leaders of the 
ruling AD, no visible efforts were made by the governing elites to engender and sustain a regime 
of smoothened relationship between the two important institutions of the executive and the 
legislature in the state.  
6.4.1 The Era of Executive-Legislative Harmony under the Oyinlola and Aregbesola  
           Administrations (2003-2015) 
 
The candidate of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Olagunsoye Oyinlola, emerged the 
winner of the 2003 gubernatorial election in Osun State. Oyinlola assumed office as Governor of 
the state on May 29, 2003. The House of Assembly was inaugurated on June 3, 2003 and Rafiu 
Adejare Bello, from Ede North State Constituency, and Taiwo Sunmonu, from Olorunda 
Constituency, became Speaker and the Deputy Speaker, respectively. The PDP had an 
overwhelming majority of 25 members out of the 26-member legislative House, leaving the AD 
with only one seat (Owoeye, 2010).  
It was within the political context of one-party dominance that the state legislative assembly 
operated in convergence with the executive arm over policy issues (Ogundiya, 2010). Observers 
described the period in the state as an era of unusual harmony between the executive and 
legislative branches of government. Ordinarily, when compared with the rancorous and crisis-
ridden relationships, such that characterised executive-legislative interface in the Second 
Assembly, one can easily assert that the harmonious working relationship between the two 
branches of government under Oyinlola was an outcome of political maturity and disposition of 
the relevant actors in the legislative process. A former lawmaker in the state who served in the 
legislature for three consecutive legislative sessions gave reasons for the convergence. His 
remarks 
The harmonious working relationships between the executive and the legislative 
branches under Oyinlola’s government was a result of deliberate efforts and 
commitments of the Governor and the House leadership to work together as one 
unit of the same government. Some of us who served in the immediate past 
assembly had also learnt that executive-legislative antagonism leads nowhere. The 
decision of the Governor to always carry the legislature along in the running of 
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state affairs also contributed to the sustained convergence between the two arms. 
(Personal Interview XXX, May 2, 2018). 
 
This is contrary to the development in the Second Assembly in the state where, in spite of the 
dominance of one party, the lawmakers and the Governor at that time still disagreed on a number 
of issues. In case of the Third Assembly, operating within the same background of a single party 
dominance, directives often emanated from the governor and party chieftains without leading to 
any serious disagreement with the legislature (Kaur, 2007; Momoh, 2006). Executive bills 
especially ‘appropriation-related requests of the governor’ as well as legislative approval and 
ratification of Commissioner nominees and other ‘high profile appointments’ were done with 
little or no delay by the assembly (Momoh, 2006, p.75). 
As earlier mentioned in the course of the discussion on executive-legislative relationship in Ondo 
state, the unique peculiarity of executive-legislative harmony under the Oyinlola’s government 
was somewhat similar to the Ondo State experience. Many believed that the conciliatory 
dispositions of legislators in the Osun state Third Assembly was an outcome of the confidence-
building efforts of the Governor and the leadership of the assembly. A former principal officer of 
the legislature in the state pointed out that mostly the governor and some powerful chieftains of 
their party, the PDP, facilitated the convergence of interest between the executive branch and the 
legislative assembly. He disagreed with the notion of describing the Third Assembly as a docile 
legislature. According to him, ‘there is nowhere in the Constitution where it was stated the 
legislature must engage in fisticuffs with the executive to demonstrate its independence or to 
show that it is not a rubber stamp’ (Personal Interview XXXI, May 4, 2018).  
Pointedly, this regime of harmonious working relationship with no executive-legislative impasse 
persisted between the governor and the state House of Assembly until the period when the 
legislative session of the third assembly ended in May 2007 (Dode, 2010). 
In the 2007 gubernatorial election in the State, Governor Olagunsoye Oyinlola, secured a second 
term in office. Nevertheless, the PDP maintained a slim majority of 15 seats in the 26-member 
legislative assembly. The opposition party, the Action Congress (AC), won 11 seats. 
Nevertheless, there were a series of litigations against the results of the election.  
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In November 2010, the Court of Appeal nullified the election of Olagunsoye Oyinlola as the 
Governor of the State, and declared Rauf Aregbesola, the candidate of the opposition Action 
Congress of Nigeria (ACN) as the winner. Consequent upon this, two members of the legislature 
on the platform of the PDP decamped to the new ruling party, ACN. The ruling party (ACN) and 
the opposition (PDP) had 13 members each but PDP members retained the leadership positions 
in the legislature (Official Report of the Osun State House of Assembly, December 6, 2011). 
In spite of this, there was no crisis that altered the harmonious working relationships between the 
executive and the legislature until the session of the Fourth Assembly lapsed in May 2011 
(Personal Interview XXX, May 2, 2018). In the 2011 elections into the House of Assembly, the 
ruling ACN won all the 26 seats in the legislative assembly. Thus, a single party dominance 
resurfaced in the state with the ACN controlling the legislature and the executive branches of 
government. The Fifth Assembly of the Osun State House of Assembly essentially functioned to 
complement the agenda of the executive (Omitola and Ogunnubi, 2016).  A senior aide to the 
governor attributed the sustained confidence and harmony between the state governor and the 
assembly to the transparent conduct and disposition of the Governor (Personal Interview XXXII, 
May 4, 2018). He claimed that, the governor usually carried the legislature along on issues 
regarding to the ‘allocation and distribution of state resources, particularly the revolving revenue 
profile of the state’ (Personal Interview XXXII, May 4, 2018). In similar manner, a respondent, 
who is a serving lawmaker in the state, confirmed the assertion of the governor’s aide. According 
to him: 
The legislature has every reason to support the Governor in his bid to transform 
the state. He has been very transparent in managing the affairs of the state and we 
lawmakers are always in the know of the financial position of the state 
government (Personal Interview XXXII, May 5, 2018).     
 For these reasons or so it seemed, there were no disagreement or crisis of confidence that could 
jeopardize the stable and harmonious working relationship between the two branches of 
government under the firm grip of a single political party, the ACN.   
The relationship between the executive and the legislature under Aregbesola was very cordial. 
Nonetheless, questions have been raised about the state of the oversight functions of the 
legislature between 2011 and 2015, especially the effectiveness of its constitutional role as the 
watchdog of executive activities. One of the principal roles of the legislature in Nigeria’s 
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presidential system is to serve as an effective check on the exercise of executive powers of the 
government.  
In June 2015, a serving High Court Judge in the state, Olamide Oloyede, petitioned the House of 
Assembly alleging the Governor of maladministration and abuse of office (Premium Times, 
07/07/2015). The Judge therefore called on the legislature to commence an impeachment process 
for the removal of the Governor. Nevertheless, the legislature feigned investigation into the 
matter, and subsequently dismissed the petition, describing it as ‘baseless, lacking in merit and 
largely unwarranted by a serving judicial officer of the state’ (Premium Times, 07/07/2015). 
Consequently, Justice Oleyede was forcefully retired from the judicial service of the state after 
publicly criticising the state legislature for failing to act on her petition (Premium Times, 
06/10/2015). 
The harmonious working relationship between the executive and legislative branches in the state 
was commendable for preventing gridlocks in government. This notwithstanding, the legislature 
has been less visible or possibly overwhelmed in the legislative process largely dominated by the 
executive and its administrative agencies (Omitola and Ogunnubi 2016). The role of the 
legislature is much more than being ‘reduced to the arena for shrewd bargaining and allocation 
of spoils among its members’, and in the process, abdicating the important role of institutional 
check on the exercise of executive authority (Omitola and Ogunnubi, 2016, p.169). To all intents 
and purposes, there is no doubt that the 1999 constitution construed the legislature both as a 
defender of citizen’s popular will and as an enforcer of accountability in government (Jombo and 
Fagbadebo, 2019). 
6.5  Executive-Legislative Relationships in Oyo State (1999-2015) 
The present Oyo state had been an epicentre of democratic participation prior to Nigeria’s 
attainment of independence in 1960 (Akinsanya and Davies, 2002). From the colonial period, 
Ibadan, the capital city of the defunct Western Region, and the present Oyo State, had played 
host to the intense politicking and shrewd party politics, characteristic of the Region 
(Akinbobola, 2002; Robert, 2003). In 1976, the military government created Oyo State out of the 
defunct Western Region (Anifowose, 2004; Agedah, 1993). Between 1999 and 2015, four 
successive Governors, elected under different party platforms, have since served the state. On 
May 29, 1999, Lamidi Adesina of the Alliance for Democracy (AD) was inaugurated as the 
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Governor of Oyo State. The AD won 30 in the 32-seats State House of Assembly, while the 
Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) had only two members (Oni, 2013). 
At the inauguration of the House, Kehinde Olatunji Ayoola, emerged as the speaker but was 
replaced with Asimiyu Alarape, from Atiba Constituency, in November 1999 while Joshua 
Olagunju was elected Deputy Speaker (Department of Planning, Research and Statistics, Oyo 
State House of Assembly). The relationships between the two branches of government was 
characterised by harmony and consensus building by the elites in the executive and the 
legislature. This was dictated, largely, by the unifying roles of notable leaders of the ruling party 
as well as the understanding facilitated by the elders’ wing of the AD, and the Afenifere Group 
(Obiagwu and Ogbodo, 2006). A leader of the former ruling party in the state in an interview 
described the period this way: 
Executive-legislature relationships under the Lam Adesina administration were 
most cordial. The understanding and convergence of interests between the two 
organs of government can be attributed to the dispositions of the Governor and 
the assembly leadership to the mediatory roles of our party, especially the elderly 
roles of Afenifere leaders (Personal Interview XXXIV, May 10, 2018). 
Thus, executive-legislative relations sailed smoothly with no recorded impasse between the two 
arms of government throughout the tenure of that administration. Even the undue dependence of 
the legislative assembly on the executive branch for the funding of its activities, including its 
oversight responsibilities, was hardly an issue. This was because the Governor gave prompt 
approvals for the release of funds due to the assembly (Personal Interview XXXV, May 10, 
2018).  
This is contrary to the situation in most other states, where the executive delayed the approval of 
funds due to the legislature. In most of these states, this was a major source of incessant frictions 
between the executive and legislative branches. A septuagenarian, who was a former principal 
officer of the legislature in the state, attested to this when he told me that funding of the 
assembly’s activities was never an issue between the lawmakers and the Governor. According to 
him, ‘the Governor was always acceding to the funding requests of the legislature because those 
monies have already been budgeted for in the appropriation law of the state’ (Personal Interview 
XXXV, May 10, 2018). Therefore, it was a matter of implementing the laws duly passed by the 
legislature and assented to by the Governor. 
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The subsisting process of shrewd bargaining and payoffs sustained a regime of cooperation 
among the key players in the legislative process throughout the duration of Lam Adesina’s 
administration thereby culminating into a harmonious working relationship between the 
executive and the legislature over the period. Nevertheless, the system of political bargaining and 
patronage among the political elites in the two institutions is a pointer to the prebendal politics 
characteristic of the Nigerian presidential system (Kifordu, 2010). The sustained harmony, which 
existed between the executive and the legislative branches over the period, was achieved at a 
huge cost; the partitioning of collective wealth among the governing elites for primordial gains 
(Joseph, 1991; Agbaje and Adejumobi, 2006). The Governor and the AD lost the state to the 
opposition party, the PDP in the 2003 gubernatorial election. Rashidi Ladoja of the PDP emerged 
the Governor and the party won 30 out of the 32 seats in the state House of Assembly.  
On 29 May 2003, Rashidi Ladoja was sworn-in as the Governor and Adeolu Adeleke, and, 
Dauda Titilola, emerged as the Speaker and Deputy Speaker, respectively.  The executive-
legislative relationships were cordial until the middle of 2005, when interferences of external 
forces, orchestrated as a result of the fallout between the governor and his political godfather, 
Chief Lamidi Adedibu, altered the harmonious working relationships between the Governor and 
the members of the legislative assembly (Adegboyega, 2006). 
The development led to polarisation of members of the House of Assembly into two opposing 
camps (Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007). According to Omitola and Ogunnubi (2016, p.163), 
‘allegations of monetary inducement of the state lawmakers’ to pursue agenda linked to the 
politico-economic interests of certain powerful individuals in and outside the state government 
trailed the divisions in the House. As Omobowale and Olutayo have noted, the high point of the 
crisis was the impeachment proceeding against Governor Ladoja in December 2005. The ensuing 
development threw the state into palpable fear and turmoil, leading to a wave of political 
uncertainty.  
6.5.1 Godfatherism and the Impeachment of Governor Rashidi Ladoja of Oyo State 
On 13 December 2005, 18 members out of the 32-member Oyo State House of Assembly 
concluded the process of impeachment of Governor Rashidi Ladoja (Apabiekun, 2006). This 
followed the adoption of the report of the panel set up to investigate allegations of gross 
misconduct leveled against the Governor. The allegations include: 
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1. Conflict of interest. 
2. Fraudulent conversion of public funds. 
3. Establishment of Oyo State Road Maintenance Agency without the consent of the State 
House of Assembly. 
4. Operation of Foreign Accounts, Sponsorship of attack on Honourable Members of the 
House of Assembly. 
5. Sponsored attacks on members of the legislature. 
6. Undermining the integrity and constitutional power and functions of the legislature. 
7. Undermining the integrity of the judiciary. 
8. Acts unbecoming of a Governor of Oyo State. 
9. Nepotism on contract. 
10. Chieftaincy matters. 
11. Usurpation of the power of the state legislature on local government affairs. 
12. Undermining the principle of separation of powers. 
13. Purchase of 33 graders. 
14. Dereliction of duties. 
In spite of these allegations, many observers of political events in the state believed the Governor 
might not have been removed if he had not drawn the anger of his godfather and benefactor, the 
late Lamidi Adedibu and former President Olusegun Obasanjo (Fagbadebo, 2016; Oarhe, 2010; 
Sklar et al, 2006). They argued that the actual reasons for the impeachment remained concealed 
or rather undisclosed but largely a consequence of the fallout between the Governor and his 
godfathers (Adegboyega, 2006). A principal officer of the state legislature appeared to have 
confirmed the positions of these scholars during an interview when he narrated to me that: 
Godfatherism was the main issue behind the unconstitutional removal of the 
governor from office. If you carefully consider the allegations proffered against 
Governor Ladoja, you will find out that they are not provable in anyway. You 
could see that the panel itself finds it difficult in proving even those ones that can 
be considered as constituting gross misconduct in breach of the constitution. The 
main issue is that the governor stepped on toes of his godfather and at the same 
incurred the wrath of President Obasanjo, who would have readily intervened and 
appeased Baba Adedibu on his behalf. To be honest with you, those of us who 
belonged to the group of lawmakers opposed to Ladoja’s impeachment offered to 
do so at a high risk to our lives and political survival (Personal Interview XXXV, 
May 10, 2018). 
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It is evident that the plot to impeach the Governor transcended the independent actions of the 18 
lawmakers, as portrayed in the allegations of gross misconduct. Evidently, it was a 
demonstration of the influence of political actors outside the formal structure of government 
(Lawan, 2010). In Nigeria, the scope of political elites extends far beyond individuals 
functioning within the legitimate institutions of the state. It includes array of powerful and high 
network individuals regarded as patrons but commonly called godfathers, who wield tremendous 
influence on the political process (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011; Oni, 2013). Sklar et al (2006) 
captured this in their description of the Nigeria’s political landscape as being  
dominated by powerful ‘godfathers’ who sit atop vast patronage networks at the 
local, state and federal levels. Political outcomes are primarily a function of 
titanic struggles among these magnates, who bargain among themselves- and at 
the expense of the impoverished greater public – within a political context of 
multiple ethno -religious division (Sklar et al, 2006, p.101). 
In the contemporary Nigeria, politics is about personalities and the political process essentially 
depends on the craving to please certain individuals who control state power. This is similar to 
what Fagbadebo (2016) describes as the strategic political elites who construed their 
participation in politics as a means of gaining access to the state resources. Therefore, they see 
the electoral process as the ‘theatre of absurdities’ for all kinds of manipulation to ensure the 
emergence of their sponsored candidates, who in turns reward them with unhindered access to 
the resources of the state (Kifordu, 2010; Uneze, 2008; Sklar et al, 2006).  
These groups of political elites are ‘patrons’ or ‘godfathers’ who subjected the political process 
to the vagaries of patron-client relationship (Oarhe, 2010; Sarker, 2008; Mwenda and Tangri, 
2005; Stein, 1996). In this relationship, the godfather (patron) supplies all the political and 
financial means required for the electoral victory of his godson (client). The political means 
often provided include, and, extend beyond the use of electoral violence as a strategy of rigging 
to manipulation of the processes and rules of party primaries for the selection of candidates all in 
a bid to ensure the emergence of the preferred candidate of the godfather (Fagbadebo, 2016; 
Adele, 2012; Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007; Agbaje, 2006).  
Osumah Oarhe describes it thus: 
In Nigeria, the patron-client relation is based on master-servant relationship and 
motivated by commercial interest at the detriment of public interest. The patrons 
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foist charlatans or hooligans on the rest of the people and help to ensure that they 
stay in office for as long as they desire. The clients in return devise perfidious 
schemes aimed at boosting the residual interests of the cabal (Oarhe, 2010, p.54). 
After a godfather had deployed his political influence to install his godson into office, the 
expectation is that the godson would reciprocate the gesture by allowing unimpeded access to 
state resources. This could be through various means such as political appointments, award of 
choice contracts, even when the capacity to execute such was nonexistent, outright release of 
large sum of money at regular intervals or through other forms of patronage characteristic of the 
Nigerian political space (Olupohunda, 2014). Whenever the godson defaulted in this reciprocity, 
the godfather would mobilise, constitutionally or otherwise, his political influence to remove the 
godson from office (Animasawun, 2013; Fagbadebo, 2016, p.190; Sklar et al, 2006, p.105). 
Chimaroke Nnamani38, a former Governor captured the larger than life posture of Nigerian 
political godfathers when he construes a godfather as ‘a merchant set out to acquire the godson 
as a client’ (cf. Tell Magazine, 2004, p.17). According to him, a godfather in the Nigerian 
political context was 
an impervious guardian who provided the lifeline and direction to the godson, 
perceived to live a life of total submission, subservience and protection of the 
oracular personality located in the larger, material frame of opulence, affluence 
and decisiveness, that is, if not ruthless (cf. Fagbadebo, 2016, p.192-193). 
Nevertheless, there is nothing in this description to suggest that patron-client relationship is a 
forceful endeavour. Rather, it is a voluntary arrangement freely agreed to by the two parties for 
their mutual interests and politico-economic benefits (Edigin, 2010). The tie is often motivated 
by mutual desires.  
Scott (1972) had reasoned that the desire of an aspirant, or a budding political figure, to seek 
refuge and protection from an individual of higher socio-economic status and immense political 
means often resulted to such relationships. According to him, it is more often involved a 
transactional relationship where a service or support was sought in exchange for an agreed 
reciprocity. Richard Joseph gave an elaborate description of such relationships: 
                                                          
38
 Chimaroke Nnamani was a former Governor of Enugu State, South East Nigeria. He was elected Governor in 
1999 and served for two terms of eight years. He gave the description in the wake of the faceoff between him and 
his godfather, Chief Jim Nwobodo. For details, see Nnamani, 2003. 
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An individual seeks out patrons as he or she moves upward socially and 
materially; such individuals also come to accept ties of solidarity from their own 
clients which they view as fundamental to the latter’s security and continued 
advancement as well as their own. Clientelism therefore is the very channel 
through which one joins the dominant class and a practice, which is then seen as 
fundamental to the continued enjoyment of the perquisites of that class (Joseph, 
1991, p.55). 
Going by these assertions, mutual consent for the control of state resources, for their upward 
mobility in the social structure, is often at the centre of godfather-godson relationships rather 
than concerns for public good. Hence, it is evident that the very essence of democratic 
governance is far from being realised in Nigeria. Democracy presupposes the collective interests 
and aspirations of a people who have consented to be governed under certain set of rules and 
principles (Przeworski, 1992). Similarly, the modern state, as Fukuyama (2015, p.13) has 
reasoned, prioritises efforts ‘to be impersonal, treating people equally on the basis of citizenship 
rather than on whether they have a personal relationship to the ruler’. Nevertheless, this is in 
sharp contrast to the prevailing orientation among the Nigerian elites, especially the godfathers, 
whose asymmetric relationships with their godsons ensured the overt appropriation of state 
resources for their personal benefits.  
This set of elites, as Oarhe (2010) has noted, see politics as avenues for investments, in 
anticipation of reaping bountiful returns. They deploy their financial resources and political 
networks to sponsor candidates into offices in the executive and legislative branches of 
government. For these reasons, they exercise substantial influence on the decision-making 
process and often determine the course of action of government, sometimes with brazen 
impunity (Edigin, 2010; Sklar et al, 2006; Albert, 2005; Joseph, 1991). This group of elites, 
because of their sprawling networks and connections, both within and outside the official circles, 
also has government protection and apparatus at their disposal. They deploy such to intimidate 
and coerce political opponents, especially recalcitrant godsons, who have refused to do their 
biddings. The late Lamidi Adedibu of Oyo State belonged to this group. 
He had positioned himself as an influential power broker in Nigeria, particularly in Oyo State, 
even before the enthronement of democratic practice in 1999 (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011). 
This is largely because of his roles in the political transition programmes administered by the 
military. Before the sponsoring of Rashidi Ladoja for the governorship seat of Oyo state under 
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the platform of the PDP in 2003, Adedibu was reputed to have wielded significant influence39 in 
the electoral victories of successive Governors in the state as well as arrays of other elected 
members of the legislature (Fagbadebo, 2016; Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007). 
Governor Ladoja enjoyed a good working relationship with the legislature until he parted ways 
with his godfather; Chief Adedibu, because of the excessive cash demands from the Governor, 
and his penchant for a commanding control in the administration of the state (Omobowale and 
Olutayo, 2007). The Governor, who claimed to have a different plan for the governance of the 
state, had rebuffed the overtures of Adedibu; a development that degenerated to factionalisation 
of the ruling party (Obiagwu and Ogbodo, 2006). The 18 lawmakers that carried out the 
impeachment of the governor belonged to the godfather’s group of supporters, while the other 14 
lawmakers, including the Principal Officers, pitched their tents with the group sympathetic to the 
Governor (Oni, 2013).  
In the wake of the impeachment crisis, the Governor had said that his problem with Adedibu 
bordered ‘on the difference in our interpretations of governance and politics’ (cf. Fagbadebo, 
2016, p.200). For this reason, the Governor had sought to ensure that his preferences prevailed 
over that of his godfather; but that attempt resulted to his impeachment (Omobowale and 
Olutayo, 2007). A respondent who served as principal officer of the state legislative assembly 
put it this way: 
Ladoja’s emergence as governor of Oyo State was made possible by Baba 
Adedibu who sponsored his election right from the level of party primaries of the 
PDP up to the general election. Baba did all these obviously in anticipation of 
constant returns from Ladoja after he became governor. He had wanted the 
governor to be deferring to him on the running of the state but Ladoja chose to be 
his own man even to the point of ignoring President Obasanjo’s advice40 who had 
                                                          
39Chief Adedibu established himself as a political heavyweight in the politics of the state owing to his vast networks 
of cronies in the political circles spanning every department of state power. His political networks also included an 
army of thugs and street urchins who acted as an ‘informal coercive force’ for the entire political machinery. 
Adedibu’s exploits in the political arena of Oyo state won him the appellation of “the Strongman of Ibadan politics”, 
and the reality of which he demonstrated until his death on 11 June 2008. For more details, see Apabiekun, 2006; 
Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011; Fagbadebo, 2016; Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007. 
40Olusegun Obasanjo was Nigeria’s President between 1999 and 2007. Late Lamidi Adedibu, the Governor’s 
godfather was an influential member of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the platform under which both the 
president and Governor Ladoja were elected into office.  At the height of the crisis between the Governor and Chief 
Adedibu in 2005, the president was said to have advised the governor to tread the path of peace by going to beg and 
pacify his godfather if he still wants to continue in office as Governor of Oyo state. This highlighted the importance 
ascribed to the roles of some powerful individuals in the Nigerian political process. Even though they are outside the 
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told him to go and beg Baba for forgiveness if he desire to remain as governor of 
the state (Personal Interview XXXV, May 10, 2018). 
This means that elite group within political parties sponsored the election of a sizeable number of 
lawmakers. Only few of them were elected on the strength of their individual merits (Sklar et al, 
2006). This is a dominant trend in Nigerian politics41, where ‘electoral contest is construed as a 
business deal for which returns are made in due time. 
At the height of the impeachment crisis, the Governor’s godfather, Chief Adedibu, had argued 
that he had every right to demand money and other forms of patronage from the governor after 
he had laboured so hard to install Ladoja as governor. ‘I put him there, so, if I demand money, 
will it be wrong? Do I even need to ask for it’? (cf. Apabiekun, 2006, p.21). This claim by the 
godfather was a reflection of the prevailing perceptions of the Nigeria’s political elites, 
especially patrons outside the official structures of government, who sponsors candidates to fill 
political offices purposely for the realisation or promotion of personal primordial gains. A 
respondent who had the knowledge of this sort of practice said:                 
Yes, it is true that many of us did not win election by our own strength and 
therefore cannot act independently of our sponsors. It was Ladoja’s decision to go 
against the wish of his benefactor, Baba Adedibu that led to his ordeal. This 
unfortunately, coincided with the consequences of his choice to support Vice 
President Atiku Abubakar, against the desire of his kinsman, President Obasanjo 
to go for third time in office. If it was the disagreement with Baba alone, 
Obasanjo could have  resolved it (Personal Interview XXXV, May 10, 2018).  
The submission made by this respondent added another twist to the events leading to the removal 
of Governor Ladoja from office in 2005. Apart from his failed attempt to deflate the influence of 
his godfather, the governor had also incurred the wrath of former President Obasanjo. This was 
not only in ignoring his advice to appease Adedibu but also, principally in the Governor’s refusal 
to support the tenure elongation bid of the former president42. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
formal structures of government, they exert substantial influence on the course of actions of government, sometimes 
with brazen impunity. For more, see Fagbadebo, 2016; Sklar et al, 2006, etc.  
41While commenting on the prevalence and egregious influence of some powerful and politically established 
individuals in the Nigerian political process, Ezumezu (2010, p.17) had derided a Nigerian ‘politician without a 
godfather’ as a ‘cyclist without a bicycle’. To him, these godfathers servedas the underground railway for the 
corrupt leaders, and office holders’ thereby becoming ‘the incubators for corrupt’ political elites. For details, see 
Olupohunda, 2014; Adele, 2012; Ezumezu, 2010. 
42The former president had sought the support of all the PDP controlled states in his quest to perpetuate himself in 
power but failed to secure Ladoja’s support as well as some other governors elected under the platform of the PDP. 
Afterward, virtually all the PDP governors opposed to his tenure elongation bid in connivance with his Vice, Atiku 
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The Nigeria’s 1999 constitution guarantees a maximum of 8 years tenure limit for the president 
and state governors. However, former president Obasanjo had sought to elongate his stay in 
office through a shrewd constitutional amendment embellished to benefit the Governors and 
members of the legislature, apparently to hoodwink the two critical players whose approvals 
were needed for the move to materialise (Fagbadebo, 2016). However, the idea did not eventuate 
because of the opposition mounted by Obasanjo’s Deputy, Atiku Abubakar, who had rallied his 
nationwide network of supporters, including the PDP Governors, to thwart the proposed 
constitutional amendment. The president viewed his deputy as an obstacle to his third-term 
ambition. This did not go down well with the president, who, through the deployment of state 
power, descended on his Deputy together with his group of ‘recalcitrant Governors’, one of 
whom was Rashidi Ladoja (Albert, 2005; Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007; Oarhe, 2010). 
Omobowale and Olutayo (2007) captured the principal reasons behind Ladoja’s ordeal. 
Perhaps all the support Adedibu needed had to be granted, because as well as 
Ladoja’s disagreement with Adedibu, he was also against the supposed third term 
bid of President Obasanjo. Retaining Ladoja in power meant losing the vital 
support of one of the Yoruba South Western states that Obasanjo considered his 
primary constituency and base of the third term campaign43. Moreover, since 
Ladoja was out of favour with the ‘real powers behind the throne’, he was 
impeachedthough unconstitutionally (Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007, p.443). 
In Nigeria, crisis emanating from godfather-godson relationships often surfaced in the public 
domain when there was a total breakdown in the process of transactional exchanges because of 
infringement on the expectations of the godfather. The infringement could be in form of default 
or outright refusal of the godson to continue to honour the ‘agreed reciprocity’ (Fagbadebo, 
2016, p.195).     
The failure, default or refusal of a political godson to honour the demands or preferences of his 
godfather amounted to a revolt, which often precipitated damaging consequences on the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Abubakar, were made to suffer one problem or the other. As resonated by a good number of respondents in the 
course gathering data for this study, one common feature of the Obasanjo’s presidency in Nigeria was the excessive 
use of executive power, especially the incessant use of brazen force and unconstitutional means to harass and 
intimidate real or perceived political opponents in his quest to achieving personal political ends. For more details, 
see Aliyu, 2006; Sklar et al, 2006; Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007.   
43The South West geo-political zone of Nigeria is home to the Yoruba speaking ethnic group and comprises Ekiti, 
Lagos, Ogun, Ondo, Osun and Oyo states. In his quest to perpetuate his stay in power, former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo who hails from Owu, Abeokuta, Ogun state, had considered the region, being his home base, as his 
primary constituency for his third term agenda but met with stiff resistance. For details see Sklar, et al, 2006; 
Apabiekun, 2006; Animasawun, 2013.  
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democratic space (Oarhe, 2010; Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007; Sklar et al, 2006; Albert, 2005). 
For instance, Kifordu (2010) has argued that the revolt of a godson against his godfather had the 
proclivity towards political crisis. The disagreement between Governor Ladoja and his godfather, 
Lamidi Adedibu, validated this position, (Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007).   
The process that led to the removal of Ladoja was fraught with a series of breaches of the 
Constitution. Thus, the judiciary declared the removal as illegal and unconstitutional. The 
process was characterized by circumvention of the democratic process and violation of the 
constitutional provisions regarding the removal of members of the executive by the legislature.  
The crisis that led to the removal of the Governor did not emanate from acrimonious 
relationships between the executive and legislative branches. Rather, it was the manifestation of 
patron-client politics of patronage. The struggle for the control of state power and resources 
pitched the godfather against his godson. This fallout between the Governor and his godfather 
generated the executive-legislative feuds, which resulted in the impeachment. If not for the 
judicial intervention, the impeachment would have been sustained.   
6.6 Summary 
In this chapter, the researcher examined the nature and characteristics of executive-legislative 
relationships in the selected states within the ambit of the socio-cultural milieu and institutional 
contexts peculiar to them. The analysis began with an assessment of the relative executive-
legislative harmony experienced in Ondo state over the period. Certain informal mechanisms and 
practices put in place by the governing elites to cultivate and sustain harmonious working 
relationships between the executive and legislative branches in the states were identified. One of 
such practices was the usual unofficial cooperation between the Governor and leadership of the 
state legislature to harmonise all contentious areas in the appropriation bill, ahead of its formal 
presentation to the legislature for consideration. 
In Ekiti state, the fallout between Governor Ayodele Fayose and former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo led to the removal of Fayose and his deputy from office, albeit through 
unconstitutional means. Subsequently, the impeachment plot became enmeshed in controversies, 
leading to power tussles between Acting Governor, Friday Aderemi and Fayose’s Deputy, 
Abiodun Olujimi. The idiosyncratic traits of Fayose, which manifested in the Governor’s 
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confrontational approach to governance as well as nature and manner of contestation for power 
among the political elites in the state, precipitated the political crisis, which led to the declaration 
of emergency rule on the state by the Federal Government.  
The Osun state experience, especially in the first four years of the return of presidential 
democracy to Nigeria, revealed the implications of intra-executive conflicts on the smooth 
operations of government, particularly the relationship between the executive and the legislature. 
For instance, the fallout between former Governor Bisi Akande and his deputy, Iyiola Omisore 
led to divisions in the legislature and eventually culminated in the impeachment of the deputy 
governor. In addition, in Oyo state, the strained relationship between former Governor Ladoja 
and his political sponsor, Lamidi Adedibu led to the polarisation in the state legislative assembly 
and this eventually paved the way for the removal of the governor from office. Although the 
Supreme Court of Nigeria later nullified Ladoja’s impeachment and the Governor restored to 
office to complete his term, the circumstances that surrounded his impeachment and its attendant 
consequences on the democratic space of the state portend serious danger for the growth of 
democratic institutions and political stability of Nigeria. 
Overall, the institutional contexts of the various states revealed the peculiarities of the elites’ 
behaviour toward the exercise of power in relation to the crisis of confidence that usually 
engendered constant frictions in executive-legislative relations in the selected states. Moreso, the 
experiences in Ondo and Ekiti states in the first four years of democratic practice also 
highlighted the important roles of a socio-political organisation like Afenifere in the nation’s 
presidential democracy. This group exerted significant influence aimed at improving relations 
between the executive and legislative branches. My finding here is that the particularistic nature 
of the political elites in the states and the varying roles and degree of interventions by political 
parties, determined the intensity of the executive-legislative feuds. The next chapter considers 
the impacts of acrimonious executive-legislative relations and the stability of Nigeria’s 
presidential system.            
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Chapter Seven 
Executive-Legislative Conflicts and the Stability of Nigeria’s Presidential System 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Executive-legislative conflicts have been a common feature of democratic governance in 
Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. Many observers have argued that the disagreements between the 
executive and legislative branches were necessary for the deepening of democratic values in the 
nation’s political process (Akinbobola, 2005; Aminu, 2006; Oyewo, 2007; Oleszek, 2014). For 
instance, the occasional faceoffs between the two branches over the oversight role of the 
legislature in some agencies and parastatals of government had somewhat increased the 
momentum of the calls for accountable governance in Nigeria (Aminu, 2006). However, the 
country’s experience since 1999 has shown some semblance of personal dimensions to struggles 
between the two arms of government yet manifesting as constitutional issues (Oboh, 2010). As 
Ukase (2014) has noted, a scrutiny of the relationships between the executive and the legislature 
since 1999 revealed a ‘pot-full’ of acrimonies and conflicts with far-reaching implications on the 
smooth running of government and the nation’s democratic process.  
Conflicts, political rivalry and mutual suspicion characterised the acrimonious nature of the 
executive-legislative relations in Nigeria’s presidential system over the course of successive 
administrations since 1999 (Aiyede, 2005; Oyewo, 2007; Obiyan, 2013). These have been major 
contributing factors to the ineffectiveness of government, manifesting in gridlocks over policy 
formulation and implementation as well as funds appropriation. The unending conflicts between 
the executive and legislative actors have serious consequences for democratic growth and 
stability in Nigeria (Bassey, 2006; Fashagba, 2012). 
Crisis-ridden relationships between the executive and legislative branches, Lafenwa (2009) has 
reasoned, remained a major source of political instability in Nigeria. Executive-legislative feuds, 
in developed democracies, are good imperatives for the deepening of democratic values. Among 
such values is the attainment of more clearly defined spheres of influence of the two organs of 
government because there is greatser propensity to resort to judicial intervention during policy 
logjams. In addition, frictions between the two branches do not only propel greater commitment 
towards institutionalising a strong regime of accountability in governance but also stimulate a 
robust debate for building strong institutions (Oboh, 2010; Oleszek, 2014). Nevertheless, such 
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occurrences in the Nigeria’s practice of presidentialism are different because incessant frictions 
between the two arms are parts of the narratives for the deep-seated leadership crisis. This is a 
constant phenomenon, manifesting through an unbridled competition among the political class 
for the soul of the state, apparently for a strategic political gain and undue economic advantage 
associated with public office. 
This chapter presents data to explore some factors promoting executive-legislative conflicts and 
the impacts of acrimonious relationships between the executive and legislative branches on the 
stability of the Nigeria’s presidential democracy. The themes of the chapter are divided into three 
sections. The first is the introductory part while the second section examines some of the factors 
promoting executive-legislative feuds in the country’s practice of presidential system. The third 
section presents empirical data to determine the impacts of executive-legislative acrimony on the 
democratic stability of the states.  
7.2   Obstacles to Harmonious Executive-Legislative Relationships in Nigeria. 
It is evident that executive-legislative relationships in Nigeria’s presidential system are in a state 
of flux, as demonstrated in the political contexts of the selected states. It is expedient to discuss 
the factors promoting the incessant face-offs between the two branches of government. The next 
section explores some of these factors. 
7.2.1       Constitutional History and Perceived Executive Dominance  
Nigeria’s constitutional history has shown that the legislature suffered from the prolonged 
culture of military dictatorship, in terms of institutionalisation of representative democracy. 
While the executive and administrative structures of the military government get more 
entrenched and expanded, there was total absence of any legislative body to serve as check on 
the exercise of powers of the military.  
 
Lafenwa (2007) observes that one of the reasons for the recognition of executive powers in the 
Nigerian context was because of the nature of inactive legislatures existing alongside resilient 
and active executive over a long period. Even at the periods preceding independence in 1960, the 
colonial government had always arrogated state power and important functions to the executive 
council largely dominated by expatriates at the expense of the legislative council (Awotokun 
1998, Ojo 1998). The situation became worse in the course of the prolonged military rule as 
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institutions of lawmaking was side-lined, with support shifting to the executive branch, thereby 
making it more powerful. On this same issue, Remi Aiyede, comments thus: 
the legislative houses were immediately shut down after each overthrow of an 
elected government. Legislative and  executive functions were then fused, thereby 
institutionalising a system and culture of government that was extremely   
executive-centred. Thus, over the years, the executive function became over-
developed, especially in its authoritarian elements, in relations to the legislative 
function (Aiyede, 2006, p.152). 
 
The untoward effect of this was a context where two unequally developed arms of government 
were made to stand side by side as autonomous and competing entities of government. In 
Nigeria, past military leaders have dominated the political parties during transitions to 
democracies after periods of military rule. In view of this, a former President, Olusegun 
Obasanjo, having been a military Head of State under the military era, which exercised absolute 
governmental powers without any form of legislative oversight or ‘interference’, will expectedly 
be less tolerant of a legislature he perceived as being an interfering body irrespective of their 
constitutional powers and role (Oyewo, 2007; Fashagba, 2009).  
The leadership of the National Assembly accused him of being overbearing with the mentality of 
a military leader and as such could hardly survive the intrigues and politicking that goes with 
democratic practices (Anyim, 2003). Between 1999 and 2007, Obasanjo’s military background 
was always coming to the fore in his long-drawn supremacy battle with the National Assembly44. 
At the states level, governors were also having running battles with their legislatures over issues 
of shared responsibility such as budgeting and allocation of public funds45. Oftentimes, the 
                                                          
44
 President Olusegun Obasanjo was a retired army general who served as Head of State between 1976 and 1979. He 
completed the transition programme initiated by his predecessor, Major-General Muritala Muhammed and handed 
over power to a democratically-elected government headed by Alhaji Shehu Shagari as Executive President on 
October 1st, 1979. The period marked the first attempt at presidentialism as a system of government in Nigeria 
(Nwabueze, 1985; Joseph, 1991; Agedah, 1993; Davies, 1996; Anifowose, 2004; Nwabuani, 2014). At his second 
coming as elected president in May 1999, President Obasanjo had protracted exchanges with the National Assembly, 
Nigeria’s central legislature, over a sizable number of issues. These include the 2000 Appropriation Bill, Niger Delta 
Development and the Universal Basic Education Bills and the choice of leaders for the two chambers of the National 
Assembly, the Senate and the House of Representatives, among others. For more details see Anyim, 2003; Aiyede, 
2005; Oyewo, 2007; Eminue, 2008; Fagbadebo, 2009; Fashagba, 2009; Lafenwa, 2010; Obiyan and Amuwo, 2013; 
Orluwene, 2014; Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016.     
45
 The 1999 Constitution of Nigeria, as amended, gives the state houses of assembly power and control over public 
funds. Sections 120(3) of the constitution specifically states that ‘no money shall be withdrawn from any fund of the 
State, unless the issues of those monies had been authorised by a Law of the House of Assembly of the State.’ In 
similar manner, section 121 of the constitution provides for an Appropriation Bill which serves as the basis of the 
executive’ s  plan for a given fiscal year and which must be considered and passed by the legislature before any 
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conflictual relationships between the executive and legislature degenerated into severe 
constitutional issues, which nearly undermined democratic consolidation.  
Some state governors and/or their deputies were victim of executive-legislative conflicts having 
lost their seats through impeachment by their legislatures. Such included Ayo Fayose, governor 
of Ekiti state and his deputy, Abiodun Olujimi, who were impeached on October 16, 2006. The 
aftermath of the impeachment threw the state into palpable tension and near anarchy before the 
eventual declaration of state of emergency by the Federal government (Aliyu, 2010; Fagbadebo, 
2016). Others include Diepreye Alamieseigha of Bayelsa state on December 9, 2005; Rashidi 
Ladoja, of Oyo state on January 12, 2006; and Peter Obi of Anambra on November 2, 2006. 
Joshua Dariye of Plateau state was impeached on November 13, 2006; Murtala Nyako of 
Adamawa state in July 2014, and a host of others (Eze, 2013; Godswealth et al, 2016; 
Fagbadebo, 2016; Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016). 
7.2.2    Poor Institutional Capacity  
The presence of a great number of legislators, newly elected after every four-year, due to the lack 
of continuity in legislative membership, often accounts for the lapses of the legislature in the 
discharge of its function. Oftentimes, members of parliament do not return to their seats, which 
reduced the turnout of necessary legislative experience that could boost their capacity, and in 
turn deepens their depth of knowledge in relating effectively with the executive. A serving 
principal officer of the legislature in Ondo state bear his mind on the impact lack of continuity in 
legislative membership has on executive-legislative relations; 
Legislative functions and performance require a great depth of knowledge and 
experience. These experiences are not picked by the roadside; they are 
accumulated over a long period of time acting on the role as legislators. In my 
view, the more years legislators can spend on their roles, the better for executive-
legislative relations. This is because, knowledge and experience on the role breeds 
maturity and pedigree, which are necessary in fostering a smoothened relation 
between the two arms of government (Personal Interview II, February 16, 2018).  
 
In the four selected states of this study, there is a high turnover rate of legislators who did not 
return to their seats (Aliyu, 2010; Omitola and Ogunnubi, 2016). Between 1999 and 2003, almost 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
money can be withdrawn from relevant accounts of the state. Unfortunately, many of the state governors have not 
come to terms with these provisions in the running of the affairs of their states. For more details see Oyewo, 2007; 
Obidimma and Obidimma, 2015; Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016.  
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all the individuals who served the legislative assemblies lost their re-election bids, and, as a 
result, a new set of individuals with little or no legislative experience were elected into the 
legislatures. For instance, in Ondo and Ekiti states, out of the 26 members that served in their 
respective Houses of Assembly between 1999 and 2003, only one each returned to his seat. Oyo 
and Osun states presented similar developments (Aliyu, 2010; Omitola and Ogunnubi, 2016).  
At the return of the country to civil rule in 1999, the legislature was in its infancy in terms of 
structures, functions, and rules of conduct. The submission of a former speaker of Ekiti State 
House of Assembly lent credence to this viewpoint. He avers that: 
The myriad of challenges facing the legislature in the discharge of its 
constitutionally assigned function is enormous. This, I believe is not the making 
of the constitution but the system we operate which make the executive the 
landlord and legislature the tenant due to the decay in legislative institutional 
capacity as a result of prolonged Military rule (Personal Interivew VI, 10th March 
2018). 
Thus, it took the National Assembly and the various State Houses of Assembly some time to 
appreciate their constitutional powers and roles. The longer the duration of democracy, the better 
equipped the legislators and staff aides, and the deeper will be the entrenchment of democratic 
values and practice. This would facilitate and promote stable and harmonious relationships 
between the executive and the legislature. 
7.2.3     Absence of Ideological-based Political Parties 
Adebayo (2008) submits that political parties are an important institutional component of liberal 
democracy and the electoral process. The growth and stability of modern democratic practice 
revolves around political parties, which stand out as organised platforms for the articulation of 
aspirations of the diverse interests that make up the nation.  
Essentially, political parties are most often recognised and defined by their common goal; they 
set their eyes on capturing political power through competitive struggles for citizens’ votes and 
endorsement. Omodia and Egwemi (2011) maintain that the distinguishing factor that separate 
political parties from other groups in a political system is the goal of attaining and maintaining 
political power. Dwelling on the importance of political parties, Osaghae (1998) affirms that 
political parties perform some crucial roles in a democracy; ranging from recruitment of political 
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actors, mobilisation of the citizenry to provision of alternative political and electoral choices for 
the populace. 
For political parties to be able to perform these all-important roles effectively, such parties must 
put on the toga of ideology (Jombo 2015; Omotola 2009). In other words, the issue of ideology is 
so central to the activities of political parties that none can effectively achieve its purpose 
without due recourse to it. Ideology indicates the durable convictions commonly held by party 
members and determines the natural attitude of a political party towards every public question 
(Iyare, 2004; Moore, 2002; Nnoli, 2003). It represents a ‘certain ethical set of ideas, principles, 
doctrines, myths or symbols of a social movement, institution, class, and large group that 
explains how society should work, and offers some political and cultural blueprint for a certain 
social order’ (Olanrewaju, 2015, p.8). 
Political ideology serves as a veritable means of identification for political parties as well as an 
instrument of conflict resolution, a prescriptive formula and a unifying force for mobilisation. It 
emboldens political parties to pursue politics of issues in their competitive quest for political 
power and offers definite blueprints on how to allocate power and to what end it should be used. 
Ideology captures a broad spectrum of opinion and beliefs held by members of a political party, 
which also reflects its agenda, purpose, programmes and manifestoes. In developed democracies, 
ideology provides the roadmap, which guides the operation and activities of established and 
successful political parties, especially their programmes of action in and out of government.             
However, Nigerian political parties since the return of democracy in 1999 have hardly shown 
any sign of ideological distinctiveness (Omotola, 2009). There are 91 political parties in Nigeria 
(INEC Nigeria, 2018). Of all these political parties, there is none with clear-cut ideological 
foundations and structures to enable them to contribute effectively to the political process. They 
are neither progressive nor conservative. Ideology, as captured by Simbine (2005), remains the 
driving force that provides direction for political parties. Since all members of both the National 
Assembly and States’ legislative assemblies must belong to a political party, it makes sense that 
they should be subject to the agendas and manifestoes of these parties. Nevertheless, political 
parties in the present republic have consistently shown their lack of commitment to clear-cut 
ideological leanings. Moreover, this deficiency continues to undermine their capacities to 
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embrace broad based manifestoes that could offer a sort of agenda setting for their members in 
government (Omotola 2009; Omodia and Egwemi, 2011).  
For instance, in spite of their national spread, both the APC and the PDP are not totally immune 
to the ethno-regional bickering and competitions characteristic of Nigeria’s political space since 
independence (Jombo, 2015).  As Anifowose (2004) has noted, a common development in any of 
the ruling parties is for the sitting president or governor, mostly surrounded by their kinsmen, to 
take sweeping control of both party and administrative machineries of the government for 
political reasons. This often resulted into intra party crises and factionalisation. These internal 
squabbles and factionalisation most often find their way into the policymaking process and could 
invariably engender a disharmonious relation between the executive and the legislature even in a 
situation where a single party controls the two arms of government.    
The two political parties that have ruled in the Fourth Republic, the PDP and the APC had 
majority members in National Assembly. The PDP had a majority control of the members of the 
Senate and the House of Representatives between 1999 and 2015. Similarly, the APC has 
majority of the members of the two chambers in the National Assembly from 2015 up till date. 
Nevertheless, this political advantage has not in anyway translated into a smoothened 
relationship between the executive and legislative branches (Aiyede, 2005; Oyewo, 2007; Fatile 
and Adejuwon, 2016).   A former Chairman of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Barnabas 
Gemade, affirmed this deficiency when he lamented that members of the party in the National 
Assembly failed to adhere to the party’s directives on some issues.  He conceded over the period 
that resorts had to be made to some respected past national leaders to mediate between the two 
branches of government during conflicts instead of the leadership of PDP (This Day, 2015, p.1). 
Nevertheless, it should be recognised that the ability of a party to integrate its members in 
government in line with its ideology is somewhat antithetical to the ideals and principles of 
presidentialism and could not in any way remove executive-legislative acrimony. This is 
because; unlike in parliamentary system where party discipline is a sine qua non for the 
continuity of government, in presidential systems, members of both the executive and legislative 
branches of government have independent base of power arising from their separate competitive 
political contests. As a result, there is bound to be friction between the executive and the 
legislature in the course of policy making irrespective of party affiliation.     
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7.2.4   Executive high-handedness and undue Interference in the Oversight Functions of the                  
          Legislature 
Since the nation’s return to democracy in 1999, the executive arm of government has attracted a 
lot of criticism for the way and manner it handles some issues involving the legislature 
(Uchendu, 2008). The determination of who occupy various leadership positions in the 
legislature as Fatile and Adejuwon (2016) have noted, generated power tussles between the 
executive and members of the legislature.  
 
Most times, the executive has been accused of meddling in the affairs of the legislature, 
including the performance of its oversight functions (Akomolede and Akomolede, 2012). One of 
such was the Senate investigations into the handling of Petroleum Trust Development Fund by 
the Presidency in 2005. President Obasanjo had rejected the findings of the Senate’s probe, 
which indicted him by kicking against the composition of the Senate committee that investigated 
the matter (Ajayi, 2007; Momodu and Matudi, 2013). Obasanjo has alleged his Vice, Atiku 
Abubakar, of influencing the membership of the Senate committee in order for him to be cleared 
of any wrongdoing. At the height of the imbroglio, another committee was reconstituted which 
subsequently carried out the investigations (Obidimma and Obidimma, 2015). This has led to so 
much tension and crisis in the legislature, which in a way impacted on executive-legislative 
relationships, negatively, over the period. 
 
In Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, there are always persistent overtures by either the President or 
Governors to influence the choice of leadership for the legislature. Many observers believe this 
development is a definite ploy by the executive to ensure its firm grip on the legislature by 
manipulating it to do its biddings (Ayua, 2003; Aiyede, 2005; Okpe, 2014; Ukase, 2014; 
Mohammed and Kinge, 2015). However, whenever the executive failed to achieve that, it 
resorted to surreptitious means to stifle either the legislature or its leadership. A former Speaker 
of the House of Representatives, Aminu Masari, attested to this when he said: 
The high level leadership turnover in the legislature and indeed the turnover of 
members in the institutions is attributable to the desire by the executive and other 
extraneous political forces (parties) to pull out of parliament those they termed 
trouble makers who would not succumb to the dictatorial tendencies of the 
executive (cf. Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016, p.101). 
Ukase (2014) submits that one of the persistent issues that brought disagreements between the 
two arms of government in Nigeria was the fact that the executive had not really come to term 
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with the reality of the legislative oversight responsibilities. Besides its extensive powers of 
appropriation and control over public funds, the legislature has the power to scrutinise and 
approve certain appointments of the executive, including Ministers, Ambassadors, and Heads of 
security agencies as well as ratification of treaties for domestic use46.  
In addition, the legislature is further empowered to remove any erring President, Vice President, 
Governor and Deputy Governor via the impeachment procedure provided for in the Constitution. 
Section 143 and 144 of the 1999 Constitution provide for the impeachment of the President or 
vice president, while section 188 and 189 provide for the removal of a governor or deputy 
governor from office. In the course of performing its oversight functions as well as running its 
internal affairs, scholars have discovered that there were excessive interference of the executive 
arm in the activities of the legislature, mostly in the selection of its leaders, which often 
generated crisis in the legislature (Akomolede and Akomolede, 2012; Obidimma and Obidimma, 
2014; Okpe, 2014; Ukase, 2014). For instance, as mentioned earlier, the House of 
Representatives had two Speakers in its first session viz; Salisu Buhari (1999-2000) and Ghali 
Umar Na’abba (2000-2003). While the Senate experienced leadership change five different times 
between 1999 and 2007.  
Although official misconducts and abuse of office were often alleged as reasons for the incessant 
change in leadership, Ovwasa and Abdullahi (2017) identified excessive incursion and over-
bearing attitude of the executive branch under former President Olusegun Obasanjo as the major 
cause of leadership instability in the National Assembly during that period.  
Executive high-handedness also manifested in form of non-implementation of House resolutions. 
Most often, the legislature deliberated on some national issues and arrived at resolutions. Though 
it has always been argued by members of the executive branch that it is not mandatory for the 
executive to implement resolutions of the legislature, resolutions are not laws, but advisory 
statements often issued by the legislature to call attention of the executive to some matters of 
                                                          
46Section 4(2) of the 1999 Constitution provides that ‘the National Assembly shall have power to make laws for the 
peace, order and good government of the Federation or any part thereof with respect to any matter included in the 
Exclusive legislative list set out in Part I of the Second Schedule to this Constitution.’ In the same vein, section 
147(2) states that ‘any appointment to the office of Minister of the Government of the Federation ‘shall be made by 
the President but subject to the confirmation by the Senate, an arm of the central legislature. The 1999 Constitution 
also grants substantial powers to the legislature in the conduct of external relations. For instance, by virtue of section 
12(1) of the constitution, any treaty between Nigeria and other country has to be domesticated by enactment into 
Nigerian municipal law by the National Assembly before such treaty can have the force of law in Nigeria.      
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public importance. Thus, the executive is sometimes reluctant to carry out the legislative request 
or may even choose to ignore it out rightly and this often results to conflicts, which hinders 
harmonious relations between the two branches of government.  
7.2.5   Corruption 
Corruption is of global concern to the discourse on public accountability and good governance, 
especially in developing democracies. Nevertheless, its forms, intensity and sophistication vary 
from one country to another. Hence, attempts at defining the concept often proves difficult due to 
its multifaceted forms and dimensions. Many scholars have come to see the concept from 
different perspectives depending largely on their purpose and orientation.  
Corruption is considered to pose a great challenge to the development of Nigeria as a democratic 
nation. The capacity of the nation’s democracy to engender good governance and better the lot of 
the citizenry is being eroded by the pervasive corruption ravaging every facet of the country’s 
political and economic space (Aliyu, 2010). Nevertheless, the starting point of discussion on the 
concept in this section commence with Adegbite’s pontification where he avers that; 
In human history, no nation ever prospers with perverse values. In fact, no nation 
can prosper where established procedures are observed in the breach, where 
governance is for self-enrichment rather than public service. Where exists a 
yawning gap between leadership and stewardship…. virtuous societies are built 
by leaders who are accountable to the led and driven by the altruistic desire to 
improve the lot of the highest number of the people (cf. Ibietan, 2013, p.41).  
  
The concluding part of Adegbite’s statement, no doubt, adds the dimension of elite complicity in 
the Nigeria’s corruption dilemma. It further underscores the elite factor identified by Onah and 
Ibietan (2012) as the driver of corruption in Nigeria. Theoretically, these are relevant premises 
because elite culpability remains a crucial element in the discourse on the pervasive corruption in 
Nigeria.  
Bello-Imam in Onwuka et al (2009) describes corruption as ‘the abuse of public office through 
the instrumentality of private agents, who actively offers bribes to circumvent public policies and 
processes for competitive advantage and profit’ (Onwuka et al, 2009, p.42). The usefulness of 
this definition lies in the attempt to expose the negative correlation between corruption and 
national development, which manifests in the circumvention of public policies and processes for 
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personal pecuniary gains. The author goes further to state that ‘beyond bribery, public office can 
also be abused for personal benefit through patronage and nepotism’ such as diversion of state 
resources or outright theft of public assets (Bello-Imam in Onwuka et al, 2009, p.117). 
Onwuka et al (2009) see corruption as deviant behaviour that makes public officers to deviate 
from the ‘formal rules and duties of a public role because of private pecuniary gains’. This 
definition is so useful by characterising the act of corruption as deviation from the norm and 
standard rules of a public role in favour of personal gains. Ogbuke and Enojo (2007, p.96) 
contend that corruption or a corrupt act encompasses every ‘dishonest illegal behaviour’, mostly 
of public officials or ‘people in authority’. This also includes every act of making someone 
‘change from moral to immoral standards of behaviour’.  These views add both ethical and 
behavioural dimension to the discourse on corruption, which indicate that any successful anti-
graft campaign, in a country such as Nigeria can only be achieved when it is anchored on sound 
moral principles and enduring cultural values and practices (Ibietan, 2013). 
Ifesinachi (2004) attributes corruption in public life to ‘natural human factors of greed and 
ambition for social-psychological, economic and political power’ and describes it as ‘all those 
behavioural orientations that impinge on and necessarily vitiates and destroys rules and basis of 
public and political conduct’ (Ifesinachi, 2004, p.79). This appears to have corroborated the 
ethical perspective to the concept of corruption. It identifies and emphasises the human 
behavioural factor to be at the centre of top-level corruption that is characteristic of the Nigeria 
public space, and which often manifest in form of ‘abuse of power, conflict of interest, extortion, 
tribalism, nepotism or fraud’ (Ibietan, 2013, p.42). Nonetheless, in whatever form corruption 
manifests, it impedes the cause of democratic consolidation and national development. As 
established by Ogbuke and Enojo (2007), there is a strong link between corruption and nation 
building. 
Corruption can be classified depending on the arena it occurs. Nevertheless, for the purpose of 
this study, attention is placed on political and economic corruption. Political corruption often 
takes the form of manipulating people and institutional apparatus of government to gain or retain 
political power. Moreover, it usually occurs in the political arena, especially in activities related 
to or connected with elections and succession into political offices (Ibietan, 2013). Economic 
corruption, on the other hand, often assumes the circumvention of procedures and subversion of 
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the institutional regulations to benefit underserved favour or unmerited advantage. This could 
manifest in activities of parliamentarians in the discharge of their legislative duties, especially in 
the exercise of their oversight powers over the administrative agencies of government 
(Orluwene, 2014). For the purpose of this study, I define corruption as all types of irregular 
behaviour that vitiates or impedes the rules of public conduct, not just in terms of exchange of 
material means but also in terms of deployment of state power for pecuniary motives.   
Corruption is the bane of the Nigerian society. Though the executive branch together with 
officials of its administrative machineries are often at the centre of most corruption scandals, the 
legislative institution is not immune from the vagaries of the country’s ‘pervasive culture of 
corruption’ (Fagbadebo, 2016, p.110). In confirmation of the fact that the legislative institution 
in Nigeria is also enmeshed in corruption, a principal officer of the House of Assembly in one of 
the selected states had this to say: 
But what do you expect from lawmakers who have no money to buy vehicles, 
build their own house? That will be his preoccupation for the first four years. He 
will want to recoup his electioneering campaign fund. So, if the governor offers 
him money to look away, he will gladly accept (cf. Fagbadebo, 2016, p.110)  
 
The Nigerian political landscape since 1999 has been characterised by the increasing boldness of 
the ruling elites to abridge and circumvent the democratic norms  to enliven their primordial 
interests. One of the ways this often manifests is in the desire of, and sometimes struggle by the 
executive arm to manipulate or excessively control other two arms of government as extensions 
of the executive branch rather than as independent organs in a system of shared powers.  
This development, Fagbadebo (2016) has noted, ‘is a common political strategy to secure 
legislative and judicial shields against impeachment.’ This is because both the legislature and the 
judiciary play crucial role in the impeachment process in Nigeria’s presidential system47. While 
                                                          
47Section 188(1-3) empowers the State legislature to initiate impeachment proceedings against the Governor or 
Deputy Governor. It states: The Governor or Deputy Governor of a state may be removed from office in accordance 
with the provisions of this section. (2) Whenever a notice of any allegation in writing signed by not less than one-
third of the members of the House of Assembly. (b) stating that the holder of such office is guilty of gross 
misconduct in the performance of the functions of his office, detailed particulars of which shall be specified. Sub-
sections 5 and 8 of the constitution enlisted the Judiciary into the process by providing that: (5) Within seven days of 
the passing of a motion under the foregoing provisions of this section, the Chief judge of the State shall at the 
request of the speaker of the House of Assembly, appoint a Panel of seven persons who in his opinion are of 
unquestionable integrity, not being members of any public service, legislative house or political party, to investigate 
the allegation as provided in this section. (8) Where the Panel reports to the House of Assembly that the allegation 
has not been proved, no further proceedings shall be taken in respect of the matter. 
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legislature reserves the right and power to initiate the proceedings, the judiciary is empowered to 
set up the panel that would prove the allegations of misconduct. To secure their seats, state 
governors always seek in the legislature and the judiciary a willing ally, who are ready to be ‘co-
opted into the regime of executive dominance and recklessness’. And to cap it all, in a system 
where the legislature has no autonomous source of financing for its activities, a loyal legislature 
or compromised judiciary will have all its funding requests speedily approved and released by 
the executive. Moreso, the legislature will find it difficult to move against the governor even in 
the midst of glaring evidence of corruption or gross misconduct (Kumolu, 2014). Fagbadebo and 
Francis (2016) succinctly capture this; 
The lack of financial autonomy of the Nigerian legislature at all levels was the 
bedrock of the incessant executive-legislative crisis in the formative years of the 
Fourth Republic. The budgetary allocations of the legislature require executive 
approvals for disbursements. Indeed, at the state level, daily financial needs of the 
legislature require the approval of the Governor. This phenomenon literarily made 
the legislature a department of government under the executive branch. While 
Governors often used this opportunity to negotiate policy preferences, the 
legislature was incapacitated to actually function as an independent institution of 
government responsible for routine oversight of the activities of the executive 
(Fagbadebo and Francis, 2016, p.21).    
In Nigeria’s presidential system, where executive and the legislature operate as separate but 
interdependent organs; the delivery of public good is consequent upon mutual trust and 
cooperation between the two branches of government. The Nigeria’s constitution prioritises the 
roles of the legislature as the foremost institution of accountability, and accordingly grants the 
legislature extensive controls over the administrative machinery of government (Fatile and 
Adejuwon, 2016). However, a compromised legislature can choose to allow the exercise of 
powers without proper scrutiny. A respondent in the study, who is a serving legislator, puts it this 
way: 
The biggest challenge in most states is that the executive arm always takes 
sweeping control of their legislative assemblies, and sometimes the judiciary as 
well. Whenever the legislators observe any lapses or abuses, there are chances that 
they can be settled but if not, the result will be executive-legislative rift (Personal 
Interview VI, April 9, 2018).             
As hinted earlier, corruption is in terms of not only monetary inducement but also all forms of 
deliberate deployment of state power to achieve personal pecuniary gains. The Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was established in 2002 under the Obasanjo regime with 
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the power of coordinating and enforcing varied but related economic and financial crimes laws. 
The efforts of the anti-graft agency were initially applauded to have brought corruption into the 
open and under check. Nevertheless, the agency was later found to have been compromised and 
was being used by President Obasanjo as a political tool to fight perceived opponents of his 
regime (Aliyu, 2010; Lawan, 2010). 
Little wonder the Obasanjo regime (1999-2007) witnessed the highest cases of impeachment 
since the country returned to democratic rule in 1999. Fagbadebo (2016) contends that ‘in almost 
all the major cases of impeachment in Nigeria’ during the Obasanjo regime, ‘there was evidence 
of interference by the federal government’. A respondent explains it thus: 
Corruption in terms of deployment of state power was prevalent under the 
administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo. In fact, Obasanjo did it in most 
crude and brazen manners. The army, the police, the anti-graft agencies especially 
the EFCC was readily deployed to harass, intimidate, and sometimes bring down 
some Governors who were proving stubborn or refusing to toe his line of thought 
(Personal Interview V, April 2, 2018).  
The heights of executive-legislative conflicts that culminated in the impeachment crises in Ekiti 
and Oyo, Bayelsa, Plateau and other states, were facilitated by the EFCC, an agency of the 
federal government (Aliyu, 2010; Fagbadebo, 2016). For instance, how can one explain a 
situation where six members of a 24-member legislature were provided security backing by the 
EFCC instead of the conventional police to carry out an impeachment of the Governor, as it 
happened in Plateau State? Many observers considered the incident as an abuse of the rule of law 
and a breach of the impeachment process as provided for in the constitution (Aliyu, 2010; 
Fashagba, 2009; Lawan, 2010).  
7.2.6    Adverse Legislative Environment  
David Easton, the chief proponent of the system approach to the realm of political theory, 
identifies the political system as a system of interactions within a given environment. In other 
words, the political system does not operate in a vacuum; it functions in an environment of 
interactions and exchanges (Parsons, 1968). According to Easton (1965), the political system 
operates and interacts with the environment in a process involving input and output mechanism. 
The inputs are information emanating from the environments, which are expressed in form of 
demands, material requests or supports and being fed into the political system. After processing, 
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they were converted as outputs and released into the environment as authoritative decisions, 
which in turns, generate feedbacks from the environment. 
Awotokun (1992) notes that Easton’s analysis identified information being fed into the political 
system as inputs and the outcome of its conversion as outputs. The environment, he reasons, 
would therefore include the people, the constitution, (or constitutional history), political parties, 
constituency interests, political culture, public opinion and other variables defining the political 
context. Going by the prescriptions of system theory, the political system is in a state of constant 
interactions and seemingly unending exchanges with the environment. This implies that the 
political system constantly shapes and being shaped by events or happenings in the environment.     
Presidential system, by design, positions the legislative branch of government to play some vital 
roles in the governing process (Nwabueze, 1985; Mainwaring, 1993). Unlike the fusion of power 
synonymous with parliamentary democracies, presidentialism espouses the notion of separation 
of powers in a system of institutional checks and balances. Under this arrangement, both the 
executive and the legislature are recognised institutions of government operating within the 
dictates of their environments.  
These environments, as described by Oyewo (2007, p.18), include the broader context of the 
socio-economic, political, and cultural milieu under which the two institutions operate. In other 
words, the environment which represents the political context within which the two 
governmental branches function largely shape and determine the mode of exchanges between 
them in the policy-making process. This context, for the legislature, is described as the 
legislative environment. 
Legislative role theorists used the concept of legislative environment to denote the link between 
the legislators and their constituents. The theory of representative linkage by Hurley and Hill 
(2003), for example, espouses the necessity for an established links between the legislators and 
their constituents on a number of issues (Fagbadebo, 2016). However, Walker et.al (1962) in 
their earlier work notes that the efficacy of such links is determined by legislative environment. 
This, according to them, denotes the context or the operational environment under which the 
legislators perform their representative roles. In their subsequent study, Johnson and Secret 
(1996) submit that the operational environment of the legislators can be formal or informal. The 
formal environment entails the operational boundaries allowed the legislators by law to function 
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as people’s representatives, including the physical infrastructure such as office space and 
apparatus in addition to their ‘party affiliates or ideological leanings’ (Cooper and Richardson, 
2006). While the informal environment represents ‘the undefined, ever-changing modes of 
constituents’ demands and preferences, party pressures, public opinion as well as the nature of 
exchanges between the executive and legislative branches of government’ (Rehfeld, 2009, p.21). 
For the purpose of this study, I define legislative environment as the political context under 
which the legislators carry out their representative duties and oversight functions. It includes 
both the formal and informal operational environment suitable for the performance of legislative 
assignments. An executive-centred environment where the executive is elevated far above the 
legislature is considered as an adverse legislative environment and is repulsive to the realization 
of the goals of parliaments (Oni, 2013; Ukase, 2014).  
Since the return of democracy in 1999, the executive arm, in Nigeria’s presidential system, has 
continued to operate as ‘a super-ordinate branch’ over other branches of government. Apart from 
the tremendous power it enjoys over the legislature, successive government since the colonial 
periods have demonstrated the importance of executive power and in so doing impressed it on 
the psyche of the people the prime place of the executive branch as the engine room of 
government (Nwabueze, 1985; Akinsanya and Davies, 2002). 
For this reason, it is commonplace for the Nigerian public to ascribe the appellation of 
‘government’ to the executive branch (Fagbadebo and Francis, 2016, p.11). Usually, the public 
perceives the role of the legislature in the nation’s democratic space as inferior to the executive. 
The prolonged dominance of the military in the country’s political space had not only weakened 
the legislative institution but also eroded the any semblance of legislative role in the policy-
making process. These, together with the disdain with which the executive arm often treat the 
legislature, sometimes degenerate into executive-legislative conflict. A former majority leader of 
a state legislative assembly added his view this way: 
Under the Nigerian presidential system, the executive branch has tremendous 
edge over the legislature. The executive role over the course of the military 
interregnum had always been stabilized and expanded as against the legislature, 
which was not allowed to function. This situation has resulted into a weakened 
legislature and over-celebrated executive with enormous political goodwill from 
members of the public. The executive has always harped on this to foster his will 
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on the legislature, which often results into conflicts (Personal Interview IX, April 
6, 2018).      
The primary role of the legislature in presidential democracy is to represent the interests of its 
constituents. This legislative role entails the set of internalized norms of behaviour by the 
legislator, which informs or determines his actual behaviour (Johnson and Secret, 1996; Olson, 
2013).  Nevertheless, the extent to which this can be achieved is dependent on the conscience of 
the legislator and preferences of the people. This is especially true of developing societies with 
asymmetric political cleavages and high prevalence of poverty such as Nigeria (Alabi, 2009; 
Olson, 2013; Fukuyama, 2015). Most often, the legislators have to battle between their political 
survival and the demanding postures of their constituents, which could force them to abandon the 
ideals, which they strongly believed in before their elections into office. 
This implies that the preferences of the people could at times be at variance with their true 
interests which changes over time and the representative role of the legislators. As a result, most 
of the behaviours and dispositions of the legislators that often heighten executive-legislative 
conflicts do not conform to their political representation role but in response to the demands and 
preferences of their constituents. Fagbadebo (2016) notes that a large proportion of the citizenry 
in ‘developing democracies like Nigeria, are not well informed’ on what constitutes the official 
responsibilities of their representatives. In lieu of that, he reasons that, ‘to determine the 
behavioural disposition of legislators in crucial decisions, there is need for an analysis of the 
context in which they seek to represent the preferences of the constituents’ (Fagbadebo, 2016, 
p.112). 
Added to these, is the obvious lack of physical infrastructure such as adequate office space, 
operational vehicles and other office apparatus that would facilitate effective legislative process. 
The National Assembly, Nigeria’s central legislature, secured its financial autonomy in 2010, 
which is over a decade after the nation returned to democratic rule while the state legislatures 
continue to depend on the executive for the approval of funds to finance their activities, 
including their oversight functions. These situations, oftentimes, elicit negative reaction from the 
legislature and impacts, wittingly or unwittingly, the mode and pattern of executive-legislative 
relations. In the course of conducting interview with some members of the legislature, I 
embarked on several visits to legislative assemblies in the selected states where I observed the 
dilapidated and sometimes, unkempt state of the legislators’ offices. This is in contrast to the 
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physical state of infrastructure at the executive branch also visited for the same purpose. A 
minority whip of a state legislature summed up the situation this way: 
The environment is not conducive to effective legislative business. As you can see 
for yourself, we seldom have electricity supply. Moreover, the House can afford 
to run generator as alternative power supply only when there is plenary or an 
Executive session. Oftentimes, committee reports of the house are delayed 
because of erratic power supply or inadequate stationery equipments for the 
secretariat. This, I strongly believe is not what obtains in governor’s office  or any 
other high office of the executive branch (Personal Interview VI, April 10, 2018).       
Generally, when the country returned to civil rule in 1999, its growing legislative tradition had 
been eroded. This is a result of the prolonged military dictatorship where both the executive and 
legislative powers were appropriated and controlled by de facto military rulers.  Under the 
military regimes, the legislature was never allowed to function and was thereby deprived the 
opportunity to grow and mature as a formidable institution of the state (Akinsanya and Davies, 
2002) In some of the states like Ekiti, such tradition was nonexistent; because the state had never 
experienced such before 1999. Therefore, it is quite clear what kind of legislative infrastructure 
would be available in the state.   
The legislative infrastructure goes beyond physical buildings, fittings and gadgets; but transcend 
into a conducive legislative atmosphere, which has to do with the socio-political environment; 
adequate and reliable staff resources; and a continuing programme of action to deliver legislative 
autonomy (Ukase 2014).   
7.3  The Impacts of Executive-Legislative Relations on Political Stability in the Selected  
             States 
Executive-legislative conflicts have serious implications for the stability of democratic regimes 
as well as political development of a nation. As events in the selected states have shown, it did 
not only slow down the pace of governance and the smooth running of government but also 
stagnated the democratic process and overheats the polity (Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016; Ukase, 
2005). Rifts between the executive and legislature often breed suspicion and hostility between 
the two branches of government. It creates division in the legislature, brings distraction to the 
governance process and, ultimately, propels the resort to the culture of impunity and total 
disregard to the rule of law among the governing elites (Momodu and Matudi, 2013). For these 
reasons, Ukase (2005) has argued that, 
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…the truth of the matter is that these conflicts circumvent the process of 
governance, especially through the unnecessary delays in the implementation of 
government policies and programmes. Importantly, the rift between both branches 
has the potentials of threatening our democratic experiment with the attendant 
effect (Ukase, 2005, p.136). 
The summary of Ukase’s argument borders on the threat posed by the seemingly unending face-
offs between the executive and legislative branches to the Nigeria’s quest for good governance 
and democratic consolidation.  
In Ondo state, findings revealed that within the period under review, disagreements between the 
executive and legislature were usually resolved through informal means. The party caucus and 
the elders’ forum of the ruling parties - the Alliance for Democracy (AD), the People’s 
Democratic Party (PDP), and the Labour Party (LP) – and, sometimes, some selected traditional 
rulers, were active in this process. For example, the differences over the 2005 budget of the 
Ondo State Oil Producing Areas Commission (OSOPADEC), was resolved by the intervention 
of the political party. The House of Assembly had queried the implementation profile of the 2004 
budget of the Commission and demanded the Governor to furnish it with relevant documents 
before it could entertain any brief on the 2005 budget (Aliyu, 2010; Ukase, 2005).  
The incident, as revealed by former principal officer of the Ondo State House of Assembly, 
stretched the structures of the PDP but was eventually resolved before it could have any 
significant effect on the polity. According to him: 
The incident of the 2004 OSOPADEC budget almost jeopardised the existing 
confidence between the House and the Governor. Nevertheless, both sides were 
aware of the untoward effect any open disagreement could have on the state in 
terms of peace and stability. For that reason, the political actors across the divide 
swiftly agreed to resolve their differences (Personal Interview XIV, April 16, 
2018).   
This demonstrated the collaborative mindsets of members of the executive and legislative 
branches in the state who chose to exercise restraint than being confrontational whenever there 
were issues that needed to be resolved between the two arms of government. Hence, the need to 
resolve issues amicably before it poses any serious threat to the peace and stability of the state. 
A former Liaison Officer to the State legislative assembly, told me, in an interview that he was 
aware of the negative impact that frictions between the executive and the legislature could have 
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on political stability in the state. He stated that the various confidence- building mechanisms put 
in place by the Governor and party leaders were ‘consciously laid to prevent or at best forestall 
any executive-legislative face-offs that could destabilise the peaceful political atmosphere being 
enjoyed in the state’ (Personal Interview XI, April 14, 2018). I discovered that there was no other 
major political crisis associated with executive-legislature impasse in the state during the period 
under review.   
Similarly, a former Senior Legislative aide to the presiding officer of the Ondo State House of 
Assembly had disclosed in an interview that the unintended impact of unresolved executive-
legislative faceoff on political stability informed a reasonable cooperative approach to 
governance between the two arms of government. He put it this way: “Any crisis between the 
Governor and the legislature is often a political crisis. Whenever there is friction, governance 
cannot take place and the peace of the state is somehow threatened” (Personal Interview V, April 
2, 2018). He further listed the possible impacts of executive-legislative conflicts to include 
‘stalemate in government; political uncertainty that may lead to unrest; breakdown in public 
social service delivery system; and political re-alignment that may spur ethnic or group suspicion 
and antagonism’ (Personal Interview V, April 2, 2018). 
The import of these developments is that incessant acrimony between the two organs of 
government has serious implication for the political stability of any state and vice versa. Ondo 
State enjoyed a relatively stable political environment, partly because of the harmonious and 
cooperative approach to governance imbibed by both the executive and legislature in the 
discharge of their constitutionally assigned duties and functions. Even the impeachment of the 
Deputy Governor, Ali Olanusi, by the state legislature in April 2015, which the Court had 
overturned, did not, jeopardise the peace and stability of the state.       
The situation in Ekiti was in sharp contrast to the experience in Ondo state, where executive-
legislature antagonism reached its crescendo in the crises that led to the impeachment of 
Governor Ayodele Fayose and his Deputy, in 2006. Although, political forces, outside the 
legislature, orchestrated the face-off between the Governor and the lawmakers, the crises that 
followed led to the declaration of state of emergency in the state by the Federal Government 
(Aliyu, 2010).  
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Findings revealed that the state was under a siege of political uncertainty during the period. A 
respondent, with the knowledge of the development said: 
Our state was under siege; it was unfortunate that tension could reach that level in 
Ekiti state. The PDP-led government lost focus and almost set the state ablaze. 
You can recalled that Ekiti state groaned under a sole administratorship agent of 
the federal government occasioned by the state of emergency declared following 
the so-called impeachment of Fayose when other states were enjoying the 
dividends of democratic government (Personal Interview XXVIII, April 23, 
2018). 
A former secretary of the PDP in the state during this period also supported the above assertion 
when he said: 
We in the PDP hierarchy regretted the situation. We regretted the untold hardship 
brought upon the people of Ekiti state as a result of the unprecedented tension and 
anxiety that engulfed the entire landscape before and after the forceful removal of 
Governor Fayose and his deputy (Personal Interview XXIII, April 21, 2018). 
Findings further revealed that the kind of political anxiety experienced in the state because of the 
rifts was unprecedented and catastrophic, with far-reaching implications that stretched even to 
the present political situation of the state. A respondent affirmed this viewpoint, saying ‘the state 
was laid under a siege by external forces that were bent on causing political chaos in order to 
impeach Fayose’ (Personal Interview XXVII, April 23, 2018). 
Moreover, the events that led to the declaration of a state of emergency in the state were 
connected with the power tussle that followed the impeachment of the Governor and his Deputy 
in October 2006. A respondent said the situation in Ekiti State, following Fayose’s removal, 
portended a great danger to the peace and stability of the state (Personal Interview I, February 
14, 2018). He reasoned that ‘nothing can be more politically challenging than when three 
separate individuals were parading themselves as rightful governor of a state; it is nothing short 
of chaos’ (Personal Interview I, February 14, 2018).  
Thus, the outcome of the executive-legislative impasse in Ekiti State, particularly with its level 
of antagonism, showed that acrimonious executive-legislative relations pose serious threat to 
political stability or democratic development of any state. Generally, executive-legislative 
interface demonstrates the primacy of the principle of separation of powers, with interdependent 
of functions constructed to avert tyranny.  ‘Neither the legislature nor the executive can function 
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in isolation; this presents the logic that government is an interactive process’ (Omoruyi, 1992, 
p.2). 
This assertion guided the executive-legislature relationships in Ondo State. The efforts made by 
key players in both the executive and the legislative branches showed that they recognised the 
danger that an acrimonious executive-legislative relationship could pose to the political stability 
and overall democratic development of the state. The administration of Governor Olusegun 
Agagu epitomized this development. According to a respondent, ‘despite the shortcomings of 
Agagu administration in some sectors, he achieved a great feat in executive-legislative 
relationships’ (Personal Interview XII, April 10, 2018). 
The contributions of the party hierarchy also helped in maintaining the harmonious executive-
legislative relationships in the state. Nevertheless, that could not have been possible without the 
conducive operational environment created by both the Governor and members of the legislature.  
In Ekiti State, for instance, the crisis that trailed the removal of the governor and his deputy, 
which subsequently plunged the state into a state of emergency rule, also had some unintended 
consequences on the legislature, leading to frequent change in the assembly leadership. It was 
discovered that between June 2, 2003 and June 5, 2007, four different speakers had led the Ekiti 
State House of Assembly. Although Friday Aderemi was the second speaker of the assembly 
having replaced Mr Patrick Ajigbolamu on July 21, 2006, the swearing of Aderemi as Acting 
Governor following the impeachment of Fayose and his Deputy, led to the emergence of two 
House Speakers in quick succession. This is presented in table III.  
Table III:  Turnover rate of Speakers of Ekiti State Second Assembly (2003- 2007) 
S/NO NAME PERIOD 
1. Patrick Sola Ajigbolamu 2nd June 2003-19th July 2004 
2. Friday Aderemi 21st July 2004-17th Oct 2006 
3. Adetope Ademiluyi 18th Oct 2006-2nd May 2007 
4. Olusola Omolayo 3rd May 2007-5th June 2007 
Source: Department of Budget, Planning, Research & Statistics, EKSHA, 2018.  
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This high turnover of leadership at the state House of Assembly, findings revealed, ccould not be 
isolated from the happenings in the executive-legislative relationships. This is because, following 
the emergence of the Speaker of the House of Assembly, Friday Aderemi, as the Acting 
Governor on October 17, 2006, Mr Adetope Ademiluyi was appointed as his replacement. 
However, the declaration of a state of emergency in the state, in the wake of the impeachment 
crisis, led to the suspension of the legislature and the exeutuve. Aderemi lost his position as the 
Acting Governor, and relaced by Sole Admiistartor. Aderemi returned to the House, as a member 
of the legislative assembly under the leadership of Ademiluyi as Speakerm after the end of the 
state of emergency.  
On May 3, 2007, Olusola Omolayo yet again emerged as the Speaker of the Ekiti State House of 
Assembly. The development was consequent upon the swearing-in of Ademiluyi as the new 
Acting Governor of the state. This followed the expiration of the period of state of emergency 
declared by the Federal Government. Omolayo led the assembly as speaker until the session of 
the Second Assembly ended on June 5, 2007.    
In Osun state, the incessant conflicts that characterised the relationship between the executive 
and the legislature during the Bisi Akande administration had some consequences for the smooth 
running of the state affairs. Governor Akande’s dictatorial dispositions in taking some unilateral 
decisions, which ought to have involved the state lawmakers more often, pitched him against the 
legislature. One of such was the directive issued by the Governor for the stoppage of payment of 
housing and transport allowances to the state lawmakers (Personal Interview XXX, May 2, 
2018). The issue generated discontents among the legislators and heightened the acrimony 
between the assembly and the executive branch, which also formed part of the crisis that led to 
the commencement of impeachment proceedings against the Governor. 
Similarly, the refusal of the governor to give effect to the assembly’s resolution urging the sack 
of the Commissioner for Finance generated heated disagreements between the Governor and the 
state legislature, which frustrated collaboration and caused disaffection between the arms of 
government (Omitola and Ogunnubi, 2016). The mistrust and lack of cooperation between the 
two arms of government is unhealthy for the imperatives of good governance. As Nwokeoma 
(2011) has asserted: 
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The ability of any democratic government to deliver the concrete benefits of good 
governance to the citizens is determined by the smooth functioning of the 
executive, judiciary and legislative arms of government. He therefore, argued that 
this assumption reinforces the theory of separation of powers of the different arms 
of government to prevent arbitrariness, tyranny and recklessness (cf. Fatile and 
Adejuwon, 2016, p.104).  
The executive had argued that the lawmakers’ demand lacked any force of law and stood 
contrary to the principles of separation of powers in the 1999 Constitution and thus rejected it. 
However, it should be noted that the Governor has the prerogative to appoint members of the 
Executive Council but with the approval of the legislature. This approval is usually given 
through legislative resolutions. For instance, if the legislature had resolved not approve the 
appointment of a Commissioner, would the Governor had gone ahead to appoint the person? The 
same legislative resolutions that lacked the force of law as they had claimed empowered the 
Governor to appoint the Commissioners whose approvals were through resolutions.  
The high point of these imbroglios was the crisis that trailed the impeachment proceedings 
initiated against Governor Bisi Akande in November 2000 (Momodu and Matudi, 2013). In the 
wake of the impeachment trial, the political atmosphere of the state was charged under palpable 
tension and anxiety that almost degenerated into political crisis until the intervention of some 
influential political actors within the ruling AD, which prevailed on the state lawmakers to halt 
the impeachment plot against the governor (Lewis and Alemika, 2003). A respondent who was a 
former lawmaker in the state put it this way: 
The impeachment notice issued against Bisi Akande precipitated a political crisis 
that almost grounded the operation of the state. As critical players in the whole 
plot, the state legislators were fully aware of the possible implication of such plot 
on the political atmosphere of the state. Being a member of that assembly, I can 
tell you that that is one of the reasons why majority of the lawmakers yielded to 
pressures to abandon the impeachment proceedings (Personal Interview XXX, 
May 2, 2018). 
The intra-executive conflicts occasioned by the fallout between the Governor and his deputy, 
also accentuated, in a way, the incessant acrimony between the executive and the legislature. 
Omisore was having a running battle with his principal because of his alleged overt moves to 
succeed the Governor after their four years term in office; a plot considered as inimical to the 
interests and political gain of the governor, especially his desire to secure a second term in office 
(Zoaka, 2003).  
181 
 
However, this is contrary to the promise given to Omisore by the party leaders. A respondent 
said that ‘the origin of the crisis was the decision of the party leaders to prevail on the popular 
candidate (Omisore) to step down and yielded his political structure for another candidate 
(Akande) based on the promise that he would succeed him’ (Personal Interview III, February 20, 
2018). There is no doubt that the decision of the party leaders provided the fertile ground for the 
intra-executive conflicts, which climaxed in the impeachment of the Deputy Governor. All these 
happenings were in spite of a single party dominance in government and in parliament. 
Overall, one visible finding from the Akande’s era in executive-legislative relationships in Osun 
State was the failure of party hierarchy of the AD to unite in finding a common ground to resolve 
the intra-executive conflicts and the incessant executive-legislative rifts that hampered the 
smooth running of government and polarised the party structure in the state. Instead, they were 
divided between the camps of the Governor and the Deputy. These leaders also appeared to have 
taken side with the Governor on a number of issues related to the legislature, which led to their 
inability to mediate between the two branches of government in periods of crisis.  
This is contrary to the experiences of the state under the Oyinlola and Aregbesola 
administrations, where party hierarchy played strategic and responsive roles in facilitating 
convergence of interests that was responsible for the harmony and cooperation between the 
executive and legislative branches (Personal Interview XXXI, May 4, 2018). The two 
administrations witnessed smooth and cordial executive-legislative relationships. There were no 
occurrences of gridlocks in the legislative-executive relations capable of threatening the effective 
running of government business as well as the political stability of the state (Davies, 2004; 
Ogundiya, 2010; Omitola and Ogunnubi, 2016). 
Nevertheless, the impact of executive-legislative feuds in Oyo state came to the fore in the crisis 
that trailed the impeachment of former Governor Rashidi Ladoja by the 18 lawmakers loyal to 
the governor’s godfather, Lamidi Adedibu, ‘the Strongman of Ibadan politics’ (Omobowale and 
Olutayo, 2007). 
As earlier stated, Ladoja’s impeachment was an aftermath of the fallout of the governor with his 
godfather owing to his refusal to continue to honour Adedibu’s insatiable demands for political 
patronage. The attempt by the governor to leverage on his gubernatorial powers to de-emphasise 
the influence of Adedibu in order to consolidate his grip on the politics of the state was met with 
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stiff resistance by the godfather and that led to the fragmentation of political institutions and 
political processes of the state. A visible consequence of this fragmentation was the polarisation 
of the 32-member state legislature into two opposing camps.  
The development affected the operations of the state government, especially the state House of 
Assembly (Animasawun, 2013).  There were two separate sittings of the legislature: the 14 
members of the legislature, led by the Principal Officers, were sitting at the State House of 
Assembly complex, while the other 18 members held their meetings at a Hotel in Ibadan with 
security provided by the Nigerian Police (Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007). In view of these 
developments, the political atmosphere of the state was enmeshed in anxiety, palpable tension 
and uneasy wave of uncertainty while it lasted (Animasawun, 2013).  
Aside from this, there was a spate of chaos and political brigandage in most parts of Ibadan, the 
state capital, perpetrated by political thugs believed to be parts of Adedibu’s political machinery 
(Oni, 2013). These political thugs harassed and intimidated supporters of the Governor 
(Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011). A party chieftain in the state expressed it this way: 
The spate of brigandage and uncertainty brought upon the political atmosphere of 
this state was unprecedented. The impeachment of Ladoja bore more of a political 
war between two powerful titans than removal of the governor from office. The 
tension and the charged political environment that characterized the impeachment 
crisis subjected the entire state to devastating political turmoil (Personal Interview 
XXXIV, May 10, 2018). 
These developments reinforced the argument that politics, in contemporary Nigeria, revolves 
around individuals and personalities as against popular participation of the citizenry (Edigin, 
2010; Oarhe, 2010; Albert, 2005). These individuals engaged in godfather-godson relationships 
defined by transactional exchanges of patronage politics. For instance, Fagbadebo (2016, p.190) 
submits that the ‘godfather provides all the financial and political means for the electoral victory 
of his godson in a transaction that commercialises the political process’. This is so because in 
this relationship, the godfather provides all the political and financial backings required for the 
emergence of his godson in positions of authority in anticipation of receiving certain ‘political 
goods’ from the godson. Hence, the refusal of a godson to continue to maintain this relationship 
has the propensity to precipitate political crisis (Animasawun, 2013; Fagbadebo, 2016; Kifordu, 
2010). This is what happened between the late Adedibu and Governor Rashidi Ladoja in Oyo 
state. 
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At the height of the impeachment imbroglio, the late Adedibu was said to have argued that he 
had every right to demand money from the governor because ‘he put him’ in that office as 
governor (Apabiekun, 2006). The import of Adedibu’s position is that by extension, he also had 
the right to remove the Governor from office, either through constitutional means or otherwise. 
Apparently, the godfather’s argument appeared to have been in conformity with the submissions 
of scholars that whenever a godson incurs the wrath of his godfather, ‘the game of politics 
becomes perilously rough and lawless’ (Sklar et al, 2006, p.110; William, 2009).  
A former lawmaker in the state had informed me that it was so unfortunate that the 
‘disagreement between the governor and his sponsor decimated the political process of the state 
as witnessed between December 2005 and January 2006’ (Personal Interview XXXV, May 10, 
2018). According to him, the main drivers of the violence that engulfed the state over the period 
were the use of ‘unconstitutional means to remove the governor and the complicity of the 
Federal Government in the impeachment drama’ (Personal Interview XXXV, May 10, 2018)48. 
7.4 Summary 
This chapter explored some of the factors promoting the recurrent executive-legislative conflicts 
in Nigeria since the adoption of presidentialism as a governing system and the implications of 
the constant acrimonious executive-legislative relations on democratic development of the states 
as well as political stability of Nigeria. Most of these factors are manifestations of the nature of 
contestation for power among the country’s political elites. 
For these reasons, the researcher claims that most conflicts between the executive and legislative 
branches in Nigeria are symptomatic of the interplay of political forces always enmeshed in 
long-drawn battles for the control of state power and resources. As a result, the arena of 
executive-legislative interface since 1999 has manifested the egregious contentions among the 
                                                          
48The culpable roles of the Obasanjo- led Federal Government in the subversion of the democratic process which 
submerged the state into avoidable political turmoil once again reveals the neo-patrimonial culture characteristic of 
the Nigerian state. Under this, the political elites both within and outside the formal structures of governance engage 
in transactional relationship of politics of patronage, and in the main, subvert or allow the subversion of public 
institutions and known rules of political engagement for the promotion of personal gains. It was obvious during the 
Ladoja’s impeachment crisis that former President Obasanjo pitched his tent with the Chief Adedibu, the governor’s 
godfather and allowed the apparatus of state power such the police to be used in subverting the democratic process. 
Formore details, see Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011; Kifordu, 2010; Higley, 2011; Fashagba, 2014; Sklar et al, 2006. 
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political elites, sometimes powerful opposing political forces, in their bids to outwit one another 
in the race to gain advantaged position in the control over public policy and state resources.  
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Chapter Eight 
Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 
8.1 Conclusion 
This study examined the peculiarities in the nature and character of executive-legislative 
relations in the selected states in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. The central theme of the study is 
interrogation of the incessant antagonism and confrontation between the executive and 
legislative branches of government in the states within the ambit of the socio-cultural milieu and 
institutional contexts peculiar to them. This included the determination of the implications of 
acrimonious executive-legislative relationships on democratic stability of the states and Nigeria 
over the period under review.  
The study commenced with the discussion on the operations of presidential democracies, based 
on shared decision making by the executive and legislative organs of government. It focused 
principally on the underlying principles of presidentialism, which construe the three arms of 
government – the executive, legislature, and the judiciary – to function and operate as 
independent institutions in a system of separated but shared powers. The analysis of the central 
theme of the study is anchored on the components of two major but complementary theories: 
David Easton’s input-output analysis model of the systems theory and the historical approach. 
For this study, the researcher utilised the interpretative approach to knowledge to unravel the 
peculiarities surrounding the interplay of power between the executive and legislative institutions 
in Nigeria’s presidential system. The primary purpose for adopting this method is to gain an in-
depth understanding of the intricacy of decision-making and the web of interactions among 
political actors within and outside the formal structures of governance. The qualitative 
methodology was adopted for the collection of data principally because of its flexibility. The 
interviews of key informants drawn from major political actors in the legislative process formed 
the major source of primary data. Other sources of primary data included documentary analysis 
of archival materials, government publications, as well as records and Hansard proceedings of 
legislative assemblies of the selected states. I depended on the extant literature for my secondary 
data.  
The analysis of the main issues of executive-legislative relationships in Nigeria’s Fourth 
Republic was compartmentalised into eight chapters. Drawing extensively from the differing 
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perspectives of scholars, chapter one provided a general background of the extant principles of 
presidentialism as a governing system as well as the main issues surrounding executive-
legislative relationships in the country’s presidential democracy since 1999. 
In chapter two, the researcher explored the different perspectives of scholars on the underlying 
principles of presidentialism as a governing system. This included an appraisal of the existing 
taxonomies of executive-legislative relations and their implications for different contexts. Using 
the practice of presidentialism in the United States, Latin America and Asia as templates, the 
researcher probed into the literature to examine the contending debates on gridlocks associated 
with presidential democracy. There was convergence among scholars that the primary concern of 
presidential system is the elimination of arbitrariness and the need to promote accountability in 
government. The extant literature was also reviewed to explore the evolution and development of 
legislative institution in Nigeria starting from the First Republic.  
In chapter three, the two principal theories for the study were discussed. The chapter examined 
and analysed the relevance of these theories within the context of executive-legislative 
relationships in the Nigeria’s presidential system. The researcher found out, from the literature, 
that none of these theories is sufficient to undertake a comprehensive analysis required to explain 
the nature and manner of contestation for power among the governing elites in the executive and 
legislative branches of the government. This was applied to the governance structures in 
Nigeria’s presidential system to show the interplay of power relations between the executive and 
legislative branches of government. Thus, it was discovered, theoretically, that there is a personal 
dimension to most of the disagreements between the two arms of government, which often 
border on the nature and scope of power granted either of the two in the constitutional scheme. 
The researcher therefore claimed that in Nigeria, the incessant antagonisms and acrimonies 
between the executive and the legislative branches are fallouts of the nature and manner of 
contestations among the political elites, which often centre on the excessive push to gain 
advantaged positions in the appropriation of state power and resources for primordial gains. 
The fourth chapter traced the history of executive-legislative relationships in Nigeria’s 
presidential system beginning with the Second Republic when the country first adopted 
presidentialism as a governing system. Drawing on documentary and empirical evidences, it was 
discovered that Nigeria’s journey into nationhood, both in democratic practice and military 
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dictatorship, has been characterised by an executive-centred political environment where the 
executive was always stronger than the legislature in the policy making process. The researcher 
claimed that most of the conflicts between the executive and the legislature in Nigeria are 
manifest evidence of political intolerance and struggles for power, which is often shrouded in 
politics of survival among powerful and contending political actors seeking to outsmart one 
another, rather the concerns for public good.  
In chapter five, some relevant provisions of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, as amended in relation to the functions and powers allotted to the executive and 
legislative branches of government were explored. The strengths of these provisions were 
equally examined, to provide insights into the exercise of power by the Nigerian governing 
elites. It was discovered that the constitution formally structured the interactions between the 
executive and the legislature but the relationships that exist in actual practice depend largely on 
the political context as well as the characteristics of the governing elites.  
The researcher explored the various constitutional guarantees granted the legislature to monitor 
the exercise of executive power, which seeks to institutionalise adherence to the rule of law and 
the culture of accountability in government. The study discovered that the various constitutional 
provisions that defined the interface between the executive and the legislative branches are 
adequate to engender stable and accountable government. For these reasons, the study claimed 
that the nature of the conflicts between the executive and the legislature in Nigeria proved that 
most of these acrimonies had nothing to do with the contradictions in the 1999 constitution. The 
Nigerian experience, since 1999, has shown some semblances of personal dimensions to the 
struggles between the two arms of government; yet manifesting as constitutional issues.  
Chapter six examined the nature and character of executive-legislative relationships in the 
selected states within the ambits of the socio-cultural milieu and institutional contexts peculiar to 
them. Insights from these states provided the basis for the researcher’s claim that every 
phenomenon of executive-legislative impasse has its own unique nature, causes, implications, 
and consequences. This was proven, with data that showed the differing peculiarities of 
executive-legislative relations in each of the states. These peculiarities showed how internal 
dynamics and external forces influenced the political outcomes of both the executive and 
legislative institutions in the selected states. The researcher therefore claimed that the 
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particularistic nature of the political elites in the states and the varying roles and degree of 
interventions by political parties determined the intensity of executive-legislative feuds.  
In chapter seven, some of the factors promoting the recurrent executive-legislative conflicts in 
Nigeria since the adoption of presidentialism as a governing system were explored, including the 
implications of the constant acrimonious executive-legislative relations on democratic stability of 
the states as well as political development of Nigeria. Empirical data were presented to identify 
some of the factors promoting the recurrent executive-legislative feuds in Nigeria since the 
adoption of presidentialism as a governing system as well as the peculiarities surrounding most 
cases of executive-legislative stand-offs and their consequences on the nation’s body politic. The 
findings showed that some of these contending issues are not particularly inherent in the practice 
of presidential system but a manifestation of the nature of struggles for power among the 
country’s political elites. The researcher therefore claimed that the nature of patronage politics in 
Nigeria weakens the capacity of the legislature to act as an independent body thereby making it 
susceptible to the abuses of external forces 
The researcher claimed that the incessant frictions between the executive and legislative 
branches in Nigeria are manifestation of the entrenched leadership crisis, manifested through the 
unbridled competition among the political elite. The objective is for the control of state power 
and resources for strategic political survival.  
8.2 Summary of findings  
A major finding of this study is the peculiarities of elites’ behaviour in the exercise of power, in 
relation to the crisis of confidence that engendered, often, constant frictions between the 
executive and legislative branches in Nigeria’s presidential system. The different attitudes and 
dispositions of the political elites is a major factor responsible for the varied experiences of the 
selected states. The particularistic nature of the political elites in the states and the varying roles 
and degrees of interventions by political parties always determined the intensity or otherwise of 
the executive-legislative feuds.  
This development was visible in Ondo State over the period under review in the conscious 
efforts made by the governing elites across the divide to institute a regime of harmonious 
working relationships between the executive and the legislature. Overtime, an atmosphere of 
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consensus building, inter-branch consultation and dialogue characterised the interface between 
the two organs of government. This was reinforced by the various mediatory and stabilising roles 
played by party structures and other relevant stakeholders such as traditional institutions in 
promoting or at best ensuring harmony and cooperation between the executive and the legislature 
for the overall democratic health and political stability of the state. A respondent explained the 
nature of the mutual interaction thus: 
The House of Assembly, from 2003, set about doing its work including 
lawmaking, budgeting, oversight function, confirmation, and investigation. 
Conflict often developed over these and they could have become centre of 
controversy but for the quick and responsible intervention of respected party 
leaders who often see things from the perspective of legislature (Personal 
Interview XVIII, April 17, 2018). 
 
From the foregoing, it is evident that the real issue in executive-legislative relations is not the 
elimination of conflicts but the development of conflict management or reduction mechanism. 
This is capable of mitigating political conflicts or disagreements between the two arms of 
government.  
However, the crisis generated by the impeachment of Ayo Fayose and his deputy in Ekiti state in 
2006, as well as the nature of contestation for power among the state political elites, precipitated 
the political crisis that led to the declaration of emergency rule on the state by the Federal 
Government. Without disregarding the culpability of the Obasanjo-led Federal Government in the 
escalated conflicts between the executive and the legislature in the state, the governor had been 
having running battles with different groups and institutions such as traditional rulers and opinion 
leaders in the state. This development swayed public opinion in favour of the governor’s 
impeachment in spite of the unconstitutional means employed to carry out the plot.  
A party chieftain in the state described the governor’s confrontational attitude this way: 
The governor having successfully caged the legislature; he extended the same 
ploy to other actors but was serially rebuffed. It was pressure from these forces on 
the legislature that forced Fayose out of power. After all, the legislature that can 
be a willing tool in the hand of the governor can equally do the same for others 
when the die is cast (Personal Interview XXVIII, April 23, 2018). 
 
A writer supported this claim when he noted that Fayose’s removal from office through 
unconstitutional means appeared to have been applauded and legitimized by relevant groups and 
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institutions in the state when these stakeholders could no longer condone the ‘impeccably 
garrulous and unrepentantly confrontational approach of Fayose to governance’(Oyetayo, 2006, 
p.16). 
In a similar version, the Osun State experience in executive-legislative relationships, particularly 
in the first four years of democratic experiment under Bisi Akande’s government, showed the 
shrewd exchanges and influence of the political elites in the altercation between the governor and 
the state legislature. The roles of these individuals became visible in the wake of the 
impeachment process of Governor Bisi Akande, as well as in the rifts between the governor and 
his deputy, Iyiola Omisore, which climaxed into the impeachment of the Deputy Governor by the 
State House of Assembly. 
The leaders of the AD who pressurized the state lawmakers to halt the impeachment of the 
governor were the same people who mounted pressure on the legislators to remove his deputy, 
Iyiola Omisore, from office (Fagbadebo, 2016; Omitola and Ogunnubi, 2016; Fatile and 
Adejuwon, 2016; Akinsanya and Davies, 2002). 
To further prove the plausibility of this claim, under the successive administrations of 
Olagunsoye Oyinlola and Rauf Aregbesola in the state, the split in the legislative membership 
between the two opposing political parties, the PDP and ACN, especially in the Fourth and Fifth 
Assemblies, did not lead to executive-legislative conflicts. This was attributed to the 
convergence of purpose among the political elites, irrespective of their political affiliations 
(Kaur, 2007; Omitola and Ogunnubi, 2016). 
In Oyo state, split among the political elites of the same political party polarised the legislature 
and eventually led to the removal of former Governor Rashidi Ladoja from office albeit through 
unconstitutional means. The executive-legislative face-off that culminated in the governor’s 
impeachment was a sad reflection of the nature and consequences of patronage politics prevalent 
in the political landscape of Nigeria. Overall, the infamous roles of the state political elite both 
within and outside the formal structure of government were reflected in the struggles and battles 
of wits which plunged the state into avoidable chaos and political uncertainty that characterised 
the period.    
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8.3 Patronage Politics and the Culture of Impunity in Nigeria’s Presidential System 
Executive-legislative impasse has proven to be a major source of political instability in Nigeria 
since 1999 (Fatile and Adejuwon, 2016). In advanced democracies, such contradictions are 
regarded as necessary and even pivotal in deepening democratic ethos and practices. However, 
this is not so in Nigeria where executive-legislative rifts is perhaps considered as part of the 
narratives of the deep-seated leadership crisis impeding the country’s socio-economic growth 
and democratic consolidation. Akinbobola (2002) captures this situation when he remarks that: 
In Nigeria, democratisation has remained a dilemma. The dilemma is that there 
exists an articulated desire to democratise the polity, but the spirit and 
commitment is wavery. Indeed, the stakeholders in the polity circumvent the 
democratization process (Akinbobola, 2002, p.366). 
In Nigeria, the prolonged military dictatorship had entrenched a tradition of executive 
dominance. The lack of commitment of the governing elites to initiate a sincere and genuine 
process of democratisation that ‘provides the pillars for political stability and good governance’, 
coumpounded this crisis (Ukase, 2014, p.93). The military had always had the penchant and 
culture of fusing both the executive and legislative powers and functions under the sole control 
of military rulers. This development spilled over to the Fourth Republic and has continued to 
impact negatively on the country’s democratic practice since 1999. 
As Okpeh (2014) has argued, the collapse of the previous Republics was not because the 
constitutions were bad. Rather, they were attributable to the failure of the political elites to 
comply with the basic rules of engagement that governed the political process, especially the 
interface between the executive and legislative branches of government. Evidently, the 
contemporary Nigerian leaders appeared to have refused to learn from history because of the 
growing culture of impunity and flagrant disregard for the rule of law prevalent among the 
governing elites in the executive and the legislature both at the national and state levels from 
1999 up until date.  
This development, as Oyebode (1995, p.56) has argued, has led to a situation of ‘executive 
recklessness and legislative rascality’ in the political process. The attendant consequences are the 
denial of Nigerians and Nigeria the opportunity of savouring the proceeds of good governance, 
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economic advancement and political transformation believed to the accompanying benefits of 
democratic governments. 
The conflictual executive-legislative relationship has ominous implications for good governance 
and stability of democratic regimes. Nevertheless, it is incontestable, as events in the selected 
states have shown, that much of these conflicts in Nigeria were manifest expression of the overt 
struggles and contests for power among the political forces. These individuals often spanned 
beyond the political actors in the formal structure of state power. They operate outside the 
official positions of authority but on a large scale, their towering influence determined the 
political outcomes of government institutions.  
This is attributable to one of the misconceptions in the country’s presidential system where the 
concept of executive president or governor is widely misconstrued as legitimate conferment of 
absolute power in the executive branch. This often heralds the emergence of individuals who 
exert immense control on state affairs thereby hastening the personalisation of the political 
process. This development is antithetical to the extant principles of presidentialism (Fagbadebo, 
2016). The direct consequence of this institutional malaise is the culture of impunity that 
characterized the executive and legislative branches of government. As a result, frequent 
breaches of constitutional rules have become common occurrence while the concerns for public 
good have become a rarity.  
This is contrary to the underlying principles of presidentialism, such as the notion of separation 
of powers and the doctrine of checks and balances which, in the interests of the people, sought to 
entrench the culture of accountability in government. However, the perception of politics and the 
reconstruction of the concept of political power by the Nigerian political elites has remolded 
their behaviour and orientation from being the governing elites to becoming the political 
merchants, who see politics and political power as the easiest, surest, and fastest means of 
amassing personal wealth (Kifordu, 2010). 
This is a true reflection and manifestation of Richard Joseph’s concept of prebendal politics, 
which he used to denote the Nigeria’s presidential system of the Second Republic. He reasoned 
that in the understanding of the Nigerian political process, ‘the nature, extent and persistence of a 
certain mode of behaviour, and of its social and economic manifestations’ cannot be 
underestimated (Joseph, 1991, p.1). According to him, prebendal politics approximates the: 
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Pattern of political behaviour, which rests on the justifying principle that such 
offices should be competed for and then utilised for the personal benefit of office 
holders as well as of their reference or support group. The official public purpose 
of the office becomes a secondary concern, however much that purpose might 
have been originally cited in its creation or during the periodic competition to fill 
it (Joseph, 1991, p.8). 
 
From the foregoing, it is evident that Richard Joseph’s theory of prebendalism draws heavily 
from the penchant of the political elites to exploit state power, constantly, for their pecuniary 
gains at the expense of public good and the collective interests of the citizenry. In the process, 
they often expose the political environment to the repulsive consequences of their ‘intensive and 
persistent struggles to control and exploit the offices of the state’ (Joseph, 1991, p.1). Thus, the 
political process in Nigeria’s presidential system and the theatre of intense competition among 
the political elite resulted into unbridled rivalry and acrimonious relationships between the 
executive and legislative branches of government.  
Fagbadebo (2016) advances the theory of prebendalism further in his study of the presidential 
system in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, describing it as ‘a mercantilist version of politics’ 
(Fagbadebo, 2016, p.258). In both theory and practice, mercantilism is a regimented economic 
agenda seeking to strengthen the economic and political positions of a state at the expense of 
other states (Irwin, 1991; Hutchison, 1988).  
As a strategic economic policy of a rent-seeking state, the primary objective of mercantilists is to 
consolidate on a state economic position by seeking to monopolise the trading system to the 
disadvantage of other competing states in a bid to eliminate or push them out of reckoning. Irwin 
(1991) notes that the mercantilist overtures have the propensity to precipitate armed military 
conflicts among states as they seek to counteract the unpleasant implications of the monopolised 
trading system on their economies. 
In a sublime version, Fagbadebo (2016) adapts the mercantilist orientation to explain the 
pervasive influence of godfathers in the Nigeria’s presidential system. He posits that: 
As an advanced form of prebendal politics, mercantilist politics permits a 
godfather to buy off the political space with a view to determining the outcome of 
the socio-economic and political process. He recruits godsons as subordinate 
trading agents to oversee the various political outposts in the executive and the 
legislative arms of government (Fagbadebo, 2016, p.258). 
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In his analysis of the politics behind the impeachment of some state governors in the Fourth 
Republic, he construes the oversight power of the legislature as ‘a trading instrument in 
exchange for socio-political rewards in favour of the godfather’ (Fagbedebo, 2016, p.258). In 
other words, the godfather, acting as a merchant, only sees in the impeachment provision a 
veritable tool to be appropriated, mostly through unconstitutional means, in his quest to pursue 
personal profits at the detriment of other political actors and the larger society. This 
development, unfortunately, has become a menace depriving Nigerians the much sought after 
dividends of representative democracy.  
This is reconceptualised as the Nigerian version of patronage politics. By this conceptualisation, 
the researcher seeks to define politics as transactional relationships where an individual invest in 
the political aspiration of another in anticipation of rewards of personal benefits. As a variant of 
prebendal and mercantilist politics, patronage politics in Nigeria, denotes the political orientation 
of individuals who construe their involvement or participation in politics as a means of achieving 
some predetermined personal advantages. Under this orientation, both the godfather and the 
godson acquiescence to realise their mostly incompatible selfish purposes through brazen 
subversion of the democratic process. Moreover, in the main, ‘activities of political parties are 
largely determined by the towering influence of godfathers to satisfy a pecuniary political 
objective’ (Fagbadebo, 2016, p.257). 
Just like its prebendal and mercantilist variants, patronage politics is amoral and thrives in an 
environment of impunity, intense struggles and brazen subversion of the constitutional order. In 
essence, patronage politics is an inclusive form of godfatherism, in which some ruling merchants 
seek to engage in various shrewd tactics to pull down the very foundation of masses-driven 
governance in favour of the political process where the preferences of the few hold sway 
(Akinola, 2009; Kaur, 2007). This set of individuals, as Oarhe (2010) has noted, see politics as 
an avenue for investments in anticipation for reaping bountiful returns. Thus, the godfather, who 
operates as political merchant, could deploy his financial muscles and political networks to 
ensure the emergence of his chosen candidates (godsons), in positions of authority. The godson, 
who functions as a trading agent, submits himself to the tutelage and guidance of his sponsor 
until, at least, political power is attained (Albert, 2005; Edigin, 2010; Sklar et al, 2006).  
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A former state governor in Nigeria described the position of a godfather in the nation’s political 
turf as 
an impervious guardian who provided the lifeline and direction to the godson, 
perceived to live a life of total submission, subservience and protection of the 
oracular personality located in the larger, material frame of opulence, affluence 
and decisiveness, that is, if not ruthless (cf. Fagbadebo, 2016, p.192-193). 
 
Nonetheless, nothing in the foregoing suggests that the relationship of patronage exchanges of 
personal rewards and benefits is a forceful endeavour. Edigin (2010) has noted that mutual 
interests and politico-economic benefits of the individuals involved often motivate the 
relationship. Scott (1972) has reasoned that the desire of an aspiring political figure, to seek 
refuge and protection from an individual of higher socio-economic status and established 
political power, mostly results in such relationships. According to him, it is often involves a 
transactional relationship where a service or support is sought in exchange of an agreed 
reciprocity.  
It is evident; therefore, that mutual consent for the control of state power and resources is the 
motive behind godfather-godson relationships other than the concerns for public good. The 
failure, default or outright refusal of a godson to continue to honour the standing principles 
governing the relationships, leading to the breakdown in the process of reciprocity and 
patronage, amount to a revolt, and has the proclivity towards political crisis, sometimes, violent 
conflicts. Such crisis often elicits damaging and abrasive consequences on the democratic space 
(Fagbadebo, 2016; Olupohunda, 2014; Omobowale and Olutayo, 2007). 
The researcher uses patronage politics to mirror the shrewd and sometimes violent struggles 
among the political elites for the control of state power and resources to explain the escalating 
acrimonious relationships between the executive and legislative branches in Nigeria’s 
presidential system. This unending struggles and battles of wits have subjected the country’s 
political process to the vagaries of patron-client relationships of patronage politics (Oarhe, 2010; 
Sarker, 2008; Stein, 1996; Mwenda and Tangri, 2005). In this relationship, when there is a 
convergence between the godfather and the godson, in their interests and goals, the two sides 
unite to plunder collective resources, subvert the democratic process, and even deploy state 
power as a political tool to further their private benefits to the disadvantage of the public. 
However, whenever there is conflict of interest between or within these groups, the public space 
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becomes suffocated with intense struggles and bickering which often lead to acrimonious 
relationships among the political elite and ultimately among the institutions of government 
(Ayeni and Soremekun, 1998). Oarhe (2010) argues that the breakdown in the patronage 
exchange is the bedrock of the struggle between a godfather and his godson.  
The import of these developments on the Nigeria’s democratic space is that the menace of 
godfatherism, as well as its attendant patronage linkages, has made it increasingly difficult for 
political actors, operating within the various institutions of government, to act independently. 
Therefore, the unconstitutional removal of former Governor Ladoja in Oyo state transcended the 
independent actions of the 18 lawmakers, contrary to the allegations of gross misconduct 
proffered against the governor.  
Patronage politics also manifested among political actors within the formal institutions of 
government. This is often aimed at providing important shields for the positions of elected public 
figures or strategic interests of individuals or groups. For instance, the usual crave by state 
governors to install their surrogates in the legislature is believed to be aimed at providing 
legislative shields for themselves in the exercise of executive power (Fagbadebo, 2016). 
Moreover, this usual plot by state chief executives can be viewed from the standpoint of 
patronage politics. Similarly, the state governors are also fond of ensuring the emergence of their 
loyal godsons and allies as Local Government Chairmen through either compromised election or 
selection by executive fiat. It is understood that most of these governors engage in such practices 
to avail themselves of unfettered access to the local government treasury (Davies, 2004). 
A serving lawmaker in one of the selected states had argued that state governors could go to any 
length to deflate the oversight influence of their state legislatures: 
As experiences did show under Mimiko, the governor’s sinister attempt at eroding 
the autonomy of the state’s legislative assembly stemmed beyond reducing the 
institutional and operational capacities of the legislative body. It dovetailed into 
the political arena where the governor often mobilise state resources to ensure the 
selection of politically naïve individuals bereft of informed minds, intellectual 
capacity and visible electoral base needed to understand and pursue legislative 
oversight agenda capable of checking any possible infractions in the exercise of 
executive power (Personal Interview XIX, April 15, 2018). 
As the lawmaker further argued, the plot often begins with party primaries where state governors 
usually manipulate the selection process in favour of their preferred candidates and even go 
197 
 
further to ensure their emergence in the general elections. According to him, the implication of 
this development is a ‘legislature operating as an extension of the executive branch’ (Personal 
Interview XIX, April 15, 2018). 
A trend prevalent in the Nigeria is that many of the elected public officials were sponsored into 
office by one elite group or the other within political parties while a few of them were elected on 
their individual strength independently of any godfather (Sklar et al, 2006). Thus, any form of 
conflict or bickering within and/or between these groups could also elicit acrimonies among the 
institutions of government. Much of the conflicts between the executive and legislative branches 
in Nigeria can be understood from this perspective.  
8.4 Recommendations           
a. Institutionalising Dialogue Procedure as a Measure of Enthroning Executive-    
Legislative Harmony in Nigeria’s Presidential System 
Taking into consideration the underlying principles of Nigeria’s presidential constitution, the 
study argues that institutionalisation of the culture and procedure of dialogue between the 
executive and legislative branches remains the most viable means of enthroning executive-
legislative harmony. By this, I mean to emplace, constitutionally, cooperative approach and 
dialogue procedures that will be legally recognised by both sides on important inter-branch 
issues such as money bills and appropriation-related matters. The leadership of both arms of 
government needs to understand and choose to act in the consciousness that, in a presidential 
system, the legislature wields tremendous power and control over public fund while the 
executive is in charge of its approved budget. Any public spending outside this requires 
legislative consideration and approval. 
This measure will enable the political actors to explore the numerous available viable options to 
resolve their grievances and differences on policy issues at the primary level before they magnify 
into serious impasse. In this regard, the two organs of government should endeavour to put in 
place conflicts resolution mechanisms in form of active and functional inter-branch liaison 
offices in their respective institutions to foster stable and harmonious working relationships.  
At the states level, such offices could derive its structure and modus operandi from what is 
presently in operation between the Presidency and the National Assembly. Under this 
arrangement, presidential advisers on legislative matters function to relate directly with the two 
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chambers of the National Assembly. The usual practice is to appoint former lawmakers with 
demonstrable experience and goodwill to run the affairs of such offices. This kind of 
arrangement should be replicated at the states level. However, to make such offices functional 
and goal-oriented, it is recommended that it should have two wings; one at the legislative 
chamber and the other at the Governor’s office. The offices should be designed and made to 
operate a two-way communication links between the executive and legislative branches. Moreso, 
it is imperative for such offices to be manned by experienced democrats, consisting mainly of 
individuals that have previously served in government and former lawmakers, seasoned and 
versed, in mediatory and collaborative politics and engagement.    
This is essential, because, in a presidential system, such as Nigeria, it is somewhat difficult, if 
not impossible, to eliminate frictions between the executive and the legislature. Nonetheless, 
functional measures, such as the foregoing, can be adopted to institute harmonious working 
relationships between the two arms of government. As events in the selected states have shown, 
disagreements between the executive and legislative branches are inevitable, because there is 
always a potential for it. However, one viable way to counteract this is to ensure that executive-
legislative relationships are conducted, based on understanding, consensus building and dialogue 
as well as cooperative approach by the political actors operating within the two institutions. 
The experience of Ondo state showed that the real issue in executive-legislative relations is not 
the elimination of conflicts but the development and sustenance of conflict management 
mechanisms that are capable of dousing tensions and disagreements arising from the interaction 
between the two arms of government. One of such was the roles played by social and political 
organisations like the Afenifere under Adefarati and party caucus during the Agagu government. 
It should be noted, however, that such informal structures equally existed in other states under 
review but could not muster appreciable impact like what was recorded in Ondo state. Therefore, 
the major lesson learnt was the avowed commitment of political elite in the state to adopting 
collaborative and mediatory mindsets in addressing issues that affected executive-legislative 
relationships.     
This approach demands the executive to accept that the constitution provides for the legislature 
and assigned responsibilities to it. The delays often occasioned by the long process of legislative 
scrutiny should not be construed as antagonism to executive action. They are considered as 
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essential to the plurality and diffusion of power expressed clearly in the principle of separation of 
power and checks and balances incorporated into the country’s presidential constitution to avert 
possible tyranny and other undemocratic tendencies of the executive branch.  
The legislative actors must equally ensure they operate, with, the consciousness that the 
legislature is not a willing tool in the hands of political merchants to scuttle or slow down the 
pace of governance. There could be a possibility for the two institutions to disagree on policy 
issues for the good and stability of the system. However, confrontations between the two 
branches of government need not necessarily lead to acrimony when members of the executive 
and the legislature imbibe a high sense of maturity and patriotism for the overall democratic 
health and political stability of the nation. For democratic stability to be sustained, the two arms 
of government should choose and be determined to operate within the limits of their 
constitutional powers; and ultimately by resorting to judicial intervention as a way of settling 
disputes between them when negotiation fails.    
b. The Need for an Active Judiciary 
It is important to mention that the effectiveness of the recommendation highlighted in the 
foregoing requires the unbiased intervention of an activist judiciary, insulated from the vagaries 
of partisan politics, especially at the state levels. This is because, in a political environment 
besieged by the pervasive influence of powerful patrons and godfathers, the chances of 
independent actions by the governing elites operating within the relevant institutions of the state 
become very slim. In other words, the possibility of abuse of power by the various institutional 
actors is very high owing largely to the contending battles of wits among private interests over 
public goods.  
Moreover, in a situation of continuous struggles among the various elite groups for the control of 
state power and resources to further their private purposes, there is a definite need for an activist 
judiciary acting as an independent arbiter in the swift dispensation of justice. This is necessary to 
sanitize the democratic space by ensuring its conformity with the extant laws governing political 
competition and electoral contests in the country, especially the limits of power granted the 
respective government institutions.  
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An unbiased judicial arbiter is not only needed for the effective administration of justice but also 
remains a sine qua non for the sanctity of the nation’s laws, especially the rules governing the 
electoral process. 
c. A Re-orientation of Citizens’ Perception of the Legislative Role  
In view of the military legacy that promoted the executive branch, most Nigerians are yet to 
come to terms with the exact roles of the legislature as envisaged by the constitution. The usual 
public perception sees the legislature as inferior to the executive. The prolonged dominance of 
the military in the country’s political space had not only weakened the legislative institution but 
also eroded any semblance of legislative role in the policy-making process  
This problem is compounded by the loss of integrity of the legislature, which makes it vulnerable 
to manipulation of the executive branch (Jombo and Fagbadebo, 2019; Odunlami, 2015). In 
Nigeria as of today, one of the challenges facing the legislature in the discharge of its 
constitutional responsibilities is the self-inflicted integrity crisis.  
An added twist to this development is the prevailing culture of stomach infrastructure occasioned 
by the high level of poverty among the populace (Alabi, 2009; Olson, 2013; Fukuyama, 2015). 
This has translated into ceaseless demands from the legislators by their constituents to 
continually provide them with palliatives which they have somewhat construed as the direct 
responsibility of their representatives. A lawmaker noted that people are no longer concerned 
about the real constitutional role of their elected representatives.  
For these reasons, a re-orientation of the peoples’ perception of the constitutional role of the 
legislators is paramount and essential to the reconstruction of the proper legislative agenda that 
founds its roots in the collective will and aspiration of the people.  This is necessary, because, 
ceaseless demands, from the legislators, by their constituents have the propensity to generate 
anxiety in them and in turns heightening tension in the executive-legislative relationships.  
Alabi (2009) has argued that most of the behaviours and dispositions of the Nigerian legislators 
that often heighten executive-legislative conflicts do not conform to their political representation 
role but in response to the demands and preferences of their constituents. In a related manner, 
Fagbadebo (2016) has noted that a large proportion of the citizenry in ‘developing democracies 
like Nigeria’ are not aware of what constitutes the official responsibilities of their 
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representatives. In lieu of that, he reasons that, ‘to determine the behavioural disposition of 
legislators in crucial decisions, one needs an analysis of the context in which they seek to 
represent the preferences of the constituents’ (Fagbadebo, 2016, p.112). 
Nonetheless, it is also very important for the lawmakers to change their attitudes of flaunting 
their ‘ill-gotten wealth’ and expensive lifestyles in the midst of their impoverished mass of 
constituents. This attitudinal change on the part of Nigerian parliamentarians is needed to win 
back citizens’ trust and confidence as true representatives of their interests and aspirations in 
government. This will no doubt ease off a lot of pressure for monetary settlement on the 
assemblymen and invariably allowed them to focus more on their constitutional roles of law-
making, representation and effective oversight rather than seeking avenues of financial 
inducements from the executive, especially its arrays of administrative agencies which often 
results to acrimonies between the two arms of government. 
In addition, the programmes of capacity building for legislators need to be reworked and 
finetuned to bring about optimal performance of parliamentarians on the legislative duties. To 
build or improve capacities of our parliamentarians, the starting point is that they need to stay 
longer on their seats to learn the rudiments of legislative work through experience (Personal 
Interview II, February 16, 2018). They need more engaging commitment to enroll in capacity 
building seminars and workshops on regular basis to horn their legislative skills. A rejuvenated 
National Institute for Legislative Studies (NILS) will suffice for this purpose. 
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Appendix I 
 
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT 
Dear Participant, 
My name is JOMBO, Ojo Celestine. I am a PhD (Political Science) candidate studying at the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg campus, South Africa. The title of my research is: 
Examining the Peculiarities of Executive-legislative relations in Nigeria’s presidential system: 
Insights from selected States in the Fourth Republic, 1999-2015. The research is aimed at studying 
the peculiar nature and cause of acrimonies between the executive and legislative branches of 
government in the States. To gather the information, I am interested in interviewing you to share some 
of your experiences and observations on the issue. 
Please note that: 
• Your confidentiality is guaranteed as your inputs will not be attributed to you in person, but 
reported only as a population member opinion. 
• The interview may last for about 1 hour and may be split depending on your preference. 
• Any information given by you cannot be used against you, and the collected data will be used 
for purposes of this research only. 
• Data will be stored in secure storage and destroyed after 5 years. 
• You have a choice to participate, not participate or stop participating in the research. You will 
not be penalized for taking such an action. 
• Your involvement is purely for academic purposes only, and there are no financial benefits 
involved. 
• If you are willing to be interviewed, please indicate by signing the attached declaration (a 
separate sheet for signature is attached). 
I can be contacted at:Email: greatcelexo@yahoo.com 
Cell: +2348032430947 or +27742744775. 
My supervisor is Dr. Khondlo Mtshali who is located at the School of Social Sciences, 
Pietermaritzburg campus of the University of KwaZulu-Natal.  
Contact details: email: Mtshali@ukzn.ac.za   Phone number: +27824038876. 
My Co-supervisor is Dr. Omololu Fagbadebo, School of Management, IT and Public Governance, 
Pietermaritzburg Campus, University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Phone number: +27611533824 Email: Fagbadebo@ukzn.ac.za 
You may also contact the Research Office through: 
P. Mohun 
HSSREC Research Office,Tel: 031 260 4557 E-mail: mohunp@ukzn.ac.za 
Thank you for your contribution to this research.  
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Appendix II 
August 8, 2017 
 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
Dear Sir/Ma  
Re: Request for Academic Research Data  
This serves to certify that Mr. Ojo Celestine Jombo is a registered PhD student in Political 
Science at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg campus, South Africa. We request 
you to grant Mr Jombo permission to access scholarly research data from your institution as part 
of the key requirements for his research focusing on “Peculiarities of Executive-Legislative 
Relations in Nigeria’s Presidential System: Insights from Selected States in the Fourth 
Republic.”Weassure you that the information that you provide will be used for scholarly 
research only and in strict compliance with the general principles of research ethics as set by the 
University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
We appreciateyour understanding to oblige Mr. Jombo unfettered access and other necessary 
supports as may be required. Do not hestitate to contact us if there is any clarification you need.  
Thankyou in anticipationof your cooperation and understanding. 
Dr Khondlo Mtshali 
Supervisor 
School of Social Sciences, 
International and Public Affairs Cluster, 
University of KwaZulu-Natal,  
Pietermaritzburg Campus, Scottsville, 3209, 
Email: Mtshali@ukzn.ac.za 
Tel: +27824038876. 
 
Dr Omololu Fagbadebo 
Co-supervisor 
School of Management, IT and Public Governance 
University of KwaZulu-Natal, 
Pietermaritzburg Campus. 
Email: Fagbadebo@ukzn.ac.za 
Tel: +27611533824.  
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Appendix III 
 
Interview Questions for the key informants 
 
For members of the legislature:  
 
1. As a former member of the state legislative assembly, how would you describe your session in 
the assembly?  
 
2. As part of orientation programme for newly elected legislators, can you recollect measures put 
in place to farmiliarise lawmakers with their roles as provided for in the 1999 constitution?  
 
3. Can you say the legislature was often under pressure from their constituents to re-order 
budgetary proposals submitted to it by the executive? Or it was just a way of asserting legislative 
independence over the executive and its agencies?  
 
4. With your experience, what actually constitute impeachable offences for a governor or deputy 
governor?  
5. In real life situation and in your own view, what will ultimately make a state house of 
assembly resolve to hurriedly impeach a state governor or deputy governor?  
 
6. As a former member of the house, how would you respond to insinuations that members of the 
legislature often represent numerous and sometime conflicting interests other than that of their 
constituents? These could range from personal, business or even parochial interests of a sponsor 
or a political godfather.  
 
7. Based on your experience, do you see any role for political parties in the events of recurrent 
face-off between the executive and the legislative branch?  
 
8. What do you think is/are responsible for disagreements, including potentials for conflicts 
between the executive and the legislature in your state?  
 
9. Based on your experience in the legislative process, what plausible measures, do you think, 
are available to promote harmonious relations between the two arms of government?  
 
For principal members of the legislature: 
  
1. As a former principal of the house, can you recollect any matter or issue that the executive 
tried to force on the legislature through undue influence?  
 
2. It is often said the legislature faces myriad of challenges in the discharge of its constitutionally 
assigned duties. As a former principal officer of the house, can you list or identify some of these 
challenges?  
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3. Based on your experience as a former principal officer of the legislature in the state, what is 
your opinion on funding of the legislature? In other words, in your candid opinion, is it under 
funded, adequately funded, or over funded?  
 
4. During your stint in the house, how did legislators react when the executive did not carry out 
resolutions passed at the floor of the house?  
 
5. How would you react to the speculation that some principal officers of the state legislatures 
are often allies of the governor who are financially rewarded for coasting along?  
 
6. Can you recollect any visible role played by your party in times of disagreements or conflicts 
between the two arms?  
 
7. Can you attribute disagreements between the executive and the legislature in your state to 
some peculiar factors? If yes, can you itemise them?  
 
8. Based on your experience in the legislature, what measures can you recommend to improve 
executive-legislative relations in your state?  
 
For members of the executive branch:  
1. As a former legislative aide to the governor, what are the main functions of your office in the 
legislative process?  
 
2. How would describe the relationship between your principal, the governor, and the legislative 
assembly in your state during the period under review?  
 
3. From experience, what did you observe as possible sources of frictions between the assembly 
and your principal?  
 
4. As a member of the executive team working closely with the legislature, what explanations 
can you give on why most resolutions of the house of assembly over activities of the executive 
branch were not implemented or reckoned with?  
 
5. How did your principal, the governor react when you relay sometimes excessive demands of 
the legislators?  
 
6. How did you react to the incessant cases of impeachment of principal officers of the 
legislature by members over allegations of unholy alliance with the executive?  
 
7. As a member of the executive team, can you recollect any visible role played by the party in 
mediating between the two arms of government in times of disagreement or potential conflict?  
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8. Based on your experience, what consequences does executive-legislative rift have on the 
running of government and perhaps political stability of the state?  
 
9. Was there any specific measure(s) taken by your principal to promote harmonious relations 
between the executive and the legislature while in office?  
 
For the principal party officials:  
1. As a party man, how would you describe the relationship between the executive and the 
legislature in your state during the period under review?  
 
2. From experience, what did you observe as potential sources of disagreement between the 
executive and the legislature in your state?  
 
3. As a former party official in the state, what influence did your party has on your members 
holding executive and legislative positions in government?  
 
4. Can you recollect any visible role played by your party in times of disagreements or conflicts 
between the two arms?  
 
5. And what measures did you take as a party to mediate between the two arms of government in 
periods of conflicts or open confrontations? 
 
For respondents from the academia: 
1. As an academic and researcher in the social sciences, can you attribute incessant friction 
between the executive and the legislature to lopsided provisions in the 1999 constitution? 
 
2. From the experience in the field, can you say there are factors that promote harmony and/or 
disharmony between the executive and the legislature in Nigeria’s presidential system? 
 
3. In your own candid view, what implications and consequences do executive-legislative 
gridlocks have on democratic stability and consolidation in Nigeria? 
 
4. In your informed opinion, do you agree that most executive-legislative impasses were as a 
result of continued decline in party supremacy in Nigeria in recent years? 
 
5. What are the plausible measures do you think are available to promote harmonious 
relationships between the two arms of government?    
 
